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A governance 
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transparency 
Algorithmic systems are increasingly being used as part of decision-making 
processes in both the public and private sectors, with potentially significant 
consequences for individuals, organisations and societies as a whole. Algorithmic 
systems in this context refer to the combination of algorithms, data and the 
interface process that together determine the outcomes that affect end users. Many 
types of decisions can be made faster and more efficiently using algorithms. A 
significant factor in the adoption of algorithmic systems for decision-making is their 
capacity to process large amounts of varied data sets (i.e. big data), which can be 
paired with machine learning methods in order to infer statistical models directly 
from the data. The same properties of scale, complexity and autonomous model 
inference however are linked to increasing concerns that many of these systems are 
opaque to the people affected by their use and lack clear explanations for the 
decisions they make. This lack of transparency risks undermining meaningful 
scrutiny and accountability, which is a significant concern when these systems are 
applied as part of decision-making processes that can have a considerable impact 
on people's human rights (e.g. critical safety decisions in autonomous vehicles; 
allocation of health and social service resources, etc.).  
This study develops policy options for the governance of algorithmic transparency 
and accountability, based on an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory 
challenges posed by algorithmic systems. Based on a review and analysis of existing 
proposals for governance of algorithmic systems, a set of four policy options are 
proposed, each of which addresses a different aspect of algorithmic transparency 
and accountability: 1. awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistleblowers; 
2. accountability in public-sector use of algorithmic decision-making; 3. regulatory 
oversight and legal liability; and 4. global coordination for algorithmic governance. 
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Executive summary 
This report presents an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory challenges associated with 
algorithmic transparency and accountability, including a review of existing proposals for the 
governance of algorithmic systems and the current state of development of related standards and 
consideration of the global and human rights dimensions of algorithmic governance. 
Motivation 
Algorithmic systems are increasingly being used as part of decision-making processes with 
potentially significant consequences for individuals, organisations and societies as a whole. When 
used appropriately, with due care and analysis of its impacts on people's lives, algorithmic systems, 
including artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, have great potential to improve human 
rights and democratic society. In order to achieve this however it is vitally necessary to establish 
clear governance frameworks for algorithmic transparency and accountability to make sure that the 
risk and benefits are equitably distributed in a way that does not unduly burden or benefit particular 
sectors of society. There is growing concern that unless appropriate governance frameworks are put 
in place, the opacity of algorithmic systems could lead to situations where individuals are negatively 
impacted because 'the computer says NO', with no recourse to meaningful explanation, a correction 
mechanism, or a way to ascertain faults that could bring about compensatory processes. As with the 
governance of any other aspect of society, the extent of algorithmic accountability required should 
be considered within the context of the good, harm, and risks these systems present.  
Background definitions and drivers for algorithmic transparency and accountability 
The study presents two 'conceptual landscapes' that explore the conceptual roles and uses of 
transparency and accountability in the context of algorithmic systems.  
The primary role of transparency is identified as a tool to enable accountability. If it is not known 
what an organisation is doing, it cannot be held accountable and cannot be regulated. Transparency 
may relate to the data, algorithms, goals, outcomes, compliance, influence and/or usage of 
automated decision making systems (i.e. algorithmic systems), and will often require different levels 
of detail for the general public, regulatory staff, third-party forensic analysts and researchers. The 
degree of transparency of an algorithmic systems often depends on a combination of governance 
processes and technical properties of the system. 
An important difference between transparency and accountability is that accountability is primarily 
a legal and ethical obligation on an individual or organisation to account for its activities, accept 
responsibility for them, and to disclose the results in a transparent manner. The challenges for 
algorithmic accountability arise from: the complex interactions between sub-systems and data 
sources, which might not all be under the control of the same entity; the impossibility of testing 
against all possible conditions when there are no formal proofs for the system's performance; 
difficulties in translating algorithmically derived concepts into human understandable concepts, 
resulting in incorrect interpretations; information asymmetries arising from algorithmic inferences; 
accumulation of many small (individually non-significant) algorithmic decisions; difficult to detect 
injections of adversarial data. 
When considering the governance of both transparency and accountability it is important to keep 
in mind the larger motivating drivers that define what is meant to be achieved. While recognising 
that fairness is an immensely complex concept with different, sometimes competing, definitions it 
is nevertheless seen as a fundamental component underpinning responsible systems and it is 
suggested that algorithmic processes should seek to minimise their potential to be unfair and 
maximise their potential to be fair. Transparency and accountability provide two important ways in 
which this can be achieved. Fairness is discussed through the lens of social justice, highlighting the 
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potential for algorithmic systems to systematically disadvantage, or even discriminate against, 
different social groups and demographics. A series of real life case studies is used to illustrate how 
this lack of fairness can arise, before exploring the consequences that lack of fairness can have plus 
the complexities inherent to trying to achieve fairness in any given societal context. The study 
describes ways in which lack of fairness in the outcomes of algorithmic systems might be caused by 
developmental decision-making and design features embedded at different points in the lifecycle 
of an algorithmic decision making model. A connection is made between the problem of fairness 
and the tools of transparency and accountability, while highlighting the value of responsible 
research and innovation (RRI) approaches to pursuing fairness in algorithmic systems.   
Technical challenges and solutions 
Viewing transparency as 'explaining the steps of the algorithm' is unlikely to lead to an informative 
outcome.  On the one hand, it could result in a description that only captures the general process 
used to make a decision.  At the other extreme would be to provide the complete set of steps taken 
(e.g. the complete detailed algorithm, or the machine learned model.)  While this may enable the 
outcome to be reconstructed (provided the input data was the same), the complexity is such that 
even experts may be unable to provide satisfying explanations as to why a particular result was 
obtained. In order to appreciate the nature of the challenges confronting algorithmic transparency 
and accountability it is necessary to take into consideration the technical properties of algorithmic 
decision systems that can give rise to opacity. Key issues are complexity (linked to scale of data, the 
modularity of algorithms, iterative processing and randomised tiebreaking), the interconnection of 
decisions, and processes that are learned from data. As a result of these issues, simply releasing the 
source code of an algorithmic system would often not provide meaningful transparency.  
There are also other reasons why simply releasing a model (or the learning algorithm and the data) 
is often not a feasible solution to transparency: data privacy could be compromised since it may be 
possible to 'reverse engineer' a model to determine the data used to construct it; continuous, or 
frequently updated, learning to capture and incorporate new data and changing trends also poses 
a challenge. 
There are, however, technical methods for reducing algorithmic opacity, or extracting explanations 
for system behaviour despite a lack of transparency. To consider these, it is helpful to divide 
transparency and explanation into two categories:  Understanding the overall system, and 
understanding a particular outcome.  These may require quite different approaches. A key idea to 
keep in mind is the goal of transparency.  Is it to understand how the system works? Or how it 
behaves?   
For understanding the overall system the goal is to obtain a general understanding of the process 
by which an algorithmic system makes decisions. Approaches include: design/code review; input 
data analysis; statistical analysis of outcomes; and analysis of sensitivity to inputs. One challenge 
with these approaches is that they are likely to be difficult or impossible without the direct 
involvement of system developers.  Or at least provision of a 'sandbox' testing environment. 
Understanding how a system works is likely of little value for the transparency of individual 
outcomes. In that case approaches providing explanation become more important. Systems can be 
designed to provide explanation of the basis of individual outcomes.  This can be either a specific 
design criteria incorporated into the entire system, or accomplished through techniques such as 
sensitivity analysis. 
Meaningful transparency into how outcomes are reached is technically challenging given modern 
computing systems; regulatory requirements for such transparency may significantly limit the 
ability to use advanced computing techniques for regulated purposes.  Meaningful transparency 
into the behaviour of computing systems is feasible, and can provide important benefits.  
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Mechanisms for behavioural transparency may need to be designed into systems, and typically 
require the participation of the developers or operators of systems. 
Technical issues in algorithmic accountability are largely a question if the system behaves according 
to specifications.  Accountability issues such as redress are beyond the technical challenges of the 
algorithm; these are more a question about the actions implied by the specifications.  While 
accountability for actions taken by algorithmic systems may need to be different than for human 
actions, those differences are largely governed by the particular application.  
Governance frameworks 
The review of the governance frameworks of algorithmic transparency and accountability is 
structured hierarchically. It begins from a high-level perspective on fundamental approaches to 
technology governance, then provides a detailed consideration of various categories of governance 
options, and finally reviews specific proposals for governance of algorithmic systems that have been 
discussed in the existing literature.  
At the higher level two aspects are considered, principles vs rules-based approaches and regulation 
related to algorithms as a single regulatory category or rather as a kind of helper technology that 
should be regulated as a component of other technologies. 
Consideration of principles vs rules-based approaches in the context of technology-related 
governance reveals that much of the existing literature/practice focuses on risks-oriented principles-
based approaches. Methods emphasise maximising the benefits and minimising the risks that arise 
from the use of the technology by allocating resources in proportion to risks to society, considering 
both the impacts themselves and the likelihood that they happen, in order to establish appropriate 
levels of control. One common tool used to support risk-based approaches is an impact assessment. 
When considering whether algorithms should be considered as a single regulatory category or, 
rather, as a component of other kinds of technologies, there are arguments in favour of both, but at 
the very least, there would need to be strong coordination between agencies when regulating 
algorithms in order to ensure that lessons learned in developing regulatory solutions for one set of 
algorithms are readily available to other agencies developing solutions to identical or highly similar 
algorithms.  
At the level of governance mechanisms an analysis is made for each of five governance categories: 
demand side market solutions; supply side market solutions; companies' self organisation; branches' 
self-regulation; co-regulation; and state intervention. For each of these a review is made of the 
current practices related to algorithms or associated technologies, and their likely role in governing 
algorithmic transparency and accountability. In brief, it is concluded that both demand and supply 
side market solutions are mostly not effective as regulatory mechanisms for algorithmic 
transparency or accountability. While there is some movement towards self organisation and self-
regulation, much of this appears to be reactive in response to threats to company reputation due to 
media reports from whistleblowers or investigative journalism. Self-regulation at the level of 
industry standards setting has started to take shape, but is still in the development stages. Once 
completed, industry Standards may provide a useful vehicle for co-regulation. At the level of state 
intervention consideration is given to possible roles for: information measures, e.g. public 
algorithmic literacy; incentives by funding and taxes, such as strategic investment to increase 
research into algorithmic methods that are transparent and accountable, as well as 
technical/infrastructure support for investigative tech-journalism; legislative measures; and a 
possible role for a regulatory body.  
Among legislative measures consideration is given to the role of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), concluding that is not likely to be sufficient. Proposals to maintain 'goal and 
outcomes' transparency are noted as a means to provide for third-party auditing, while there is also 
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a suggestion based on applying no-fault/strict tort liability with possible modification of liability 
levels depending on the transparency and criticality of the algorithmic systems. 
Possible roles for a regulatory body include: involvement in standards-setting, along the lines of co-
regulation with the regulatory body involved in monitoring the use of best-practice standards; a 
regulator with powers to intervene ranging from 'light touch' nudging of the algorithm designer by 
means of low-cost incentives to 'hard' intervention by requiring pre-market approval testing.  
Existing governance proposals  
In the review of existing governance proposals for algorithmic systems attention is given to 
proposals on: 'a right to reasonable inferences'; a possible role for consumer protection agencies; 
the establishment of 'an FDA for algorithms'; proposals based on tort liability in combination with 
algorithm certification by a regulatory agency; an algorithmic impact assessment-based proposal 
for accountability of algorithmic systems used by public authorities.  
Development of industry standards 
The development of industry standards relating to algorithmic transparency and accountability 
methods is important in shaping the potential for branch self-regulation, co-regulation and as 
reference for the possible setting of regulatory requirements. The review of the current status of 
standards development in this area however suggests that it will take between 1.5 and four years 
before the first international standards are completed. 
Human rights  
While many in the technical and academic communities discussing algorithmic accountability and 
transparency have framed these in the language of 'ethics', human-rights NGOs and researchers 
have started to pick up these issues as a matter of human rights. In early 2018 the 'Toronto 
Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination in machine learning systems' 
was published with the aim of drawing attention to the relevant and well-established framework of 
international human rights law and standards as binding and actionable laws that provide tangible 
means to protect the human rights of individuals. At implementation level human rights impact 
assessments provide a framework designed to identify the intended and unintended impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights, and the State's ability to protect and fulfil them. 
Global dimensions of algorithmic governance  
As with much of the digital economy, the use of algorithmic systems is characterised by the highly 
cross-border nature and global reach of the services that are built on these technologies. To 
successfully govern algorithmic systems therefore requires global dialogue and collaboration across 
borders and among rich and poor countries to avoid a patchwork of country-specific or regional 
approaches. In the context of the global dialogue attention is drawn to the tensions arising from the 
'winner-takes-all' narrative around the development of artificial intelligence (AI). As a counter point 
however note is made of the global response to the GDPR, with an increasing number of states 
enacting GDPR-inspired data privacy legislation, suggesting that the EU may be well positioned to 
take the lead in establishing a new framework for international coordination for algorithmic 
accountability and transparency. 
Policy options 
Based on the review and analysis of current literature regarding algorithmic transparency and 
accountability, and the successes, failures and challenges of different governance frameworks that 
have been applied to technological developments (especially in ICT), a set of four policy options is 
proposed, each of which addresses a different aspect of algorithmic transparency and 
accountability: 
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1. awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistleblowers; 
2. accountability in public-sector use of algorithmic decision-making; 
3. regulatory oversight and legal liability in the private sector; and 
4. the global dimension of algorithmic governance. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Algorithmic systems are increasingly being used as part of decision-making processes with 
potentially significant consequences for individuals, organisations and societies as a whole. Because 
the ways in which these systems reach their 'conclusions' may reflect or amplify existing biases, or 
may not offer explanations that satisfy our accustomed social and judicial expectations, there is 
growing concern that the traditional frameworks for implementing transparency and accountability 
may not suffice as mechanisms of governance. 
One of the key areas of concern centres around the opacity of algorithmic systems that can be highly 
complex and potentially involve machine learning, by which the system behaviour can come to 
depend not only on design choices at the time of creation but also on the data is it trained on and 
the input that is being evaluated [1, 2]. Unless appropriate governance frameworks are put in place 
there is a real risk that situations may arise where individuals are negatively impacted because 'the 
computer says NO', with no recourse to meaningful explanation, correction mechanism, or way to 
ascertain faults that could bring about compensatory processes [3, 4]. 
When linked with pervasive and automated data collection, where the individual is no longer asked 
to explicitly provide the data that is used by the algorithmic system, it can become difficult or 
impossible for individuals to identify which data were used to reach particular decision outcomes, 
and thus impossible to correct faulty data or assumptions, or to even ascertain if an error was made 
[5, 6, 7].  
An important element of concern is the inherent consequence of algorithmic decision-making 
which implicitly biases social value as being limited to only those things that are measured, since 
algorithmic decision systems can only take into account those things that are measured and fed in 
to the system [8, 9]. If blindly applied without democratic and human rights safeguards, this risks 
driving ever increasing levels of (corporate) surveillance in the name of improved algorithmic 
decision outcomes [10,11]. 
Some voices in the academic/research community are also expressing concern that the current high 
reliance on purely empirical methods (i.e. methods that rely observing responses to sampled test 
data) for evaluating system performance, with no underlying formal model to support the validity 
of the system behaviour, is sacrificing scientific rigour for rapid ad-hoc gains with potential long-
term costs to the reliability of resulting systems [12]. This could be compared to concerns in school 
education about teaching methods that produce students who are increasingly good at taking 
school exams, without truly understanding the material they are being taught. Increased 
requirements for algorithmic transparency and accountability might contribute to greater focus on 
scientifically rigorous algorithm evaluation methods, which could lead to significant gains for the 
future developments in algorithmic systems and Artificial Intelligence [13]. 
At the same time, algorithmic systems are permeating more and more aspects of our lives -- 
handwriting analysis, real-time navigation systems, hurricane prediction, medical diagnosis, 
logistics … -- for the simple reasons that they work better than the systems they are replacing or 
augmenting. As with the governance of any other aspect of our lives, the extent of algorithmic 
accountability required should be considered within the context of goods, harms, and risks these 
systems provide. They require decisions  — made by the appropriate stakeholders —  that involve 
often difficult and particular questions of social goals and values, rights, models of fairness, 
compensatory structures,  risk tolerance, etc. [14, 15, 16] 
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When used appropriately, with due care and analysis of its impacts on people’s lives, algorithmic 
systems, including AI and Machine Learning, have great potential to improve human rights and 
democratic society [17, 18]. In order to achieve this however it is vitally necessary to establish clear 
governance frameworks for algorithmic transparency and accountability to make sure that the risk 
and benefits are equitably distributed in a way that does not unduly burden or benefit particular 
sectors of society [19]. Such frameworks should not assume that transparency by itself is an ultimate 
goal, but is a means to support social values; the governance of AI and Machine Learning should 
therefore also have a tolerance for non-transparent systems when they  bring desirable social 
benefit and carry demonstrably limited and acceptable risks. Transparency is one tool in the 
governance toolbox. As with any tool, it is crucial that its wielder understand its uses, its limitations 
[20], and any trade-offs involved in its use. 
1.2. Scope 
This report reviews possible governance frameworks for accountability and transparency of 
algorithmic systems, including discussion of the challenges and opportunities associated with their 
implementation, based on an assessment of the current status of algorithmic system governance 
and comparison with the governance of other technological systems.  
We view the question to be three dimensional: 1. The multiple points in the process and multiple 
structural elements of algorithmic systems that might be made transparent; 2. The various tools and 
implements by which algorithmic systems can be governed; 3. The benefits, harms, and risks of 
governing or leaving ungoverned any of the first two dimensions. 
The review includes governance frameworks in terms of legal regulatory mechanism (e.g. impact 
assessments and auditing requirements for high-impact systems), internal frameworks at the 
organisational level within public or private sector organisations (e.g. rules governing public 
procurement of algorithmic systems; adoption of industry standards for algorithmic transparency), 
and supporting frameworks for promoting third-party investigatory oversight (e.g. support 
mechanisms for public interest investigative journalism into the use of algorithmic systems). 
1.3. Objective 
Beyond providing an up-to-date review of current and potential governance frameworks for 
algorithmic accountability and transparency, the report aims to provide an understanding of the 
technical challenges and solutions for algorithmic transparency, clarify the relationship between 
accountability/transparency and fairness, and provide recommendations for an algorithmic impact 
assessment metric for assessing the degree of regulatory scrutiny of an algorithmic system that 
would be appropriate/necessary for a particular context of use. 
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2. Methodology and resources used 
The methodology is based on a literature review sourcing primary and secondary scientific 
literature, including white papers, reports from government inquiries and civil-society 
investigations into the current state, and proposed future directions, of algorithmic governance. 
News articles are included as part of the discussion on the role of investigative journalism, as well as 
illustration of perspectives and concerns in the wider population. 
The first step  involved  a review of technical approaches to algorithmic transparency and 
algorithmic accountability, including concepts of accountability by design and remedial 
accountability. The second step included a review of the types and degrees of impact that 
algorithmic systems have on social justice, fair decision-making and the associated technological 
and societal need/limits for algorithmic literacy, transparency, oversight and information symmetry. 
The third step was a review of existing proposals for governance frameworks for algorithmic 
systems, including relevant sections of EU directive/regulations (e.g. GDPR), national laws/proposals 
(e.g. French Digital Republic), local government legislation (e.g. New York City law creating a task 
force to review government use of algorithmic systems) and industry self-regulation (e.g. standards).  
2.1. Resources 
Literature databases: Google Scholar; Web of Science (key phrase searches for 'algorithmic 
governance', co-regulation of technology', 'AI ethics regulation', Algorithmic literacy', Algorithmic 
disclosure'). Key phrase searches were followed by citation and reference based searches. 
Types of literature: Primary Literature and Review papers in Computer Science, Law, Social Science; 
grey literature (Standards documents [e.g. IEEE Standards]; industry reports; media reports [e.g. 
ProPublica COMPAS]; government reports [e.g. French law for the Digital Republic]); 
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3. Synthesis of the research work and findings 
Here we present an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory challenges associated with 
algorithmic transparency and accountability, including a review of existing proposals for 
governance of algorithmic systems, the current state of related Standards development and a 
considerations of the global and human rights dimensions of algorithmic governance. 
We start with definitions for algorithmic transparency and accountability, which are further 
elaborated through two 'conceptual landscapes' that explore the conceptual roles and uses of 
transparency and accountability in the context of algorithmic systems. The underlying motivation 
for a governance framework for algorithmic transparency and accountability is explored further 
through a review of issues regarding algorithmic fairness. Rounding off this background context 
setting is an overview of the technical challenges and possible technical solutions that have been 
identified for algorithmic transparency.  
Our review of the governance of algorithmic transparency and accountability is structured 
hierarchically. We start from a high-level perspective on fundamental approaches to technology 
governance, then provide a detailed consideration of various categories of governance options, and 
finally review specific proposals for governance of algorithmic systems that have been discussed in 
the existing literature. 
In the final two subsections we take a more detailed look at the current state of international 
Standards development related to algorithmic decision-making systems and consider the global 
and human rights dimensions of algorithmic governance. 
3.1. Definitions 
The following concise definitions of 'Transparency' and 'Accountability' are provided for reference 
to clarify the meaning of these key terms as used in this document. 
Transparency - Depending on the type and use of an algorithmic decision system, the desire for 
algorithmic transparency may refer to one, or more of the following aspects: code, logic, model, 
goals (e.g. optimisation targets), decision variables, or some other aspect that is considered to 
provide insight into the way the algorithm performs. Algorithmic system transparency can be 
global, seeking insight into the system behaviour for any kind of input, or local, seeking to explain a 
specific input - output relationship.  
Accountability -  'A set of mechanisms, practices and attributes that sum to a governance structure 
which involves committing to legal and ethical obligations, policies, procedures and mechanism, 
explaining and demonstrating ethical implementation to internal and external stakeholders and 
remedying any failure to act properly' (derived from [21] as used in [22]). 
A more detailed consideration of the nuances and meanings associated with the terms is provided 
in the subsequent 'conceptual landscape' sections. 
3.2. Conceptual landscape 1: The uses  of transparency 
In the context of ensuring responsible development and use of algorithmic systems such that they 
improve human rights and benefit society, transparency is a tool. 
Tools have four properties that are directly relevant to transparency’s use as a mechanism of 
governance of algorithmic systems:  
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1. A tool is valuable not in itself but because of the goals its serves; a can-opener is only useful if 
there are cans to be opened.  
2. No tool is right for every job. Misusing a tool has costs. Even using it appropriately often 
requires trade-offs. 
3. It cannot be simply assumed that it is a matter of indifference who uses the tool.  
So, what is transparency a tool for? What are the limits of its use? What are the costs and trade-offs? 
What others tools might sometimes be better at the job than transparency? 
3.2.1. Transparency of what? 
Transparency is implied by the most basic conception of accountability: if we cannot know what an 
organisation is doing, we cannot hold it accountable, and cannot regulate it. 
But the demand for transparency of algorithmic systems goes beyond that simple and assumed 
sense. We ask for transparent algorithmic systems because they are becoming so central to our lives 
and economies, and yet some of them use models and algorithms the workings of which are too 
complex for the human mind to follow.. While the 'black box' metaphor [23] is clearly evocative of 
this sense of impenetrable mystery of the systems acting upon us, it is important to consider if 
making the box transparent, so that we can see the gears within, is truly what is needed to satisfy 
our concerns with these systems.  Depending on which aspect of an algorithmic system is in 
question, that is usually not what the calls for the transparency really aim at [24]. 
There are seven broad areas of machine learning systems about which transparency might be 
demanded:  
1. Data. The transparency of the data used by the algorithmic system -- in particular by 
machine learning and deep learning algorithms -- can refer to the raw data, to the data’s 
sources, to how the data were preprocessed, to the methods by which it was verified as 
unbiased and representative (including looking for features that are proxies for information 
about protected classes), or to the processes by which the data are updated and the system 
is retrained on them.  
2. Algorithms. The transparency of the systems' algorithms can refer to testing its output 
against inputs for which we know the proper output, reducing the variables to the most 
significant so we can validate them, testing the system with counterfactuals to see if 
prejudicial data is infecting the output, a third party code review, analysis of how the 
algorithms work, inspection of internal and external bug reports, or assurance the software 
development processes are sound. 
3. Goals. Algorithmic systems can also be transparent about their goals. When a system has 
multiple goals, this would mean being transparent about their relative priorities. For 
example, the AI driving autonomous vehicles (AVs) might be aimed at reducing traffic 
fatalities, lowering the AVs’ environmental impact, reducing serious injuries, shortening 
transit times, avoiding property damage, and providing a comfortable ride. A manufacturer 
could be required to be transparent about those goals and their priority.  
4. Outcomes. Manufacturers or operators could be required to be transparent about the 
outcomes of the deployment of their algorithmic systems, including the internal states of 
the system (how worn are the brakes of an AV? how much electricity used?), the effects on 
external systems (how many accidents, or times it’s caused another AV to swerve?), and 
computer-based interactions with other algorithmic systems (what communications with 
other AVs, what data fed into traffic monitoring systems?).  
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5. Compliance. Manufacturers or operators may be required to be transparent about their 
overall compliance  with whatever  transparency requirements have been imposed upon 
them. In many instances, we may insist that these compliance reports are backed by data 
that is inspectable by regulators or the general public. 
6. Influence. Just as the public has an interest in knowing if an article in a newspaper was in 
fact paid for by an interested party, the public may have an interest in knowing if any 
element of the AI process was purposefully bent to favour a particular outcome. For 
example, if a trusted search platform is artificially boosting some results because they were 
paid to, and if it is not flagging that fact to users, users can be manipulated. Regulators might 
want to insist that such influence be conspicuously acknowledged. 
7. Usage. Users may  want to know what personal data a system is using, either to personalise 
outcomes or as data that can train the system to refine it or update it. Knowing what 
personal data is used, they may then want to control that usage, perhaps to make their 
personalised results more accurate, or, more urgently, because they feel that usage violates 
their privacy, even though the data in question may already be a desired part of the system, 
such as a purchase or search history. There are grey areas here as well: collecting 
anonymised, highly detailed information about trips made by autonomous vehicles — how 
often the car brakes or swerves, for example — could be important to optimizing traffic for 
safety or fuel efficiency. Regulators may face some difficult decisions as well as drawing 
relatively obvious lines  
Note that 'transparency' has different meanings in this categorisation. It can mean: access upon 
request to the public or authorised people; public posting of information; direct inspection of 
internal processes; the results of the manufacturer’s or operator’s tests of the system for accuracy 
and fairness; delivery of complete subsystems and their data for testing by authorised people, with 
the results reported to the public or to regulatory bodies; access to computer scientists and 
managers to explain algorithmic or operational processes. 
Transparency is therefore not a single property to be applied blindly to every element of every 
algorithmic system. It should be applied differently to different systems depending upon the nature 
of the algorithmic system, the complex circumstances that lead to the need for governance, and the 
goals of that governance. 
3.2.2. By and for whom? 
Because transparency often, if not always, has costs and risks, it matters who gets to see what 
illuminated. When considering regulating transparency the potential viewers include: 
● Everyone: fully open access to data, algorithms, outcomes, etc. 
● Regulatory staff. 
● Third-party forensic analysts whose reports are made public, made selectively public, or kept 
private. 
● Researchers, possibly limited to those affiliated with accredited organisations and/or 
funding bodies. 
3.2.3. Why transparency? 
We want systems to be transparent not to satisfy idle curiosity, but to help achieve important social 
goals related to accountability: 
We want to inspect an algorithmic system’s data and algorithms to:  
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● Check for bias in the data and algorithms that affects the fairness of the system. (The 
mechanics, costs, and secondary effects are different when checking data vs. algorithms). 
● Check that the system is drawing inferences from relevant and representative data. 
● See if we can learn anything from the machine’s way of connecting and weighting the data 
- perhaps there’s a meaningful correlation we had not been aware of. 
● Look for, and fix, bugs. 
● Guard against malicious/adversarial data injection. 
We want the hierarchy of goals and outcomes to be transparent so: 
● It can be debated and possibly regulated. 
● Regulators and the public can assess how well an algorithmic system has performed relative 
to its goals, and compared to the pre-algorithmic systems it may be replacing or 
supplementing. 
We want an organisation's compliance status to be public so: 
● Regulators can hold the organisation accountable in case of failure. 
● The public can  evaluate the trustworthiness of the organisation, so people can make 
informed decisions as users about the services offered, and so citizens can become better 
informed about the benefits, risks, and trade-offs of algorithmic-based services overall. 
3.2.4. Fit to purpose 
Transparency is not a good in itself, as the struggle for online personal privacy makes evident. 
Transparency of algorithmic systems is not even clearly a prima facie good, that is — a practice that 
does not need any special justification, but does require justification for its denial — for 
transparency of algorithmic systems can have costs associated with it, some of them substantial. 
Potential costs include: 
● Regulatory bodies have to have staff sufficient to oversee compliance. 
● Businesses and other organisations have to create and maintain the processes, code, and 
legal oversight required by the regulatory bodies. 
● Transparency might put justifiable trade secrets at risk. 
● Public access to data can flame interest-driven controversies via the untutored or 
unscrupulous misuse of data [25]. 
● The requirement for transparency can lead to the use of algorithms that are suboptimal for 
their purposes, resulting in what can be serious harms when compared with achievable 
goods.  
● Access to data that seems innocuous can lead to breaches of personal privacy by clever and 
determined hackers. 
● Increased transparency of algorithms can make them easier to hack for malicious purposes. 
Some of these potential costs can be mitigated by choosing where and how transparency 
interventions are necessary. For example, rather than providing direct public access to the data 
being used to train a machine learning system, independent data scientists could examine the data 
in private and publish the conclusions of their forensic research. Transparency is not an absolute 
STOA | Panel for the Future of Science and Technology 
  
8 
good and thus needs to be negotiated depending on its purpose and the balance of benefits and 
costs. 
Such considerations should include an examination of other tools and remedies to achieve the 
desired goals. For example, if a system is producing results that replicate, or even amplify, existing 
biases, allowing the owners of the system to adjust it so that it rights itself might be an acceptable 
solution. This could be done on the basis of transparency of the system’s results, without requiring 
transparency of the data or algorithms used [26]. 
Or, if an individual believes that s/he has been discriminated against by a black-box algorithmic 
system, but there is no evidence of systematic bias, the system might be tested to see if 
discriminatory factors were determinative in that particular outcome. Such testing might not require 
transparency. For example, inputting counterfactual data [27] —  say, a loan application in which 
only a factor is changed at a time —  can identify the impact of possibly prejudicial data without 
requiring full transparency. 
The costs and benefits of requiring transparency therefore should be weighed based on the benefits 
and costs, direct and indirect, of using it, and the availability of alternatives. 
3.2.5. Conclusion 
Transparency is a tool. As with any tool, whether and how it should best be used depends upon:  
● The goals of requiring transparency. 
● Which elements of the process should be made transparent. 
● What type of transparency is most beneficial and least costly. 
● Alternative ways of achieving the goal. 
● A judgement of the potential trade-off between risk and the benefit an AI system could 
bring compared with the system it is replacing or augmenting. 
Transparency is a tool to be used responsibly, which means accepting that applying it means being 
sensitive to the complex contexts in which it is used, and the balance of benefits and harms its use 
inevitably entails. 
3.3. Conceptual landscape 2: Accountability 
Accountability, like transparency, is ultimately a tool. Accountability serves to ensure responsible 
development and use of algorithmic systems such that they improve human rights and benefit 
society [28]. An important difference between transparency and accountability is that accountability 
is primarily a legal and ethical obligation on an individual or organisation to account for its activities, 
accept responsibility for them, and to disclose the results in a transparent manner. Transparency, 
logs of data provenance, code changes and other record keeping are important technical tools but 
ultimately accountability depends on establishing clear chains of responsibility. Accountability 
ultimately lies with a (legal) person [29]. 
In the context of algorithmic systems, the challenges arise from: 
● Complex interactions between sub-systems and data sources, some of which might not be 
under the control of the same entity (e.g. systems relying on data acquired through data 
brokers who rely on data sources that use algorithmic inference to aggregate over 'similar' 
data subjects). 
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● Unexpected outcomes associated with the impossibility of testing against all possible input 
conditions when there are no methods for generating formal proofs for the system’s 
performance. 
● Difficulties in translating algorithmically derived concepts (e.g. clustering algorithm results 
that segment populations based on large numbers of input variables) into human 
understandable concepts (e.g. ethnic affiliation) resulting in incorrect interpretations of the 
meaning of algorithmic results. 
● Information asymmetries arising from algorithmic inferences and black box processes that 
make it all but impossible for data subjects to gage which, potentially false, information 
might have resulted in a particular algorithmic outcome affecting them (including lack of 
knowledge that algorithmic processes were even involved). 
● Ubiquity of (small) algorithmic decisions which, if systematically biased, may accumulate to 
have significant impacts on people even though no single decision would have achieved 
that legal threshold (e.g. impact on personal development due to reinforcement of 
racial/gender stereotypes by algorithmic recommendations). 
● Purposeful injections of adversarial data to fool a system into making errors, often in ways 
that can be very difficult to detect. [30] 
In addition to the basic function of accountability, which is to act as a deterrent to reckless, 
irresponsible or illegal behaviour on the part of humans deploying/using algorithmic systems,  
accountability in algorithmic systems has the potential to generate a self-reflective feedback loop 
for citizens and society, exposing existing biases and power dynamics [31]. 
Andrew Tutt [32] summarised the challenge as follows: 'Even if algorithms were programmed with 
specific attention to well-defined legal norms, it could be extremely difficult to know whether the 
algorithm behaved according to the legal standard or not in any given circumstance'. This is 
highlighted with the following example from [33]: 'Algorithms that engage in discrimination offer a 
good example. Suppose a company used a machine-learning algorithm to screen for promising job 
candidates. That algorithm could end up discriminating on the basis of race, gender, or sexual 
orientation—but tracing the discrimination to a problem with the algorithm could be nearly 
impossible. To be sure, the discrimination could be a result of a bug in the design of the training 
algorithm, or a typo by the programmer, but it could also be because of a problem with the training 
data, a by-product of latent society-wide discrimination accidentally channelled into the algorithm, 
or even no discrimination at all but instead a low-probability event that just happened to be 
observed.'  
In regards to pinpointing human responsibility once illegal or unethical decisions by an algorithmic 
system have been identified, algorithmic system can again pose challenges since they can be 'sliced-
and-diced in a number of ways that many other products are not' [34]. 'A company can sell only an 
algorithm’s code or even give it away. The algorithm could then be copied, modified, customised, 
and reused or put to use in a variety of applications its initial author never could have imagined. 
Figuring out how much responsibility the original developer bears when any particular harm arises 
down the road will be a difficult question. Or consider a second company that sells training data for 
use in developing one’s own learning algorithms, but does not sell any algorithms itself. Depending 
on the algorithm the customer trains, and the use to which the purchaser wishes to put the data, 
the data’s efficacy could be highly variable, and the responsibility of the data seller could be as well. 
Or imagine a third company that sells algorithmic services as a package, but the algorithm it offers 
relies partially or extensively on human interaction when determining its final decisions and outputs 
(e.g., a stock trading algorithm where a human must confirm all of the proposed trades). Divvying 
up responsibility between the algorithm and the human is likely to prove complicated.' [32] 
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Further, as AI systems become more prevalent and more integrated, they will increasing use input 
from other AI systems, perhaps in highly dynamic ways. For example, as autonomous vehicles are 
networked, their decisions may result from the AI embedded in scores or hundreds of vehicles, each 
of which also relies upon independent AI systems providing predictions of micro-weather, traffic 
congestion, pedestrian flow based on local events, etc. Tracing errors and assessing responsibility 
may be surpassingly complex — especially since those errors may arise not from individual sources 
but from the state of transient networks of passing vehicles. 
3.4. Algorithmic Fairness: a guiding purpose for transparency and 
accountability  
Fairness is an immensely complex concept with different, sometimes competing, definitions. In 
contrast to transparency and accountability, we do not suggest that fairness is to be considered as 
a tool to facilitate best practice in algorithmic systems. Rather we see it as a fundamental component 
underpinning responsible systems and suggest that algorithmic processes should seek to minimise 
their potential to be unfair and maximise their potential to be fair. Transparency and accountability 
provide two important ways in which this can be achieved. 
In this section we emphasise the importance of assessing and questioning the fairness of 
algorithmic systems used for decision-making. We discuss fairness through the lens of social justice 
and highlight the potential for algorithmic systems to systematically disadvantage, or even 
discriminate against, different social groups and demographics. We draw on a series of real life case 
studies to illustrate how this lack of fairness can arise and then go on to explore the consequences 
lack of fairness can have plus the complexities inherent to trying to achieve fairness in any given 
societal context. We describe the ways in which lack of fairness in the outcomes of algorithmic 
systems might be caused by developmental decision-making and design features embedded at 
different points in the lifecycle of an AI model. We connect the problem of fairness to the tools of 
transparency and accountability and also highlight the value of responsible research and innovation 
(RRI) [35] approaches to pursuing fairness in algorithmic systems.  
3.4.1. How can we understand algorithmic fairness? 
Fairness is an everyday concept that all of us are able to understand at an intuitive level — at least, 
we usually feel confident about recognizing unfair situations, which, does not mean we have or 
share a coherent idea of fairness. Fairness turns out to be a multi-faceted, and inherently complex 
concept. Given this, it is difficult to articulate in a single definition and may also be subject to 
competing definitions. Fairness reflects the appreciation of a situation based on a set of social 
values, such as promoting equality in society [36]. The assessment of fairness depends on facts, 
events, and goals, and therefore has to be understood as situation or task-specific and necessarily 
addressed within the scope of a practice. Therefore, for the purposes of this report 'fairness' 
appreciates the social effects of algorithms in sociotechnical structures, while considering how case-
specific actions and consequences fit into broad social values. Given the importance of 
understanding fairness within context, we present a series of relevant case studies of recent 
controversies regarding the ‘fair’ operation of algorithms in contemporary society. We then use 
these cases to highlight the core, general issues that require careful attention in discussions of 
fairness in algorithmic systems.   
The concept of fairness in the context of algorithmic implementations appears as a balance between 
the mutual interests, needs and values of different stakeholders affected by the algorithmic 
decision.  However, these will have varying levels of importance depending on the final application 
and purpose. As Friedler et al. [37] claim, it is important to have a stated purpose of a given 
deployment of algorithmic decision-making. The articulated purpose serves both as a benchmark 
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of the algorithmic performance and a legitimizing force, since the relationship between means and 
ends becomes verifiable. 
In this section we are interested in the impact of algorithmic systems on citizens – as individuals and 
collectively at societal level. Therefore, we also understand fairness within the lens of social justice, 
as opposed to individual cases in which there is a perceived imbalance of goods or penalties ('Why 
did she get more cookies than me?), an uneven applications of a rule ('You let him throw the ball out 
of turn'), a case of discrimination based on irrelevant factors that are not subject to rights claims 
('You didn’t pick me for the team even though I’m faster than the person you did pick'), etc. Social 
justice is another complex term with many potential definitions [38, 39, 40, 41, 42]. Broadly speaking, 
over the course of the 20th century it has come to be understood as referring to a framework that 
provides the means to achieve a 'fair distribution of societal goods—tangible and intangible' [43]. 
Discussions of social justice (in academic, policy and public discourses) typically recognise that 
ensuring a fair distribution is complicated by inherent inequalities in contemporary society; there 
are various differences of perspective over the extent to which a fair distribution should 
accommodate for, or attempt to address, such inequalities [44,45]. It has also been pointed out that 
the values of the goods being distributed are themselves part of complex social systems of practice 
and values [46]. In the context of this report it is worth noting that new technologies – regardless of 
their application – are generally dominated by elites such as wealthier social classes and large 
corporations [47]. In the case of algorithmic systems for decision-making, the design and knowledge 
of these systems, access to them and ability to influence them are concentrated into the hands of a 
few. This can be a hindrance to ensuring that they are socially just. Similarly, popular disdain for 
technocratic domination – real or perceived – can also form a serious impediment. 
The following are a number of examples of algorithmic decision-making applications that are most 
urgently driving the pursuit of a governance structure for algorithmic systems. We ask how useful a 
tool transparency could be for addressing these issues. What type of transparency? Applied to which 
parts of the AI system?  
Facial recognition systems 
Facial recognition technologies identify and/or verify human faces from a digital or video image. 
Typically, they work via algorithms that identify facial features from the source image and compare 
them across a dataset. Facial recognition technologies have numerous applications; they are 
particularly used for security purposes, including in policing and national security activities – 
including counter terrorism [48, 49]. In recent years, advances in Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning have increased the capacity and sophistication of these technologies, making them a 
standard part of consumer goods such as the Apple iPhone which lets users 'sign in' with their faces.  
The increasing competency and scalability of this function has given rise to various controversies 
and concerns. In recent years, several companies—including Microsoft and IBM—have been 
criticised for rolling out facial recognition software that is more accurate for some demographics 
than others. Specifically, these systems tend to accurately identify fair-skinned men far more often 
than they identify darker-skinned women [50]. Similarly, controversy arose when Google’s 
automatic photo-tagging software identified many pictures of African Americans as 'gorilla' or 
'monkey' [51]. As discussed later in this section, the cause of these errors is likely to lie in the 
development of the algorithmic models. The models were presumably trained with datasets of 
photos of predominantly white people, and thus had not been trained with sufficient data to 
identify non-white people, particularly women. These inaccuracies have been labelled as 
(re)producing inequalities by a variety of activists [52, 53]. One high-profile campaigner is Joy 
Buolamwini, computer scientist at MIT and founder of the Algorithmic Justice League [54]. Her work 
has prompted multiple companies to release statements addressing criticisms and reform their 
models [55].  
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Publicity about the shortcomings of these services can motivate the service providers to do 
whatever is necessary to fix the problem. Because these are public services, informal outcome 
transparency is likely enough: users and activists can vet the systems [56]. For services that do not 
face the public, such as a facial recognition systems used by police forces to identify criminals or 
dissidents,  requiring forensic analysis of outcomes might be called for [57].  
The inverse of facial recognition is represented by 'deepfake' videos.  In essence, an AI model is 
trained on footage of a celebrity’s face, and can then dynamically superimpose that face onto the 
body of another person, often with a verisimilitude far beyond the prior generation of faked 
celebrity nudes. Deepfakes gained widespread infamy in 2017 when users on the social media 
platform Reddit.com distributed pornographic videos with famous actors’ faces superimposed on 
pornographic actors’ bodies [58]. Forging videos of celebrities in this way raises obvious legal 
concerns about personal data protections, sexual and cyber-harassment, and defamation, and 
copyright. It is also possible that the same technology could be used to forge political speeches and 
soundbites, creating photorealistic videos of politicians doing and saying things that never 
occurred.  For example, researchers at the University of Washington have developed an AI system 
that manipulates the video of a speaker — in their demo, Barack Obama — so that the speaker 
'lipsyncs' whatever audio is provided [59].  
Deepfakes aim at being non-transparent about being deepfakes, as does fake news in general. 
Where a society feels that fakes are degrading trust in public institutions,  that society may demand 
transparency, just as governments might require ads that look like news articles to be labelled as 
ads. This could be a version of influence transparency that does not necessarily require any 
inspection or knowledge of the processes by which the fakes were created, although such 
inspection might be required in order to determine that undue influence has been exercised. 
Search 
In recent years a number of concerns have been expressed that the results of searches made on 
internet search platforms can mirror wider societal stereotypes or prejudices. This is best illustrated 
through examples of image searches. In June 2016 Kabir Alli posted a video of himself conducting 
Google Image searches [60]. He showed that when he searched for images of ‘three white teenagers’ 
this query returned results showing smiling and wholesome looking individuals. By contrast when 
he searched for ‘three black teenagers’ the query returned images of mug shots (see Figure 1a). Also 
in 2016, an MBA student contrasted the results she received for searches of ‘unprofessional’ versus 
‘professional’ hairstyles [61] (see Figure 1b). The images suggested a difference along racial lines. 
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Figure 1: bias in image search results. a) ‘three white teenagers’ vs. ‘three black teenagers’. b) ‘professional 
hairstyles’ 
Commentators have also noticed that image search results reflect gender stereotypes. For instance 
a search for ‘nurses’ will show more women than men and a search for ‘doctors’ more men than 
women [62]. The results for a search for CEO consisted of only 11% women, at a time when 27% of 
CEOs in the USA were female [63]. 
These search algorithms are not creating content but simply ranking the content that already exists 
online. These kinds of stereotyped or prejudicial results are a reflection of existing societal inequities 
expressed in what content is posted, how often it’s linked to, viewed, and tagged by users. 
However, the public’s reliance on search engines as a source of information has raised concerns 
about their influence. Some commentators have argued that search results have the capacity to 
alter users’ perception and reinforce societal prejudices [64]. This in turn leads to questions about 
whether platforms such as Google therefore have a responsibility to monitor the results of their 
search algorithms and ‘correct’ them if necessary. In the section 'Conceptual Landscape I', we have 
referred to this as outcome transparency. 
Algorithmic transparency may also be called for but the problem may not be with the algorithm. 
Plus, there is a clear trade-off here.  Search platforms tend to give little information about exactly 
what criteria their  algorithms use, at least in part because doing so would enable commercial 
interests to 'game' the system, making the results ranking less useful and reliable. Therefore, 
algorithmic transparency can be at odds with the public (and commercial) interest in producing 
reliable, accurate search results. This can be addressed by keeping the algorithmic inspection limited 
to trusted experts who are not permitted to disclose what they learn. This of course also has some 
risks: disclosure by accident or corruption. 
There is another issue with algorithmic transparency when it comes to search engines, however. 
Even when the algorithms can be understood by humans, unless there are relatively clear signs of 
corrupt intent or wilful tampering, the processing of these algorithms are incredibly complex. How 
is the inspection of an algorithm going to lets us predict that fake news is going to slip through or 
women are going to be under-represented in searches for images of professionals? Rigorous testing 
of outcomes is more likely to flag a problem. The service provider could then be required to 
ameliorate the outcomes without requiring algorithmic transparency to the regulators or to the 
public. This is a case where outcome transparency, goals transparency, and influence transparency 
seem likely to be more effective tools than algorithmic transparency. 
Personalised online content 
Personalisation algorithms on online platforms are designed to sift through data in order to supply 
users with content that is apparently most personally relevant and appealing to them. For instance, 
the results of a Google search may be influenced by past searches a user has made; the content and 
order of items in a user’s personal Facebook newsfeed will be shaped by what Facebook’s 
algorithms have calculated is of most interest to that user and Amazon recommends products based 
on past purchases and searches on the platform. Personalisation mechanisms therefore curate and 
shape much of the browsing experience [65]. This can be seen as helpful to online users as it avoids 
them having to sort through the vast amounts of content that are available online and instead 
directs them towards what they might find most useful or interesting [66]. It helps local businesses 
by preferring search results for services within the user’s local vicinity. It also brings many 
advantages to internet companies as it can increase user numbers and drive up purchasing and/or 
advertising revenues [67]. However, concerns have been raised around the ‘gatekeeping’ role 
played by personalisation algorithms [68]. Issues include: 
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● The creation of online echo chambers. On a social network such as Facebook 
personalisation algorithms ensure that we are more likely to see content similar to what we 
have previously ‘liked’ or commented on. This can mean that we repeatedly see content that 
reaffirms our existing views and we are not exposed to anything that might challenge our 
own thinking [65,69]. Recent political events such as the election of Donald Trump to the US 
presidency have led to much debate over the role of echo chambers in modern democratic 
societies [70,71]. 
● The results of personalisation algorithms may be inaccurate and even discriminatory. 
Despite the sophisticated calculations underpinning them, the algorithms that recommend 
or advertise a purchase to us or present us with content we might want to see, might not in 
fact reflect our own interests. This can be an annoyance or distraction. More seriously, 
algorithms might alternatively curate content for different users in ways that can be 
perceived as discriminatory against particular social groups [65,72]. For instance, 
researchers at Carnegie Mellon University [73] ran experimental online searches with various 
simulated user profiles and found that significantly fewer female users than males were 
shown advertisements promising them help getting high paid jobs. Similarly, a researcher 
at Harvard [74] experimented with entering over 2000 names into the Google search 
platform and observing what kinds of advertisements were shown alongside the results of 
the search. The results indicated that searches for names associated with African-Americans 
were more likely to be accompanied by advertisements including the word ‘arrest’ 
(suggesting that the name in the search may be someone who has been arrested in the past) 
than searches for ‘white sounding’ names. 
● Personalisation algorithms function to collate and act on information collected about 
the online user. This means that large amounts of information about individual users might 
be collected. Users are often unaware of the amounts of personal information being 
collected about them [75] or if they are, or become, aware they may feel uncomfortable 
about this, for instance feeling that it constitutes a breach of their privacy [76]. The impact 
of this perception can be seen in the emergence of options to opt out of personalisation 
advertisements on platforms such as Google [77] and the growth of platforms that claim not 
to track you [78,79]. 
These concerns are exacerbated by the opaque nature of most personalisation algorithms and the 
lack of regulation protecting the users [23]. In some cases, providers offer a weak form of algorithmic 
transparency by telling users at least some of what the personalisations are based on — search or 
purchase history, location, etc. — and may provide some control to users about what is considered 
in the algorithmic decisions. For example, Amazon lets users exclude purchases from consideration, 
and Google lets users exclude their search history from the computations (see Figure 2). These are 
all forms of usage transparency.  In the absence of third-party verification of these explanations 
however concerns have been raised that incomplete transparency regarding the reasons for a 
personalisation outcome can be misleading [80]. 
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Figure 2: A portion of Google’s 'Search Settings' page, United States version. 
There are further concerns over the use of targeted advertising in connection to personalised 
content. This is discussed next, in the context of the Cambridge Analytica case.  
Cambridge Analytica (personalisation, privacy and targeted advertising) 
The 2018 ‘Cambridge Analytica’ scandal is a high profile case that highlights particular concerns 
around the impact of personalisation algorithms – in particular where they relate to privacy and 
targeted advertising. 
In 2010, Facebook launched a platform called Open Graph to third-party apps [81]. This allowed 
external developers to create tools that could engage with Facebook users and elicit their consent 
to access certain types of their personal data on the social network. This data might include the 
user’s name, gender, location, birthday, relationship status, political and religious views, educational 
history and, in some instances, their private messages. The tools could also be built to allow access 
to the personal data of the Facebook friends of the original user. 
In 2013 Aleksandr Kogan and his company, Global Science Research created an app called 
‘thisisyourdigitallife’ [82]. The app drew on the Open Graph platform and invited users to answer a 
series of questions in return for receiving a psychological profile. Users were required to give 
permission for their personal data and their friends’ personal data to be collected in order to install 
the app. Around 270,000 users installed it and this enabled Kogan to harvest data from 50 million 
Facebook profiles. 
In 2014 Facebook announced changes that limited developers’ access to user data [83]; these 
changes meant it was no longer possible for a user to give permission for third party access to their 
friends’ data. A former manager at Facebook reported to Bloomberg that before it was discontinued, 
potentially hundreds of thousands of developers were making use of the third party access feature 
[84].   
In 2015 Kogan and Global Science Research (in a breach of Facebook’s policies) sold the personal 
data they had harvested to Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm. The firm used 
methods based on psychometric profiling: data about individuals was collected from a variety of 
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sources and personality profiles of them were created. Once profiled, individuals could be targeted 
with personalised advertisements. These would be highly tailored in terms of content and tone etc. 
to match the preferences of the profiled individual. Cambridge Analytica worked in support of a 
number of high profile campaigns, including Donald Trump’s US presidential campaign and the 
Leave.EU campaign in the UK European Union referendum [85]. 
On 17 March 2018, a whistleblower exposed Cambridge Analytica's use of the harvested Facebook 
data [86]. Subsequent media coverage and public debate has focused on a number of issues, 
including two that are highly relevant to this report: 
● The ethics of the acquisition of personal data. At the time, the use of a third party app to collect 
personal data from a user and his/her friends was allowed by Facebook’s policies. Due to 
lack of usage transparency regarding these data transfers, users could prevent this occurring 
by changing their account privacy settings but, would be unlikely to be aware of the need 
to do this. Similarly, they would have been unlikely to realise that installing the app would 
enable such a large amount of data to be collected. As described above, users are often 
unaware of the extent to which online platforms and other organisations are collecting 
information about them for the purposes of targeted advertising. When they become aware, 
they can often feel that this constitutes a breach of their privacy. Awareness can also have 
an impact on business, with users losing trust in these organisations. For instance, the 
reputation of Facebook has been damaged by the revelation of their apparent willingness 
to allow others to access user data – something which the network has been working to 
address. In this case, Facebook and Cambridge Analytically arguably would have been 
better off being more transparent: CA might have lost some participants, but would not 
have been at the centre of a scandal that ultimately led to the disbanding of the company. 
● The impact and ethics of targeted advertising. There has been much debate over the extent 
to which Cambridge Analytica’s use of targeted advertising helped to secure victory for 
Donald Trump in his presidential campaign [87]. Whilst profiling techniques have been in 
use for a long time, their combination with algorithmically-driven personalised advertising 
is viewed by some as particularly troublesome. This is because, first, it allows a far greater 
reach across a population than other methods and might be (excessively) manipulative as 
individuals are unaware of how much the message of the advertisement has been tailored 
to their perceived preferences. Second, the success of A/B testing is evidence that people 
are susceptible to non-rational persuasion; placing a model to the left of a product might 
result in 2% more clicks than having the model on the right. AI may be able to discover even 
more effective non-rational triggers, which is particularly troublesome in political 
campaigns. Third, the high cost of this form of advertising can advantage wealthier 
campaigns. As a result, concerns have been raised that targeted advertising can damage the 
integrity of democratic institutions and Cambridge Analytica has become a symbol of the 
potential for political actors to make use of AI technologies in psychologically predatory 
ways. Fourth, the use of so called 'dark ads' that are targeted at very specific small groups of 
people raises concerns that they can act as secret messaging that the opposition is unaware 
of and therefore unable to respond to  [88]. This is especially concerning in the case of 
negative messaging in which exaggerated, or even false, depictions of the opposing party 
go unchallenged because they were communicated in secret [89].  
The Cambridge Analytica case is only the most prominent example of the debate over the ethics of 
targeted advertising online. In the business to business context, the lack of transparency of the 
advertising algorithms has led to concerns from companies that the automated bidding and 
allocation process for personalised advertisements has resulted in their products being associated 
with objectionable content. For instance, in 2017 a newspaper investigation revealed that 
advertisements for well-known brands were being placed alongside videos showing extremist 
content and hate speech on the YouTube platform. This risked companies being associated with the 
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content and also a portion of the advertising revenue being passed on the video creators. Following 
the revelations, several companies withdraw their advertisements from the Google network. In 
response Google apologised and pledged to offer greater control to advertisers [90]. 
For these reasons, regulators may consider requiring usage transparency, along with some degree 
of control by users over how their data is used. As always, this will entail trade-offs possibly with the 
overall efficiency of the system overall (not using search histories may make the search algorithms 
less precise; not using automobile data might reduce the effectiveness of safety algorithms) as well 
as the system’s performance for the individuals. 
Algorithm based decision-making in the US criminal justice system 
In the early 2000s the US criminal justice system began using risk assessments to assist decision-
making [91, 92]. These assessments are based on algorithmic calculations to predict, for instance, 
how likely an individual is to re-offend or fail to attend court for sentencing. They are drawn on by 
the courts to help determine whether an individual should be granted bail or how long their 
sentence should be – with ‘low risk’ offenders given shorter sentences and perhaps even kept out 
of jail entirely. Risk assessments are now used across a wide number of states at all stages of the 
legal process [91]. Advocates suggest that they provide an objective measure of offender risk that 
overcomes potential human bias and that they can help to reduce prison overcrowding [93]. Risk 
assessment scores are usually made available to the defendant’s legal team but the criteria through 
which the scores are generated are typically regarded as proprietary to the companies that develop 
them and are not released. 
In 2016 the investigative journalism site ProPublica [93]. published a report which suggested that 
risk assessment algorithms might be both inaccurate and racially biased. Their journalists obtained 
the risk scores of 7000 people arrested in Broward County, Florida [94]. These assessments had been 
generated by a for-profit company called Northpointe using their algorithm, known as COMPAS. 
The risk scores were based on scores derived from 137 questions [93] either answered by defendants 
or pulled from criminal records. These questions related to factors such as personal offender history, 
family offender history, drug taking amongst friends and personal views on offending. Race was not 
one of the questions. ProPublica checked to see how many of the 7000 had been charged with new 
offences in the two year period since their arrest [94]. They found that: 
● Only 20% of those predicted to commit a violent crime had gone on to do so. 
● Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61% went on to be arrested, when misdemeanours 
such as driving with an expired license were included. 
● Black people were almost twice as likely to be falsely labelled as at risk of future offending 
than white people. 
● White people were mislabelled as low risk more often than black people; 
● Even when statistical tests were run to isolate the effect of race from criminal history, 
recidivism, age and gender, black people were still 77% more likely to be labelled as at risk 
of committing a future violent crime than white people and 45% more likely to be labelled 
as at risk of committing any kind of crime. 
Northpointe countered ProPublica's analysis and criticisms [95] by stating that the algorithm was 
racially neutral because it had a 60% rate of accuracy for both white and black people. Since then 
much debate has occurred over what definitions of fairness can be applied to assess algorithms of 
this kind (e.g. [96]). For example, some observers (e.g. [97]) have pointed out that ProPublica claims 
the algorithm is unfair because it is unequally wrong (i.e. more wrong for blacks than white when 
making false positives) whereas Northpointe claim it is fair because it is equally right when 
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predicting recidivism [95]. (These ideas of fairness correspond roughly to 'Equal Opportunity' 
algorithmic fairness [98] and 'Equal Accuracy' fairness [99]).  
In 2016, a defendant who had been given a long prison sentence challenged his sentence on the 
grounds that he and his legal team had not been able to assess the COMPAS algorithm. However, in 
the Loomis vs Wisconsin case the state supreme court rejected the challenge; they reasoned that 
knowledge of the algorithm’s output was a sufficient level of transparency and it was not necessary 
for defendants to know the criteria through which the scores had been calculated [100]. 
Algorithmic risk assessment scores continue to be used in the US to assist with decision-making in 
courts. In 2017 a police constabulary in the UK began to trial the approach using a machine learning 
tool called HART (Harm Assessment Risk Tool) [57]. In written evidence submitted to the UK 
government’s inquiry into Algorithms Used in decision-making [101], the Head of Criminal Justice 
at Durham Constabulary reported that it was too early to make conclusions about the accuracy of 
HART, but research into it is being conducted in order to support evidence based good practice, and 
that the results of this research would be made available. 
As will be discussed later in this section, the case raises a number of crucial points for discussion 
regarding the apparent lack of transparency of the COMPAS algorithm and the lack of opportunity 
to challenge decisions made using it. 
Commentary: understanding unfairness in algorithmic systems 
The case studies provide a useful means to understand the social effects of algorithmic systems for 
decision-making. In particular, they demonstrate the need for clear mechanisms of accountability 
due to their potential to bring about consequences that are detrimental on a number of levels: 
● detrimental to the individual: individual citizens might become the recipients of inaccurate 
decisions (e.g., facial recognition software) or be treated more harshly in comparison to 
others. Where this relates to decisions over, for instance, prison sentences, this can have very 
serious consequences. Individuals might also receive false/misleading/skewed information 
e.g. as a result of online searches and this can alter their perceptions or behaviours, perhaps 
including their voting behaviours. The collection and collation of information necessitated 
by some algorithmic processes might also be considered a breach of privacy. 
● detrimental to groups: where algorithmic processes appear to produce different results for 
different (demographic) groups, this often places some of those groups at a disadvantage. 
For instance, the case studies above suggest that blacks might be more vulnerable than 
whites to longer prison sentences, lack of access to facial recognition technologies, 
stereotyping in online advertisements, and stereotyped/prejudicial representations in 
online searches. This can have further detrimental consequences for those groups if the 
outcomes of those processes reinforce wider societal prejudices. 
● detrimental to society: entire societies are disadvantaged if the outcomes of algorithmic 
processes cannot be relied on to be accurate and/or neutral. Incorrect decisions can have 
societal effects – for instance the wrongful arrest of individuals based on facial recognition 
technologies places a society at risk if actual offenders are overlooked, and stereotyped 
online content risks reinforcing prejudices. Furthermore, these outcomes may lead to loss 
of trust amongst the population as well as concerns that companies utilising these systems 
are allowed too much power. 
Returning to the understanding of fairness outlined above, we can observe that these detrimental 
consequences might be considered unfair. The case studies illustrate that algorithmic processes can 
sometimes have social effects that do not promote equality and do not align with fundamental 
social values. As they also sometimes appear to hinder rather than uphold the equal distribution of 
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societal resources, they might also be considered socially unjust. In particular, we can highlight the 
following social values as potentially undermined through the operation of algorithmic systems for 
decision-making: 
● Equality of opportunity/equality of outcome: if algorithmic systems and/or their outcomes are 
biased, this may block equality of opportunity and/or outcome and systematically 
disadvantage certain social groups. 
● Equity: it has been argued by some [93, 52, 74] that bias in algorithms can be discriminatory, 
where it disadvantages demographic groups with protected characteristics. 
● Freedom of choice. 
● Justice: where citizens feel that algorithms are biased or even discriminatory, this can 
compromise their feeling that they live in a just society. 
● Truth: if algorithmic processes distort reality or present false information as fact, this 
undermines citizens’ ability to determine what is true and to act on it accordingly. 
● Autonomy: citizens’ ability to act and make decisions may be undermined by various 
features of algorithmic processes. They may lack freedom to choose how decisions are made 
about them – e.g. by human vs automated process – or even to know how decisions 
affecting them are being made. Therefore, the lack of transparency and accountability in 
algorithmic systems can be particularly harmful to the societal value of autonomy. 
● Consent: even in instances where individuals are required to give their consent to be subject 
to algorithmic processes, it may be that information is put to them in a way that means they 
are unlikely to be fully aware of what the agreement entails. The Cambridge Analytica case 
is a particular example of this since online users are arguably unlikely to expect that 
agreement to use an online app confers consent to access private messages or the details 
of their friends’ accounts. In general, there is much concern [102] that terms and conditions 
on online platforms etc. are overlong and full of technical terms; even if users read them in 
full they may be hard to understand, meaning that genuine informed consent is unlikely. 
Furthermore, there is also concern regarding the mutability and dynamism of algorithms, 
and how the system of one-time consent to the service, even if regularly updated, cannot 
reflect consenting to data processing algorithms that are constantly tweaked. [e.g. 103] 
● Privacy: privacy is fundamentally linked to consent. A key concern in the expansion of AI’s 
scope is its effects on personal privacy, which is a fundamental human right [104].  
Controversial uses include the integration of facial recognition technologies into public 
spaces and the degree to which advertisements online are personalised to individual users. 
● Trust: if there is a risk that algorithmic processes may have detrimental and/or uneven 
outcomes, this undermines citizens’ feelings of security and trust in the processes 
themselves and in the institutions that utilise them. This can particularly be heightened in 
instances where algorithmic processes are viewed as socially unjust. Further features that 
threaten these values are the absence of transparency and accountability; if citizens cannot 
see how decisions about them are being made and/or do not have opportunities to address 
incorrect decisions, they are less likely to trust and feel secure in these processes. 
Each of these values is closely entwined with understandings of fairness and social justice. Therefore, 
where one or more of the values is undermined, it is possible that protests will arise stating that the 
algorithmic process connected to it is in some way unfair. 
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3.4.2. Sources of unfairness 
Unfairness in algorithmic systems might result from a number of sources. Here we highlight four key 
potential sources: biased values in design, biased training data, biased data, inappropriate 
implementation of an algorithmic system.  
The first type of bias could be described as biased values in design. An algorithm might be 
considered biased if it designed to favour one feature over another. In many cases this might be 
done deliberately and have trivial consequences: for example, at one point Google was thought to 
have reduced the weight it gave to blog posts, presumably to favour more vetted sources [105]. 
However, problems arise when algorithmic systems are applied to social contexts and decisions are 
made regarding which features the algorithm is told to associate with outcomes [106]. In extreme 
cases, developers intentionally construct the model so as to discriminate against certain groups 
and/or favour others, although such cases are presumably rare. A more common scenario is that 
human value judgements and assumptions play an unintentional role. Consider the design of 
software to filter job applications. At the heart of such software are the questions, 'What does a 
qualified candidate’s profile look like?' and 'Who would we want to hire?' The principles that a 
developer decides to use to measure these qualities could introduce bias – however unintentionally. 
For instance, a decision that the software should favour candidates who are also Ivy League and 
Oxbridge graduates would disproportionately advantage white individuals and those from higher 
socio-economic groups. Similar implicit assumptions about what types of individuals seek certain 
professional roles or vote for certain political candidates could also lead to the kinds of controversies 
discussed in the case studies above. In these instance, socio-cultural assumptions are made by 
developers and embedded into the algorithm – a kind of ‘values’ bias. Even where particular 
contentious features are avoided, bias in design might still occur. In the COMPAS case it is known 
that race was not a specific feature included in the algorithm but it is likely that other features that 
were included acted as proxies for race – family history of incarceration, educational history etc. [93]. 
This could be a cause of the different results for black and white populations. 
The absence of transparency can make it difficult to identify and assess the role of bias in algorithm 
design. If it is not known what features have been included in a system and why, it is not possible to 
trace how they might result in the disadvantageous treatment of some individuals or groups in 
comparison to others. By extension, this also makes the problem of bias in algorithm design harder 
to resolve. Goal transparency is also required to make these judgments. 
A second type of bias can also occur during the development of an algorithmic system. This form 
stems from the data used to train the model. Most AI models 'learn' to classify unseen cases based 
on a 'training dataset'; this means there is potential for the model to learn from biased data and then 
reproduce these biases [53]. For example, a job application machine learning system trained on 
current data in many fields would learn that there is a low correlation between being a woman and 
having a job in senior management. It might well then replicate or amplify the problem. A version 
of this bias lies at the heart of the controversies over facial recognition technologies: the 
technologies were less accurate with non-white users because the training dataset did not include 
enough non-white faces for it to learn from. In turn, this oversight can be caused by human bias, 
with developers lacking awareness of the need for diversity. 
The third problem source also relates to biased data. When an algorithmic system has been 
developed and is functioning, its outcomes might be problematic if the data it is working on is 
problematic. This is the problem source of concerns of outcomes of searches on Google and other 
search platforms. As described above, there have been multiple reported concerns over the ways in 
which online searchers appear to reflect, and arguably reinforce, traditional gender and racial 
stereotypes. For instance, a search for images of ‘unprofessional hair’ might show many images of 
black women with natural Afro-Caribbean hair [107]; searches for ‘female football fans’ show very 
sexualised images [108] and searches for ‘three black teenagers’ return images of prison mugshots 
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in contrast to the wholesome images shown in searches for ‘three white teenagers’ [109]. These 
socially biased results are not (necessarily) caused by the algorithm design; instead the algorithms 
driving search platforms work through existing online content and are designed to prioritise 
features such as the popularity, frequency of sharing and metatagging of these existing images. 
These means that stereotyped assumptions about gender and race etc. are evident elsewhere across 
the web and are picked up and reflected by the functioning of the search engine algorithms. So, due 
to biased data these algorithmic systems reproduce and potentially amplify existing societal biases.  
The final area relates to the application or implementation of the model. In this case unfairness 
results not from the design of the model itself but the way in which it is applied. Deepfakes provide 
an excellent example of application bias, in the sense that deepfake pornography could be 
considered another example of online misogyny. Neither the data used to create deepfakes (videos 
of celebrities) nor the algorithm design (common libraries like TensorFlow for image-based machine 
learning) are problematic; the issue arises in how particular—and in this case, rogue—actors apply 
the technology. In another instance the COMPAS case could be argued as the inappropriate 
application of a system as the algorithm was used in broader ways than originally designed for [93]. 
Similarly, sentencing AI might be used to definitively determine sentences, to recommend 
sentences, or to check a judge’s independent decision for bias; the gravity of the unfairness is not 
embedded in the AI but in its use and goals. 
As we can see, the sources of unfairness identified can play a crucial part in reinforcing and 
perpetuating existing discrimination in society, affecting access to available resources and 
opportunities. Addressing these kinds of 'allocative and representational harms' is a main topic of 
initiatives such as the Algorithmic Impact Assessment proposal by AI Now, which we discuss in detail 
in (section 3.10.5.1). 
3.4.3. Opportunities and barriers towards achieving fairness in algorithmic 
systems 
Just as controversies over ‘unfair’ and ‘socially unjust’ algorithmic systems have been the focus of 
much debate in academic, policy and public discourses, attention has also been given to potential 
solutions. Various means to achieve fairness and social justice in algorithms have been suggested. 
As summarised below, they offer valuable opportunities for beneficial change but certain barriers 
exist against them being achieved. 
How to understand fairness? As stated at the start of this section, fairness is a nuanced and 
inconsistent concept open to different interpretations. This can make overall conclusions and 
agreements about accomplishing fairness difficult to reach. Social research indicates [110] that 
when presented with a set of algorithms and asked to select their preferred one to be applied in a 
particular context, participants routinely select the one they feel to be the most fair for that context. 
However, selection differences occur because participants draw on different understandings of 
what constitutes fairness in that instance. In relation to algorithm design, Kleinberg et al. [111] 
observe that it can be impossible to fully accommodate different concepts of fairness 
simultaneously because they are competing rather than compatible. In their work they focused on 
probabilistic risk assignments and formalised three fundamental conditions that might need to be 
satisfied for the assignment to be considered ‘fair’. They found that it was not possible to satisfy all 
three constraints at the same time, except under highly constrained conditions which are unlikely 
to map onto to real world scenarios. They conclude that a way forward is to consider trade-offs that 
can be made between notions of fairness.  
One of the domains that Kleinberg et al. [111] considered is the use of algorithmic decision making 
in the criminal justice system and they note the controversy surrounding the use of COMPAS in the 
US court system. COMPAS provides a highly useful case study to consider the complexities around 
what constitutes fairness. In the public discussions around the apparent bias of the algorithm both 
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ProPublica and Northpointe were able to cite evidence in support of their alternate positions. 
ProPublica argued that the COMPAS algorithm was unfair and potentially discriminatory because it 
carried a higher risk of false positives for blacks. However, Northpointe stated that the algorithm was 
fair because correct predictions of recidivism were equally accurate for whites and blacks. Each 
argument draws on different conceptualisations of fairness: unequally wrong vs equally right.  
In her work on recidivism prediction instruments (RPIs) Alexandra Chouldechova [112] also draws 
on the COMPAS case and makes a distinction between the social and ethical conceptualisation of 
fairness and the statistical concepts underpinning the operation of an algorithm.  She notes that the 
higher false positive and lower false negative rates for black defendants compared to white 
defendants was drawn on by critics of COMPAS as evidence that the algorithm was racially biased 
in its outcomes. However, she finds that this difference was a result of applying an RPI that satisfies 
predictive parity to a population in which recidivism rates differ – i.e. recorded rates of reoffending 
differed between blacks and whites.  In essence, because recidivism rates are uneven across the 
groups it is not possible for the algorithm to simultaneously be both equally right and equally wrong 
for black and white defendants [113]. As a result, disparate impact (i.e. indirect discrimination) 
occurs, in which the RPI have disproportionate negative consequences on one (demographic) 
group. This impact is unintentional and may occur regardless of whether the RPI was designed to 
fulfil specific fairness criteria. The concept of disparate impact/indirect discrimination, and its links 
to GDPR, is discussed further in sections 3.10 and 4.1. 
Similarly, different interpretations can be applied to the issue of search engine results. Search 
algorithms identify existing online content and typically prioritise – that is, give a higher ranking to 
– content that has been viewed most widely by users. By ranking this content higher, they then open 
it up to greater visibility because users are most likely to click on links that are at the top of their 
search results. So search engines have a multiplier effect as they make already highly visible content 
even more visible. This could be seen as an entirely fair process as all content is treated equally at 
the start of the process and sorted through the same criteria. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
the process is unfair as its outcome confers an additional advantage on the content that has been 
viewed most often. So in this case, interpretations on what is fair differ along the lines of equity of 
opportunity vs equity of outcome. These debates become particularly crucial in discussions of how 
to deal with online search results that appear to reinforce stereotyped or prejudicial views. In this 
case, goal transparency can at least help users evaluate the search results presented to them. 
Mittelstadt et al. [35] state that algorithms 'are inescapably value-laden. Operational parameters are 
specified by developers and configured by users with desired outcomes in mind that privilege some 
values and interests over others'. Human values are (often unconsciously) embedded into 
algorithms during the process of design through the decisions of what categories and data to 
include and exclude. As already stated above, these values are highly subjective – what can appear 
‘neutral’ or ‘rational’ to one person can seem unfair or discriminatory to another. So once again these 
subjectivities invoke different understandings of fairness. Given that algorithms have values 
embedded in them, transparency about those values can help users interpret the results, guard 
against biases, choose which systems to rely on, and engage in useful debate about the fairness of 
the outcomes. 
From a practical perspective therefore, it is important to understand that different concepts and 
elements of fairness can conflict. Promoting equity in practice can be directly opposed to promoting 
equality; in many cases, both outcomes can be viewed as socially desirable by different actors. In a 
sense, defining the governing sense of ‘fairness’ is at the heart of many political disputes and is 
required when we operationalise fairness by programming a computer. Given the complexities and 
subjectivities involved, it can be hard to reach consensus in all but the most obviously unfair, 
harmful and discriminatory cases. As a first step toward addressing this issue however there needs 
to be transparency regarding the fact that a choice of choice of fairness measure is taking place. 
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Who is responsible for ensuring fairness? 
Questions arise over where responsibility lies to resolve different forms of unfairness. For example, 
is Google culpable if their algorithm translates the word 'doctor' into the masculine form and 
'secretary' into the feminine form in a language with grammatical gender, even though this results 
from the underlying data and not Google’s algorithm?[114] Is Microsoft responsible when their AI 
chatbot learns the sexist and racist discourse of the internet? In Microsoft’s case [115], they 
apologised but ultimately blamed 'trolls' who attacked their technology, an abdication of 
responsibility despite knowing that such attacks were possible and even highly likely. Should we 
expect governments to legislate for such matters or should we expect industries to pursue best 
practices? Could there be more scope for standards-setters in the industry to be more proactive in 
establishing best practices, rather than apologising after the case while ultimately deflecting 
accountability? Or could users be assumed to have enough awareness of these processes and their 
potential outcomes that they can exercise their own judgement, critical thinking and sense of 
responsible behaviour? 
Multiple sources of unfairness, multiple solutions: Because unfairness in algorithmic systems has 
the potential to arise from a number of sources, there are multiple potential solutions to address it. 
This multiplicity of sources and solutions creates a challenge for ethicists and regulators, because 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ remedy and instead each type of unfairness invites different regulatory 
responses from industry, academia, and policymakers. 
Solutions proposed to address biased design values in the development of algorithms often centre 
on calls for greater transparency in the development process and diversity amongst developers 
[116]. Controversies around biased training data have had an active response, typically focusing on 
efforts to ensure more inclusive datasets [117]. Some academic researchers have begun to take up 
the challenge to actively create training datasets that are more inclusive of different demographic 
groups, especially for automated language and image-related tasks [50]. 
Where the source of unfairness (potentially) lies in the data algorithms work on, several 
commentators have suggested the possibility of adjusting algorithms to accommodate for known 
bias. For instance, search algorithms could be tweaked to avoid ranking online content in a way that 
reflects gender or racial stereotypes etc. [118] or sentencing algorithms could be adjusted to ensure 
different subpopulations are treated evenly, even if their baseline characteristics are skewed. Finally, 
addressing unfairness resulting from the application of algorithmic systems is often discussed in 
terms of ex post facto laws, such as the use of anti-discrimination laws to seek redress against cases 
of systematic unfairness against individuals or groups with protected characteristics [119] or the 
expansion of the General Data Protection Regulation where it provides a ‘right to explanation’ of 
how data is processed [120]. Legislation could address algorithms in general, as an 'Internet Bill of 
Rights', adapting and re-affirming rights in the context of wide-scale algorithmic decision-making; 
this should accommodate legitimate disagreements about the various forms of fairness to bring to 
bear in any particular case.  
Another approach, which doesn’t preclude the previous one, is addressing specific algorithmic 
practices in legislation, as the European Union did with algorithms in High Frequency Trading [121]. 
Regulating the opacity of algorithms, which is mostly established through confidentiality 
agreements, establishing public agencies of oversight and even pushing for sectorial self-regulation 
(as seen in the advertising industry). A good example is New York’s Bill on Algorithmic Accountability 
[122]. The current terms of the proposal seek to establish an agency responsible for fairness, 
accountability and transparency of algorithms that are used by public authorities. Citizens may 
solicit action from the agency in order to seek explanation and eventually contest algorithmically 
driven decisions by those authorities. The agency would also be responsible for policing 
discriminatory practices within algorithmic decision systems and providing information on how an 
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algorithm functions and impacts the city. We return to this proposal in section 3.10.5, which 
discusses the proposal for Algorithmic Impact Assessment in more detail. 
These different suggested solutions inevitably raise debate and are not necessarily simple to achieve 
in technical, practical or procedural terms. While datasets could theoretically be audited or self-
regulated to combat bias resulting from training data, bias resulting from design values is generally 
more subjective and difficult to regulate. In many cases, transparency is neither 'necessary nor 
sufficient' to ascertain whether the values and intent behind an algorithmic system are biased, given 
the legal and social complexities associated with establishing intent. Further, it is not always 
possible to draw a straight line from design values to outcomes, as the COMPAS case clearly 
illustrates. Similarly, there is likely to be disagreement among different parties about the values at 
stake.  One person’s pragmatic efficiency might be another person’s technocratic racism and many 
biased or discriminatory outcomes of algorithmic decision technologies began with good or neutral 
intentions. One person’s fairness that minimises false positives may be another person’s unfairness 
because it does not minimise false negatives. Fairness is complex. 
Industry standards and the risk of fairness as an escape from regulation 
As a consequence of the various controversies arising from the application of algorithmic systems 
for decision-making, there have been calls for industry to take the initiative to develop standards 
and codes of conduct to ensure fair, ethical and socially beneficial practice. Major technology 
companies recognise the importance of having dedicated teams looking into these challenges. 
Facebook’s FAIR [123] is an example of an effort directed exclusively to understanding and 
developing artificial intelligence. Similarly, in June 2018 Google published a set of principles of AI 
use [124]. These are the first steps towards establishing socially-oriented goals for the development 
of technology, as well as benchmarks for their expected behaviour. However, in a recent article, Ben 
Wagner [125] warns of the limitations of these steps by describing ethics in the technology industry 
as an escape from regulation. He states that companies are strongly adhering to the narrative of the 
value of ethics as a means to avoid regulation or to display only minimal self-regulation so as to keep 
just above the threshold for political or legislative intervention. Claiming adhesion to 'ethics' is a way 
for companies to wave the flag of positive or neutral social impacts, without entailing formal 
institutions that could restrict their liberties. 
Given these limitations, a further positive step lies in the development of standards and guidelines 
by industry associations. For example, the IEEE’s Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations in 
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems has published a report [126] on what their 
committees identified as the major debates around artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. 
The report presents issues and candidate solutions in each debate, ranging from General Principle 
to Design. Codes of conduct and standards provide a first-level of rules to orient development and 
deployment of algorithms. The benefits are the quickness and specialisation of such rules, which 
rely solely on industrial and technical consensus, and provide society with formalised institutions 
for the regulation of the activity. This is an important first step for implementation and 
institutionalisation of social values of fairness. One caveat though is that the provision of concrete 
guidance on fairness in algorithmic systems is of course also made difficult by the complexities 
around the various types of fairness.  
3.4.4. A Responsible approach to the design of Algorithms 
It may be that a solution to help facilitate the development of fair algorithms is to ensure a more 
responsible research and innovation process; in particular a more inclusive process.  The field of 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) emerged from concerns surrounding the societal and 
ethical consequences of novel technologies [127]. The notions of responsibility and fairness are core 
aspects of the field, and so could be seen a potential solutions in relation to the design and use of 
algorithms. Central to RRI is to enable an inclusive, reflexive and accountable research and 
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innovation process. This is for the most part achieved through the development of processes and 
mechanisms which ensure the involvement of relevant stakeholders throughout the entirety of the 
research and innovation life cycle [128]. In relation to the development of algorithms this would 
likely involve a contextualised consideration of an algorithm to determine the most relevant 
stakeholders.  Following this determination, mechanisms such as stakeholder workshops and focus 
groups could be integrated into the research and innovation cycle so that stakeholders could share 
their views with developers in a meaningful way.  Importantly, those developing the algorithm 
would take these perspectives and concerns into account and find ways to embed them into their 
ongoing development. This responsible procedure would help ensure that the resulting algorithm 
would be as fair as possible given the real consideration and integration of multiple stakeholder 
viewpoints and concerns. 
 The design and development of algorithms through the lens of RRI would at first glance seem to 
help to mitigate some key issues surrounding algorithms.  In particular this is because problems like 
those that were raised in the earlier case studies would emerge up-stream and thus could be 
addressed in the ongoing development of an algorithm.  Potentially problematic consequences 
such as those related to training data sets, and the engendering of potential bias and discrimination 
would likely be picked up by stakeholders.  However, it is important to point out that undertaking 
such a responsible process would also have its challenges. Firstly, there would likely exist a tension 
between transparency and accessibility to the algorithms.  Issues related to transparency would 
invariably emerge given the proprietary nature of algorithms- how can stakeholders feasibly be 
involved in the development life cycle without concerns surrounding institutional privacy?  
Secondly, even if in the most unlikely of circumstances institutions were to make their algorithms 
transparent, how could these be understood by multiple stakeholders of varying technical literacy?  
How should such information be presented to allow stakeholders to have meaningful discussion?  
Other procedural issues such as fast-paced temporality in development life cycles versus the time it 
would take to assess and include stakeholders viewpoints, as well as costs of including stakeholders 
in the process would also be additional complexities to overcome in relation to this solution.  
3.4.5. Fair vs. Political and Legal 
The discussion around fairness should not be set in isolation of other social systems. It is important 
to understand that fairness is being defined within a set of existing legal and social norms and 
political deliberation.  Therefore, the comprehension of fairness is the simultaneous inquiry of what 
should be the appropriate outcomes of algorithmic decision-making, but also a political debate 
which seeks the establishment of rules of conduct, producing higher order rules which detach 
themselves from the fairness debate. 
In this regard, the first caveat to the discussion of fairness should be its relation with institutionalised 
norms. Mittelstadt et al. [35] have mapped ethical challenges pertaining to algorithmic decision-
making, such as concerns regarding autonomy of AI, discrimination, bias, and opacity of decisions. 
Many of these issues are already addressed by existing rules and laws, for example prohibiting racial 
discrimination and anti-competitive market practices. Fairness orients action towards just 
outcomes, but it has to respect existing social constraints. If a constraint is deemed unfair, it can be 
changed though political discussion, but fairness, as a low-level institution, cannot override higher 
level institutions indiscriminately. 
A second caveat to fairness should be the political effects of algorithmic decision-making. Fairness 
shouldn’t be concerned exclusively with how algorithms are transforming society, for example by 
reinforcing discrimination, but also how these tools can shape social understanding and views. 
Algorithms can affect how information circulates in society, which indirectly affects social views and 
perceptions. This potential shaping of debate can threaten individual liberties, for example 
determining how users are exposed to political propaganda on Facebook. Therefore, fairness 
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shouldn’t be concerned exclusively with material outcomes, but also how algorithms organise 
society in a way that our values are preserved and balanced. 
In this regard, elements such as transparency and accountability are not solely tools for identifying 
and contesting biased decisions, but they are also mechanisms that enable people to ensure the 
absence of threats of unfairness to society. As Rawls [42] describes, justice encompasses an overall 
acceptability that existing institutions generate mutual benefit and cooperation in society. 
Algorithms can be understood as tools that automate and enforce decisions made and encoded by 
the developers.  These decisions are concealed from the user, and accountability and transparency 
enable users to access and take part in the process of agreeing on institutions that will be enforced 
by algorithms. Therefore, mechanisms that promote awareness, recognition and protection of social 
values are an essential part of fairness, since they enable people to participate, trust and ensure the 
reliability of algorithmic decision-making. 
3.4.6. Human vs machine bias 
It is also important not to consider algorithmic (un)fairness in isolation from issues surrounding 
human (un)fairness: more specifically human bias versus machine bias. Many algorithmic systems 
employed in contemporary society were initiated, at least in part, to overcome the shortcomings of 
human decision-making. For instance, the COMPAS algorithm was broadly welcomed when it was 
introduced as it was seen as a means to address the potential for bias in the reasoning of judges 
[129]. Similarly, HR departments increasingly use algorithmic tools to process and filter employment 
applications. Advocates for these systems argue that they save time and reduce human bias, in 
particular they are promised to be 'free from discrimination based on race, colour, religion, gender, 
gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, national origin, genetics, disability, age, or other 
factors unrelated to legitimate business interests' [129]. As already described above, the inherent 
value-laden nature of algorithm development can be seen to undermine such claims to neutrality. 
Furthermore, evaluating whether machines improve human-decision making or are superior to it, 
has proven to be extremely difficult to render visible given issues with selective labelling of data 
[130]. This is, a selection bias problem, where human-decision making usually foreshadows and is 
highly integrated with the use of the algorithm, making it difficult to quantify or measure the impact 
of the machine on decision-making in relation to or compared to the human counterpart. However, 
an important question remains: should we evaluate algorithmic systems against an ideal of perfect 
fairness, or is it enough for them just to be less ‘unfair’ than humans? 
Confidentiality of industrial practices and trade secrets. As noted throughout, lack of 
transparency is a complicating factor in being able to assess the fairness of algorithms and also a 
barrier to ensuring their fairness. This particularly refers to the confidentiality of industrial practices 
and trade secrets. Since confidentiality is the only way of preventing other companies from copying 
algorithms, the protection of its method is directly related to a technology company’s competitive 
edge. Moreover, the exposure of details about the algorithm to society could sabotage the service’s 
own workings, since it would make it easier for users to game the algorithms to their own advantage. 
In legal terms, there is still no satisfactory mechanism that obliges companies to disclose their 
algorithms, without harming competitive strategies while ensuring public scrutiny. There is little 
discussion around changing IP Law in the sense of pressing for disclosure of algorithms in 
confidentiality agreements, though there is important literature demanding the auditability and 
transparency of algorithms [131]. 
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3.5. Technical Challenges for Transparency 
In order to appreciate the nature of the challenges confronting algorithmic transparency and 
accountability it is necessary to take into consideration the technical properties of algorithmic 
decision systems that can give rise to opacity [132]. 
We often think of algorithms as a sequence of steps arriving at an outcome, in the sense of a decision 
tree (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Simple decision tree from U.S. Patent 20180032883: SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP CLASSIFICATION 
BASED ON USER FEATURES [133] 
This suggests that transparency is simple:  explain the algorithm, and it will be clear how the 
outcome is arrived at.  While strictly true, this is a naive view of the way algorithms arrive at 
outcomes.  Some systems (e.g., expert systems [134]) are built this way, and using such a step-by-
step approach may be useful.  But trying to explain outcomes of most modern computing systems 
in this manner would not be productive.  Even ignoring the intellectual property challenges of such 
an approach, disclosing algorithms is unlikely to be effective in providing meaningful transparency. 
Key issues are complexity, interconnection of decisions, and processes that are learned from data.  
We now give some examples of techniques used in algorithms as well as types of algorithms, and 
show how these issues make explanations difficult. 
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3.5.1. Complexity 
Modularity is often used to deal with complexity in algorithms.  Different modules perform different 
parts of a task, and the results are combined to arrive at the final outcome.  While each module may 
be understandable, the complexity arises as they are put together.  For example, a credit scoring 
algorithm may include modules scoring the customer’s ability to pay the total debt load, history of 
payment, likely profitability of a customer, etc.  A consumer's record of prior payment likely goes 
into all of these modules, but how it affects the final credit decision may be less clear.  For example, 
a record of prior payment may help the score based on history of payment, but since this consumes 
income that could be used to pay a new loan, it may decrease the score in a total debt load module. 
This modularity can also be a source of error.  Different modules may actually have fundamentally 
different meanings for the data. For example, in predictive policing some predictors might relate to 
the probability that a specific individual might be a criminal (each coin has a head and a trail side 
giving 50% chance for heads), others relate to the population probability that a certain number of 
people within a group will be criminals (50% of coins have two heads and 50% of coins have two 
tails, but if you take a specific coin it has 100% chance at a specific outcome). The latter gets included 
in the model as if it were the same kind of prediction as the former. 
Iterative algorithms repeatedly run a sequence of steps until the algorithm converges to a stable 
outcome.  A single pass through these steps may provide some insight into the process, but does 
not explain the final decision.  The convergence criteria may give insight into overall goals, but may 
be independent of individual outcomes.  For example, an advertising placement algorithm may 
target maximizing overall revenue through placing a package of ads, but this gives little insight into 
why a particular ad was shown to a particular individual. 
Randomised algorithms may not run the same way every time.  Often the steps to be taken are 
decided by a 'coin flip'.  However, they are typically shown to converge to the same result each time 
(when given the same inputs).  The randomness is introduced not to change the outcome, but to 
overcome problems with computational complexity.  However, the fact that an algorithm may 
achieve the result in a different way each time makes a step-by-step explanation more challenging. 
It should be noted however, that software generated random numbers are typically produce 
through the use of pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) which generate numbers that look 
random but are actually part of a complex, but deterministic, number generation process. The 
number that is generated in this case depends on a seed to initiate the complex PRNG process. A 
common method for changing the seed on successive number generations with a PRNG is to derive 
the seed from a continuously changing input such as the internal clock. If a fixed value is used for 
this PRNG seed, the behaviour and results of the execution of the algorithm can be reproduced. 
3.5.2. Relationship among decisions 
Certain types of algorithms, particularly optimisation, are often used to solve a batch of problems 
simultaneously.  An example would be college admissions, where there are a limited number of slots 
available, and the decision if an applicant should be admitted depends on how they compare to 
other applicants.  This makes explaining any single decision difficult.  Particularly challenging is 
when the problem involves multiple optimisation criteria, for example admitting students not just 
based on a computed 'score', but also based on the likelihood that they will go into particular majors. 
3.5.3. Machine Learning 
Machine Learning applies a very different approach to algorithm development.  The basic approach 
is to build a model based on data.  This model becomes the ``algorithm'' that is used to obtain a final 
result (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Machine Learning Modelling Process [135] 
 
The machine learning algorithm itself gives little insight into the outcome; it only tells how the data 
is used to build the model.  Transparency in the machine learning algorithm thus is of little use.  
What is really needed is an explanation of the model. 
While the model can be viewed as an algorithm, it is typically quite complex, and often functions 
very differently from the way a human would make a decision.  As an example, we can take decision 
tree learning - one of the early types of machine learning, and one of the most straightforward.  
Presumably we could disclose the model (decision tree), and this would provide transparency to the 
outcome.  Unfortunately, machine learned decision trees are rarely as straightforward as that of 
figure 3.  Figure 5 is an example of a decision tree produced using machine learning (the approach 
used is based on Gini coefficient for choosing splitting criteria, and minimum cost complexity 
pruning, see [136] for details). 
Note how we keep coming back to some of the same features at different points (e.g., Uniformity of 
Cell Size, Bare Nuclei.)  The logic behind such decisions is often unclear – and this is a relatively 
simple learned decision tree. 
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Figure 5: Machine-generated decision tree for diagnosing Breast Cancer [132] 
 
Decision trees are a relatively simple model.  One measure of the complexity of a machine learning 
model is the Vapnick-Chervonkis Dimension [137].  The VC dimension of a decision tree is linear in 
the number of nodes in the tree [138].  Modern machine learning techniques, such as deep learning, 
can be much higher - the VC dimension of even a simple neural network with a binary output is 
quadratic in the number of parameters in the network – [139] which for a convolutional network is 
itself quadratic in the number of nodes in the network.  As a result, machine learning models are 
often opaque even to their developers, and releasing the model is unlikely to provide significant 
transparency. 
In addition to the complexity and lack of understandability of a model, there are other reasons why 
simply releasing a model (or the learning algorithm and the data) are not feasible solutions to 
transparency. 
Data Privacy could be compromised.  The data used to train a model is typically similar to that used 
by the model -- and in cases where this is data about individuals, the training data may be protected.  
While this would preclude releasing the data itself (and disclosing the learning algorithm without 
the data provides little transparency into actual decisions), it also poses problems with releasing the 
model.  It may be possible to 'reverse engineer' a model to determine the data used to construct it, 
thus violating privacy [140].  While there are methods to prevent this (e.g., differential privacy [141]), 
using such privacy protection methods can have disadvantages, both in terms of accuracy (although 
the impact on accuracy is debatable [142]), and in complexity of system development. 
Continuous learning also poses a challenge.  In many applications, machine learning models are 
frequently or even continuously updated, to capture and incorporate new data and changing trends 
[143]. Such continuous learning models are increasingly becoming the norm in the industry, with 
machine learning pipelines allowing to the deployment of different models many times a day. While 
conceivably the model used for any particular result could be captured at that time, each model 
would likely require a new explanation.  Given the difficulty of explaining a model, and the likely 
requirement for expert human involvement (at least with current technology), this further 
complicates issues. 
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3.5.4. Conclusions 
Viewing transparency as 'explaining the steps of the algorithm' is unlikely to lead to an informative 
outcome.  On the one hand, we could end up with a description that only captures the general 
process used to make a decision:  An example of such a description, from a patent, is 'The machine 
learning module 250 uses machine learning techniques to train one or more models' and 'Based on 
the input information and the trained models, the socioeconomic group classifier 260 determines a 
probability that the given user belongs to the socioeconomic group.' (e.g., [144].)  This provides little 
insight into how any individual decision is made.  At the other extreme would be to provide the 
complete set of steps taken (e.g., the complete detailed algorithm, or the machine learned model.)  
While this may enable reconstructing the outcome (provided the same input data), the complexity 
is such that even experts may be unable to understand why a particular result was obtained. 
This does not mean that the situation is hopeless.  In the section on Technical Solutions we discuss 
alternative methods to understand the outcomes of algorithms. 
3.6. Technical solutions for reducing opacity 
Just as there can be technical reasons for opacity of algorithmic systems, there are technical 
methods for reducing algorithmic opacity, or extracting explanations for the system behaviour 
despite a lack of transparency. 
First, we divide transparency and explanation into two categories:  Understanding the overall 
system, and understanding a particular outcome.  These may require quite different approaches.  
For each category, we list several approaches, and briefly discuss what each does and does not 
provide. 
A key idea to keep in mind is the goal of transparency.  Is it to understand how the system works? 
Or how it behaves?  From a regulatory viewpoint, a primary issue is likely if the outcome is fair and 
appropriate – behaviour is critical.  The regulatory issues governing process are likely more 
straightforward – GDPR, for example, forbids processing of certain types of personal information 
except in prescribed circumstances.  This simply requires determining if such information is used by 
the system; in cases where use is allowed, the onus could be placed on the developer to explain and 
ensure that such use was proper.  They key challenge, then, is transparency into system behaviour, 
and we should evaluate methods with respect to how they support explanation [145]. 
3.6.1. Understanding the Overall System 
The goal here is to obtain a general understanding of the process by which an algorithmic system 
makes decisions.  One challenge with the approaches described below is that they are likely to be 
difficult or impossible without direct involvement of system developers.   
Design Review / Code Review 
Design and Code reviews are methods from Software Engineering, used to enhance reliability of a 
system being developed and ensure that it satisfies requirements [146]. Various techniques are 
used, such as mapping a specific requirement to the design- and code-level modules that address 
that requirement.  This does provide opportunity for transparency, and research showing that 
traditional code reviews often find issues with code understandability rather than specific defects 
suggest the viability of code reviews for improving transparency [147, 148]. 
Unfortunately, design and code reviews are expensive and time-consuming, and typically operate 
at a level that involves proprietary information.  Furthermore, as noted in the section 3.5.4 , in a 
system using machine learning, this provides little transparency.  The review may show that the 
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process for building the machine learning model is as expected, but provides little insight into what 
that model actually will do. 
Input Data Analysis 
Input data analysis can be used to determine if the data being used to make decisions is appropriate 
and consistent with legal requirements.  The process is to analyse a system at either design or code 
level to determine all information that is provided to a system when making a decision.  This can be 
useful for determining regulatory compliance, e.g., a system that does not have access to race, 
gender, etc. as input may not be capable of direct discrimination, and thus not in violation of GDPR 
Article 9. This provides little insight into system behaviour, but can be a useful step provided issues 
with proprietary information can be resolved. 
Statistical Analysis of Outcomes 
For addressing some concerns, overall analysis of outcomes can be useful.  For example, this can be 
used to identify indirect discrimination:  is a protected group disproportionately affected in a 
negative way?  The challenge is that this often requires obtaining data that would otherwise not be 
used.  For example, a machine learning model may not make use of race or gender (avoiding direct 
discrimination); to store this information anyway conflicts with the principle of data minimisation 
and places more individual data at risk, and requiring this could potentially be considered a violation 
of GDPR Article 11. 
An alternative approach is to create test datasets (either in a protected regulatory environment, or 
using synthetic data) that can be used to evaluate if overall statistical outcomes suggest there are 
issues.  For example, standard statistical evaluation techniques could be used to determine if 
outcomes or accuracy are different for specific subgroups of individuals, suggesting fairness 
problems.  This is particularly useful with static models, although it may be more difficult with 
continuous learning systems. 
One caveat is that absolute standards for what constitutes acceptable statistical outcomes may be 
problematic.  There have been many definitions for fairness proposed, and it has been shown that 
it can be impossible to simultaneously satisfy multiple definitions [37]; any hard requirement on 
fairness may have unintended impacts.  The statistical analysis approach suggested can be useful in 
determining if there are large-scale issues with a system needing further exploration, rather than as 
a specific means of providing transparency into the decision-making process and criteria. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
There is also the opportunity to test systems by providing carefully crafted inputs to better 
understand how the systems react.  For example, providing multiple test cases where only one 
attribute has changed can provide insight into how that attribute is used in an algorithmic decision 
process.  This is particular important for machine learning approaches, where even the developers 
may have little insight into how particular decisions are made [149, 150, 151]. 
While a useful technique, this is by no means complete.  Many algorithms, including most modern 
machine learning approaches, can take into account higher-order interactions between attributes.  
Evaluating all possible multi-way interactions is prohibitive, and as a result, such testing may fail to 
reveal particularly interesting cases.  A potential direction arises in the development of adversarial 
manipulation techniques [152, 153, 154]; these can identify minimal changes that result in a 
different outcome, thus identifying particularly sensitive combinations of inputs. 
A second issue is that care must be taken to distinguish causation from correlation.  While there is a 
growing research literature in making this distinction [155, 156], there are still open questions, and 
as such results need to be used carefully. 
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Algorithmic Accountability 
Technical issues in algorithmic accountability are largely a question if the system behaves according 
to specifications.  Accountability issues such as redress are really beyond the technical challenges of 
the algorithm; these are more a question about the actions implied by the specifications.  While 
accountability for actions taken by algorithmic systems may need to be different than for human 
actions, those differences are largely governed by the particular application.  As a result, this section 
will only look at mechanisms for ensuring that algorithmic systems satisfy specifications. 
Traditional software design processes include design review, code review, and testing procedures 
to ensure algorithmic systems meet specifications [157].  Beyond this, formal verification techniques 
[158] are making significant advances.  Formal verification has been demonstrated on significant 
software artefacts [159, 160], it is likely that these techniques will become part of standard software 
engineering practice [161]. 
A second aspect of accountability is process standards and certification, such as ISO/IC JTC 1/SC7 
standards for software engineering [162], or the Capability Maturity Model Integration  [163].  These 
discuss processes and procedures organisations should follow in systems design.  Within the area of 
algorithmic transparency and accountability, the IEEE P7000 series of standards currently under 
development, particularly IEEE P7001 Transparency of Autonomous Systems [164], may provide 
good options. 
3.6.2. Transparency of Individual Outcomes 
A second type of transparency is understanding a particular outcome.  Here understanding how a 
system works is likely of little value, and approaches providing explanation become more important. 
Input data analysis 
Understanding what data is used to determine an outcome can be useful in establishing confidence 
in the fairness of an individual outcome.  Furthermore, the ability to evaluate correctness of that 
data can identify incorrect outcomes.  GDPR Article 15 already requires that data subjects have 
access to the personal data being processed.  While this does not of itself provide explanation of an 
outcome, it is important to determine if an individual outcome is based on correct or incorrect data.  
Combined with other explanation methods, this provides useful recourse for individuals concerned 
about outcomes. 
There are numerous cases however where access to the data that produced an outcome might not 
be available.  Data is often considered to be a valuable asset that organisations are reluctant to share. 
GDPR for instance does not compel access to non-personal data, e.g. statistical data about large 
population groups, that might have played an important role in a decision. Furthermore, unless 
efforts are put in place to ensure that data is retained, for instance for data audit purposes, it might 
get overwritten by new inputs. A typical example where deliberate efforts are made to retain data 
that would otherwise disappear are flight data recorders. The mandatory inclusion of vehicle data 
recorders in autonomous vehicles has for instance been suggested in order to help future accident 
investigators get access to input data that preceded self-driving car crashes [165, 166]. 
Static explanation 
Systems can be designed to provide explanation of the basis of individual outcomes.  This can be 
either a specific design criteria incorporated into the entire system, or accomplished through 
techniques such as sensitivity analysis. 
Such systems already exist in practice, even without regulatory requirements.  As an example, the 
Fair-Isaac Corporation FICO score, commonly used in financial credit decisions in the United States, 
provides reports to individuals explaining their individual credit score.  These provide 'the top 
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factors that affected your FICO Score 8 from each bureau with a detailed analysis' [167]. Further, 
these factors have to be remediable by the individual; 'You are a woman' is not, but 'You are too 
often late in making your credit card payment' is.   
Design / Code Review and Statistical Analysis 
Techniques such as design and code review are of little direct relevance to understanding an 
individual outcome.  However, disclosing synopses of such reviews can be part of the process of 
setting out 'meaningful information about the logic involved', helping to satisfy GDPR Article 15 
1(h). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As with overall outcomes, sensitivity analysis can be used to determine what has led to a particular 
outcome.  By perturbing inputs — sometimes referred to as testing counterfactuals [27] — and 
evaluating the change in outcomes, insight can be gained into how a particular outcome has been 
arrived at.  The ability to start with a particular set of inputs enables a wide variety of perturbations 
to be tried, potentially even capturing multi-variate factors.  The previously discussed techniques 
for sensitivity analysis to study overall outcomes may provide appropriate starting points for such 
analysis. 
Furthermore enabling sensitivity analysis for individual outcomes provides not only greater 
transparency, but it gives the data subject the opportunity to determine what actions might result 
in a different outcome, or information that can be useful in contesting an outcome.  Such 'what if' 
analyses can provide useful information to individuals, as well as identify fairness issues that require 
further investigation. 
In many cases, this is a tractable approach, for example, in the U.S. Fair-Isaac already offers 
consumers a FICO Score Simulator that shows 'how different financial decisions — like getting a new 
credit card or paying down debt — may affect a FICO® score' [167].  
An example of a powerful, model agnostic, explanation approach for machine learning classifiers 
that uses input feature perturbation-based sensitivity analysis is the LIME (Local Interpretable 
Model-agnostic Explanations) technique [168]. LIME derives an easily interpretable model (e.g. a 
linear regression) that is locally faithful to the machine learning classifier in the vicinity around the 
individual predictions that it is seeking to explain. This is achieved by fitting the simplified model to 
input-output pairs that are generated by the machine classifier for  input sample instances in the 
vicinity of the to-be-explained prediction. 
3.6.3. Reverse engineering the 'Black-Box' - putting it all together 
Reverse engineering the black-box relies on varying the inputs and paying close attention to the 
outputs, until it becomes possible to generate a theory, or at least a story, of how the algorithm 
works, including how it transforms each input into an output, and what kinds of inputs it’s using. 
Sometimes inputs can be partially observable but are not controllable; for instance, when an 
algorithm is being driven off public data but it’s not clear exactly what aspect of that data serves as 
inputs into the algorithm. In general, the observability of the inputs and outputs is a limitation and 
challenge to the use of reverse engineering in practice. There are many algorithms that are not 
public facing, used behind an organisational barrier that makes them difficult to prod. In such cases, 
partial observability (e.g., of outputs) through FOIA, Web-scraping, or something like crowdsourcing 
can still lead to some interesting results [169,170, 171, 172, 173]. 
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3.6.4. Conclusions 
Meaningful transparency into how outcomes are reached is technically challenging given modern 
computing systems; regulatory requirements for such transparency may significantly limit the 
ability to use advanced computing techniques for regulated purposes.  Meaningful transparency 
into the behaviour of computing systems is feasible, and can provide important benefits.  
Mechanisms for behavioural transparency may need to be designed into systems, and typically 
require participation of the developers or operators of systems. 
Fairness, Accountability and Transparency/Explainability are some of the fastest growing research 
areas for algorithmic decision-making systems, and especially machine learning. Not only academic 
funding bodies, but also industry is increasing its investment in this domain. This has resulted in the 
production of an increasing number of open source libraries and tools to help developers address 
Fairness, Accountability and Transparency requirements [e.g. 168, 174, 175]. 
3.7. Collateral implications of imposing Fairness, Accountability 
and/or Transparency requirements 
Here we provide a brief overview of some of the collateral implications (i.e. indirect/secondary 
effects) that may occur when Fairness, Accountability and/or Transparency (FAT) requirements are 
imposed on algorithmic decision-making systems. A detailed analysis of these collateral 
implications however is beyond the scope of the current report. 
Performance tradeoffs 
When applied to the development of an algorithmic system, FAT requirements become additional 
performance criteria that modify the goals of the system optimization. The best optimization 
outcome as defined when including FAT requirement might therefore score lower on the fulfilment 
of the non-FAT system requirements than a system that is optimized without taking the FAT 
requirements into consideration. This is an inherent property that occurs any time a system is 
optimized to satisfy multiple requirements that are not fully independent of each other resulting in 
the need to make tradeoffs (e.g. optimizing the thickness of a motor vehicle chassis to 
simultaneously maximum impact strength and fuel-efficiency requirements inherently leads to 
tradeoffs between them). These kinds of problems are referred to in the literature as multi-
object(ive) optimisation [176, 177, 178]. 
Trust and Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness of algorithmic systems, and trust in algorithmic performance are both vital 
elements for the successful growth in applications of algorithmic systems in both the public and 
private sectors. Both trust and trustworthiness are likely to be enhanced through the application of 
FAT requirement. 
Trustworthiness of algorithmic systems relates to questions of reliability (predicable behaviour in 
normal use conditions), robustness (ability to maintain predictability in unexpected conditions), and 
resilience (ability to recover reliable behaviour after disruption) [179]. Transparency and/or 
explainability of algorithmic systems benefits these trustworthiness factors by helping to better 
understand how the systems behaves beyond the discrete data points provided by 
training/testing/validation trials. Fairness and accountability requirements more indirectly support 
trustworthiness due to the increased rigor of system behaviour inspection that is needed to control 
for fairness and establish accountability. 
Trust in the behaviour of an algorithmic system refers to the human perception of the system as 
being worthy of trust [180]. Judgements of trust can be based on assessments regarding factors 
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such as: the 'reasonableness' of the algorithmic outcomes, which is facilitated by algorithmic 
transparency/explainability; or the perceived ethical values that the service provider built into the 
system, which are expressed through fairness and accountability requirement. 
Enhanced agency for users 
Basic prerequisites for human Agency, i.e. the capacity to make a choice for oneself, are an 
awareness of what is going on and a capacity to meaningfully engage with the process. Compliance 
with FAT requirements will generally decrease the information asymmetry between citizens and 
service providers [181]. 
Impact on cost distribution 
Implementing FAT requirements during system development is likely to require additional efforts 
in system testing/validation and potentially FAT related standards-based certification [182], to name 
just a few of the potential additional development costs. At the same time however, the increase 
rigor in during the system development may result in improved reliability, robustness and/or 
resilience which might reduce maintenance costs. 
3.8. High-level perspective on governance frameworks for 
algorithmic systems 
Regarding fundamental approaches (as opposed to implementations) to governance we will briefly 
review dichotomies between Principles vs. Rules based approaches in the context of technology 
related governance. 
3.8.1. Principles vs. Rules based governance 
Rule-based regulation prescribes in detail how to behave: 'On Dutch highways the speed limit is 120 
km/hour' [183]. Rules provide certainty: when you follow a rule, you know that you will be compliant 
[184]. 
Principle-based regulation formulates norms as guidelines; the exact implementation is left to the 
subject of the norm: 'Drive responsibly when it is snowing' [185]. Principles provide flexibility: 
enables the regulatory regime to have some durability in a rapidly changing environment; and 
enhance regulatory competitiveness. Other stakeholders can benefit from the improved conduct of 
firms as they focus more on improving substantive compliance and achieving outcomes and less on 
simply following procedures, box-ticking or on working out how to avoid the rule in substance 
whilst complying with its form: ‘creative compliance’ [185]. 
Principles based regulation is criticised for failing to provide certainty and predictability and for 
allowing firms to ‘backslide’, and get away with the minimum level of conduct possible; and thus for 
providing inadequate protection to consumers and others [186, 187].  
Most regulatory systems contain a mixture of rules and principles. Rules may become more 
principle-like through the addition of qualifications and exceptions, whereas principles may 
become more rule-like by the addition of best-practices and requirements [188,189]. In legal theory, 
Cunningham [190] uses three dimensions to distinguish between Principles and Rules: 
1. The temporal dimension: Rules define boundaries ex ante, i.e., before adoption and 
implementation, whereas a Principle is settled ex post, when compliance is being audited.  
2. The conceptual dimension: Rules are specific with clearly defined boundaries indicating what is, 
and what is not in scope. Principles by contrast are general, universal and abstract, which can lead 
them to appear ‘relatively vague’ [190]. 
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3. The functional (or discretionary) dimension: Rules are defined by the regulator leaving little room 
for discretionary interpretation. Principles tend to give more space for interpretation to both 
subjects and auditors. 
In addition to the general distinguishing dimensions that apply to Rules based and Principles based 
regulatory systems, [183] highlights an additional four characteristics that apply at the level of single 
rules of principles:' 
4. A declarative representation specifies what situation is required. How this should be achieved is 
left to the discretion of the implementer. Procedural descriptions specify how, i.e. by what actions, 
an objective should be achieved. Generally principles are formulated in a declarative way; typical 
rules are procedural. 
5. What knowledge is needed to apply a regulation? Applying rules requires relatively little 
knowledge. Knowledge of the rule itself and the instantiation of the concepts involved, suffices. 
Applying principles requires more knowledge, such as knowledge of the context and of all other 
relevant principles. 
6. How are exceptions handled? A form of reasoning may be defeasible, in the sense that exceptions 
may occur and overrule the original line of reasoning, or strict, in the sense that no exceptions are 
allowed. This can be modelled in defeasible logic [1]. 
7. To resolve conflicts between different exceptions we will need a kind of priority or- der or weight. 
In other words: for principles there is a conflict resolution mechanism; for rules no conflicts are 
possible.' 
All seven distinguishing characteristics are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Distinguishing characteristics of Rules and Principles by 'dimensions' [183] 
For domains such as algorithmic transparency and accountability where, similar to data privacy, 
application conditions are rapidly and dynamically evolving, governance frameworks that are 
largely principles-based, such as GDPR, are likely to be more resilient to future developments than 
rigid rules based governance. 
In order to avoid the problem of regulatory ‘backsliding’, where organisations get away with the 
minimum level of conduct possible, the regulatory agencies tasked to monitoring, and hence 
interpreting, the principles based regulation need adequate support. 
In addition to being principles based, much of the existing literature/practice on governance of 
technology has focused on a Risks-based approach, i.e. emphasising methods to maximise the 
benefits and minimise the risks that arise from the use of the technology [191] by allocating 
resources in proportion to risks to society (such as health, safety or environmental risks), considering 
both the impacts themselves and the likelihood that they happen, in order to establish appropriate 
levels of control [192]. One common tool used to support risk-based approaches is an impact 
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assessment (e.g. environmental impact assessment [193]). An example impact assessment tool that 
is currently being developed for algorithmic systems is presented in section 3.10.5. 
3.8.2. Governance of algorithmic systems vs. systems with algorithmic 
components 
Most algorithmic systems are not used as stand-alone systems but are part of larger integrated 
devices (e.g. digital personal assistant), services (e.g. credit assessment) or machines (e.g. 
autonomous vehicles). 
Two (not mutually exclusive) ways to consider governance frameworks for these algorithms are: 
1. Regulate the accountability and transparency of the algorithmic system component as 
considered in isolation from the rest of the system it is embedded in. 
2. Regulate the accountability and transparency of the complete system, including the 
algorithmic and non-algorithmic component(s). 
Regarding 1., there is a need to match the accountability / transparency requirement to the: 
● Capabilities of the algorithmic system (e.g. different requirements for adaptive machine 
learning systems than for static decision rules). 
● Domain where it is used (e.g. domain specific certification, i.e. algorithm X is certified to be 
use for product inventory tracking but not for interacting with customers). 
Regarding 2., if the algorithmic system is considered as a component part of a larger system, 
introduction of an algorithmic component into the system must not be allowed to break the existing 
accountability or transparency requirement of the governance framework that applies to the overall 
system [194, 195]. For example, the inclusion of an algorithmic system for optimising parts 
procurement costs within a ‘just-in-time’ production process must not result in a failure to be able 
to trace back the origin of the parts that were used, as is required in order to be able to issue a 
product recall if a fault is detected in the parts from a particular supplier. This principle is already 
applied in various industry sectors, such as aviation where the overall system requirement for 
guarantees on system behaviour is imposing verification, validation, and certification challenges for 
adaptive flight-critical control system software [196]. 
A current challenge to the application of existing regulatory frameworks to systems that are 
significantly changed by the use of new algorithmic components is often a lack of clarity about the 
level of impact that the system has on citizen when a product incorporates algorithmic behaviour. 
For example, vacuum cleaners have traditionally been recognised to pose certain health risks 
through electrocution and possible dispersion of fine matter particles both of which are tested as 
part of the CE certification that vacuum cleaner must pass before being sold within the EEA. How 
does ‘upgrading’ a vacuum cleaner product line through the inclusion of autonomous navigation, 
camera image processing and communication algorithms, i.e. making it into a robot vacuum, 
change the potential for negative impact of the product? Additional tests that need to be applied 
to the robotic system might include issues of cybersecurity and potential for violations of privacy 
associated with the communications features and sensory capabilities of the device. Does the on-
board algorithmic image processing extract only non-privacy sensitive information? Which 
information is sent over the internet? Which information is potentially accessible if the device gets 
hacked? [197] 
The regulatory challenges introduced by the use of algorithmic decision-making as part of products 
or services exhibit similarities to the impact of moving to online digital service provision. In order to 
maintain the principle of 'online and offline equivalence' for legal and moral rights and obligations, 
a need to update existing laws, regulations, and international agreements to assume their 
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application in the digital environment has been observed [198]. Similar updates may be necessary 
in order to maintain a level playing field where services that do, or do not, incorporate algorithmic 
decisions are held equally accountable for outcomes that discriminate, curtail freedom, undermine 
consumers’ legal and moral rights etc. [198]. 
When considering whether algorithms should be considered separately as a single regulatory 
category or instead as a kind of helper technology that should be regulated as component of other 
kinds of technologies, Tutt [32] argues for a separate unified regulatory category on the basis that 
Machine Learning algorithms pose systematic complex challenges that transcend the particular 
technology with which they are associated. The same underlying Machine Learning algorithm could 
be deployed to drive a car and fly an airplane, as in the case of IBM’s Watson could be used to yield 
expert guidance in fields ranging from medicine [199] to finance [200].  
At the very least, there would need to be strong coordination between agencies when regulating 
algorithms in order to ensure that lessons learned in developing regulatory solutions for one set of 
algorithms are readily available to other agencies developing solutions to identical or highly similar 
algorithms. Coordination would also be necessary to provide consistency so that there is clear 
context based reasoning to support when the same algorithm is regulated two different ways 
depending on the application it is deployed in. 
3.9. Governance framework options 
From an institutional perspective, the governance options can be located on five stages of a 
continuum ranging from market mechanisms at the one end, via self-organisation by single 
companies, collective self-regulation by industry branches and co-regulation between state 
authorities and industry to command and control regulation by state authorities at the other [201, 
202, 203]. Table 2 summarises these governance options and their application regarding risks 
associated with algorithms that mediate access to information online (e.g. search engines, news-
feeds) [191].  
 
 
An important additional dimension to the governance landscape that is not explicitly highlighted 
in Table 2 is investigative journalism and associated public opinion shaping activities such as 
whistleblowers and civil-society activism that influence trust/reputation of industry and 
government, thus indirectly impacting on all other forms of governance [204, 205].  
3.9.1. Demand side Market solutions 
Demand side solutions refers to so-called market self-regulation through changes in consumer 
behaviour (citizen or public/private sector institutional clients) that threatens a sufficient loss of 
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customers to motivate changes in provider conduct. In order for demand side market solutions to 
be viable it is imperative that alternative solutions (e.g. competing services) exist. Maintaining a 
plurality of solution providers however can be challenging in these markets due to inherent winner-
takes-all dynamics of 'network-effects' [206, 207, 208, 209]. The performance of personalisation 
algorithms and machine learning systems improves with the number of data points available to the 
system, which is frequently linked to the number of current users [210, 211]. 
Based on current levels of digital literacy/algorithmic awareness and past failures to achieve 
significant demand side market solutions for data privacy and IoT cybersecurity, it seems highly 
unlikely that citizen consumer behaviour will provide a driving force for increased algorithmic 
transparency or accountability [212, 213, 214]. An important contributing factor to the lack of 
consumer action to match their privacy demands are the information and power asymmetries 
between service providers and consumers which often means that citizens are unaware of the 
extent of data collection and algorithmic manipulation they are exposed to [215, 216]. This prevents 
individuals from making the kinds of choice that would normally be expected to lead to market 
pressure for better solutions.  Efforts to inform users through journalism, as well as peer-to-peer 
social networking, could potentially help with this, as it has with other social movements  
Demand side pressure from business customers and/or public procurement are in a better position 
to help shape algorithmic products and services. Large brands like Unilever and Procter & Gamble 
have for instance put pressure on Google/YouTube and Facebook to fix aberrant behaviour of their 
advertising placement algorithms which had resulted in advertising for their brand products getting 
paired with toxic content (e.g. racism, sexism, terrorists hate messages) [217]. For the most part 
however such corporate activism tends to be reactive, responding to public embarrassment, threats 
to their brand reputation, or potential concerns about legal liability; business interests do not always 
align with those of customers or society more broadly 
Demand side market solutions driven by public procurement by contrast are more likely to 
implement proactive approaches based on ethical or societal concerns [218]. When codified as pre-
requisite requirements in order to bid for government contracts these take on the form of co-
regulation. As an example,  impact assessments currently being developed by the Canadian 
government [219] and proposed by AI Now [220] (see section 3.10.5 for detailed discussion) to the 
New York task force for examining automated decision systems used by the city [221] include public 
procurement as a key regulatory implementation mechanism. A weakness of governance based on 
public procurement requirements setting is that such measures are vulnerable to criticism and 
removal on the basis of fiscal responsibility requirements for reducing the cost of public 
procurement at the expense of ethical considerations. 
3.9.2. Supply side Market solutions 
Supply side solutions refers to product/service innovations that aim to capture market share by 
providing solutions or improvements to shortcomings of existing products/services. Examples of 
supply side solutions include: services that implement 'privacy by default' and 'privacy by design' to 
address concerns about data privacy [222, 223] and services designed to avoid filter bubbles and 
bias by integrating elements of serendipity [224, 225, 226].  
In response to mounting number of news articles about algorithmic bias, discrimination and other 
ethical or security dilemmas, as well as increasing numbers of governmental inquiries, task forces 
and reports on these topics, some supply side market solutions are starting to emerge. Primarily 
these solutions are taking the form of algorithm auditing support services such as an 'AI fairness 
toolkit' [227, 228], 'Audit-AI' by Pymetrics [229], Facebook’s 'Fairness Flow' [230] and 'ORCAA' [231] 
an Algorithms Auditing company set up by Cathy O’Neil, acclaimed author of 'Weapons of Math 
Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality And Threatens Democracy' [53].  
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Within the academic research community there has also been an increase in research related to 
algorithmic transparency and accountability, as evidenced by the creation of dedicated conferences 
e.g. FAT* (Fairness, Accountability and Transparency)[232]; AIES (Artificial Intelligence, Ethics and 
Society)[233]. A number of ethics toolkits [e.g. 234, 235], and Use Case based educational material 
[236] are also being developed.  
In order to encourage further development of such supply side solutions, however, it is vital to 
maintain both governmental and journalistic pressure. Corporate investment in the development 
of transparency and accountability of algorithmic systems is still marginal compared to the overall 
investment in the sector. Much of this investment represents a bet by these companies that 
government-mandated transparency/accountability regulations will happen in the near future. 
3.9.3. Companies’ self-organisation 
Self-organisation refers to measures taken by individual companies to reduce risks by measures such 
as company principles and standards that reflect the public interest, internal quality assessment in 
relation to certain risks, and ombudsman schemes to deal with complaints [124, 125, 237, 238]. Self-
organisation is often part of a company’s broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy and 
serves to increase reputation or to avoid reputation loss. 
Company self-organisation on issues of concern regarding algorithmic systems frequently follows a 
similar pattern to the recent developments of supply side market solutions, where action is a 
response to pressures or threats to the company reputation following revelations in the news of 
algorithmic misconduct, or government inquiries that were perceived as threats. In the absence of 
such external pressure, there are hardly any incentives for companies to proactively engage in 
efforts for increasing transparency or accountability of algorithmic systems, unless this can be 
shown to contribute to improved system performance. Public disclosure of information about the 
workings of algorithmic systems is especially sensitive, because such disclosure increases the 
danger of manipulation and imitation. This results in a 'transparency dilemma' [239, 240, 241]. 
Moreover, a company’s reputation-sensitivity affects its willingness for engaging in self-organisation 
measures [201, 242]. Great attention on companies in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets, such as 
Amazon, might promote self-restrictions in the public interest. Little public attention on companies 
in business-to-business (B2B) markets, such as data brokers (e.g. Acxiom, Corelogic and 
Datalogix)[243], reduces the reputation sensitivity and, thus, the incentives for voluntary self-
organisation. 
A more recent development has been an increase in (ex-)employee led activism aimed at changing 
company projects that are perceived to be unethical [244]. Examples include: 
● Internal protest at Google against its involvement with developing AI systems for the 
Pentagon (Project Maven) [245] and its work on a censored search engine for the Chinese 
market (Project Dragonfly) [246], both of which have included resignations and/or threats 
of resignations by employees as well as whistleblowing to the media to generate pressure 
on management. As a result of these actions Google published a code of ethics to govern 
its AI work [247] and cancelled plans to renew its project Maven contract with the Pentagon 
[248]. 
● Ex-Silicon Valley employees speaking up, and forming pressure groups, against the use of 
'addictive design' for smartphone apps and online platforms [249, 250], resulting in projects 
by Google and Apple to offer versions of their phone operating systems that are less 
addictive [251, 252]. 
● Employees at Amazon are demanding that the company stop selling its face recognition 
technology (Rekognition) to law enforcement and cancel to provision of Amazon cloud 
services (AWS) to the big data firm Palantir, which does work for US intelligence agencies 
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and law enforcement [253]. Again a primary means of putting pressure on management is 
through speaking to the media.  
Perhaps due to internal pressure, increasing public awareness, the threat of government regulation, 
and/or a genuine recognition of the issues machine learning poses to social fairness, major 
companies, including Amazon, Facebook, Google [254], IBM [255], and Microsoft, have introduced 
or announced open source tools for detecting systems for bias or unfairness in systems [256]. Some 
have also promulgated principles for the development of AI that supports social values, although 
those principles can be high level and difficult to enforce [e.g. 124]. 
3.9.4. Branches self-regulations 
Typical instruments of industry/branch self-regulation are: codes of conduct [257], organisational 
and technical industry standards [258], quality seals and certification bodies [259], ombudsmen and 
arbitration/mediation boards and ethic committees/commissions [260].  
Codes of conduct, such as those established by professional organisations that include software 
engineering in their remit (e.g. ACM [261], IEEE [262]) provide guidance on high-level principles of 
behaviour for the people who are developing algorithmic systems. For software development, 
however, codes of conduct lack enforcement power since this branch of industry, in contrast to 
medicine or law, is not a regulated profession that requires a license to practice. Many practitioners 
therefore are not member of any professional association. Corporate codes of professional conduct 
may carry the possibility of sanctioning and ultimately loss of the job if they are violated, but the 
degree to which these codes are enforced within organisations can vary widely and is often not 
transparent to external monitoring. Above all however, many of the ethical principles cited in these 
codes of conduct are very abstract and high-level, using language such as 'value alignment', 'shared 
propensity', 'moral responsibility', 'judicial transparency' and 'commitment to bias mitigation' [e.g. 
[263]) which provide little actionable help to practitioners navigating daily ethical problems in 
practice [264] and are subject to interpretation [265]. 
Academia is responding to the identified need for software developers to have a greater 
understanding of ethical and social implications of their work by introducing new courses such as 
'Mind of the Universe – Robots in Society: Blessing or Curse? [266] (TU Delft), 'The Ethics and 
Governance of Artificial Intelligence' [267] (MIT), and 'Artificial Intelligence – Philosophy, Ethics, and 
Impact' [268] (Stanford University). 
Technical and organisational/process standards [269, 270] play an important role in the software 
industry to ensure system interoperability (e.g. web-standards [271]), provide quality (e.g. software 
testing [272] and verification/validation [273]) and security (e.g. information [274] and cyber [275] 
security) control, good documentation (e.g. requirements [276] and user documentation [277]), 
maintenance [e.g. 278], review and audits [e.g. 279], and general IT governance [280]. Areas that are 
currently still under development include standards that expressly address ethical considerations 
[258], including bias [281] and transparency [161], and specific to issues related to artificial 
intelligence and machine learning [282]. We will discuss these ongoing efforts in more detail in 
section 3.11 'Development of Industry Standards relating to algorithmic systems'. 
Software product certification provides a number of potential benefits to developers. It helps to 
establish certainty about or confidence in the software, which may stimulate sales, especially when 
dealing with organisational buyers in sensitive domains, like medical devices/services [283]. 
Certification can also help to verify and certify legislative compliance. Moreover, it can help 
outsourcing partners, the outsourcers as well as the subcontractor, to convince the other party that 
deliverables are acceptable [284]. Nevertheless, while all software goes through debugging and 
testing before deployment, competitive time pressure and cost considerations typically limit 
rigorous standards conformance certification testing to safety/security critical systems in more 
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heavily regulated domains such as medical and aviation applications, financial services and 
cybersecurity. An evaluation of practices for software certification [285] reported that in the case of 
consumer software, being certified to the cybersecurity standard Common Criteria [286], time 
pressure often results in software vendors shipping product releases that are later versions than the 
one being evaluated against the standard. The same study reported that the inherently longer 
development times in the aviation industry meant that concerns about the time that is required for 
performing the certification assessment (in this case the aviation software standard DO-178C [287]) 
was much less of a limiting factor. A number of software product certification models have been 
developed in order to facilitate faster and more cost effective certification that software is 
conformant with specifications [e.g. 284] especially in the context of 'cloud' base Software as a 
Service (SaaS) [e.g. 288, 289]. When it comes to ethical and societal impacts of algorithmic (semi-
)autonomous decision-making systems, however there are as yet no established certification 
models, procedures or services. Partially this is due to a lack of existing standards on these issues to 
certify against. There are signs however that this will change. Cathy O’Neil’s 'ORCAA' Algorithmic 
Auditing Company has recently started to offer 'algorithmic accuracy, bias & fairness' certification 
[258], but certification of algorithmic systems has not yet acquired significant mainstream support.  
Article 42 of the GDPR introduced the idea of voluntary certification for ML systems to demonstrate 
compliance with the regulation — what this report refers to as 'compliance transparency' -- 
although this would primarily certify compliance with data privacy principles, not absence of 
unjustified algorithmic decision bias [290]. Similar certification of algorithmic systems around 'big 
data due process' rights has also been proposed in the US [291,292], with an emphasis on two main 
aspects of algorithmic systems: 
1. Certification of the algorithm as a software object by (a) directly specifying either its design 
specifications or the process of its design, such as the expertise involved (technology-based 
standards) and/or (b) specifying output-related requirements that can be monitored and 
evaluated (performance-based standards).[290] 
2. Certification of the whole person or process using the system (system controller) to make 
decisions, which would consider algorithms as situated in the context of their use.[290] 
The importance of Internal ethics committees is increasingly being acknowledged in the large 
technology companies as part of a response to controversies such as the DeepMind-NHS Royal Free 
health data transfer [293], Microsoft’s 'Tay' chatbot [294] , and the 'Facebook emotion manipulation 
experiment' [295], which led to them to public announce the founding of a coordinated effort to 
develop codes of conduct for ethical AI through the Partnership on AI in September 2016 [296] (also 
including Amazon, Google and IBM). To what extent these ethics committees are having an impact 
on the work that is being done at these companies is difficult to assess from the outside, leading to 
some public frustration about the lack of visible impact of these ethics committees [e.g. 297, 298] 
and concerns that the primary function of ethics committees may in fact be to manage public image 
and avoid government regulation [125]. In  January 2017 the Partnership on AI invited civil rights 
organisations (e.g. ACLU) to join in order to establish a broader multi-stakeholder platform [299]. It 
remains to be seen if the Partnership on AI will be any more effective than the Online Privacy Alliance 
(OPA), a group that formed in the mid-1990s consisting of leading Internet firms [300], to establish 
branch Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies [301]. The Guidelines failed to prohibit the collection 
of sensitive data or protect against harmful uses of data by any means other than an 'opt-out' policy 
[300]. 
3.9.5. Co-regulation 
When backed by government pressure and/or monitoring, industry self-organisation and self-
regulation takes on characteristics of co-regulation. This can either (1) involve objectives that are set 
by the regulatory body with implementation details delegated to industry (e.g. administration of 
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the  'Right to be Forgotten' by Google [302]), or (2) involve a bottom-up approach where industry 
develops and administers its own arrangements, but government provides legislative backing to 
enable the arrangements to be enforced [300,303, 304]. This is the case, for instance, when non-
compulsory rules, such as industry standards, are used as the basis for mandatory conformity 
certification requirements (e.g. CE marking related certification [305, 306]). An example of 
transparency related co-regulation are content information labels such as PEGI games content 
rating [307, 308]. An examples of (failed) accountability related co-regulation is the Safe-Harbour 
Principles for commercial data transfers between the USA and the EU, which was invalidated when 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the company self-certification practices under Safe-
Harbour had failed to provide sufficient privacy safeguards for EU citizens [309, 310]. Due to its 
dependence on implementation by the private sector, co-regulation is only suited to cases where 
fundamental rights or major political choices are not called into question [311]. 
A form of top-down co-regulation which has proven itself to be effective in a number of domains 
are mandatory impact assessments (e.g. environmental impact assessment [312, 313]), where the 
regulator sets assessment criteria which the industry has to include when reporting on their 
assessment of the impact that is to be expected from their activities. GDPR (article 35) includes a 
requirement that when a type of processing using new technologies is 'likely to result in a high risk' 
to the rights of data subjects, then there must be a prior data protection impact assessment (DPIA), 
and under some conditions, consultation with the regulator. As noted by [290], DPIAs can 
potentially have tremendous implications for increasing transparent and accountable design/use of 
Machine Learning based algorithmic systems. A proposal for mandated algorithmic impact 
assessment as part of the procurement process is a major component of a current proposal [220] 
under consideration by the New York City task force that was set up to examine automated decision 
systems used by the city [221] (see section 3.10.5 on Accountability Measures).  
In order for co-regulation to fully address concerns of lack of credibility, transparency, accountability 
effectiveness and enforceability of sanctions, that are frequently associated with self-regulation,  co-
regulation needs to establish certain guarantees and ensure a greater degree of government 
involvement than would be in self-regulation. Such a co-regulatory mechanism would need the 
following components: (1) a more balanced constitution of co-regulatory bodies with the equal 
participation of different partners (government, industry, and users - possibly represented by civil 
society groups), (2) systems that ensure that co-regulatory bodies are accountable to the 
government if they act outside the scope of their competences, (3) a clear, unambiguous legal basis, 
(4) easily accessible arrangements regarding the operation of the co-regulatory bodies, and (5) a 
clear division of tasks and competences between those bodies and the government [314, 315, 316, 
317, 318]. The fact that the state can impose sanctions for non-compliance with established co-
regulatory rules is a major difference between co-regulation and self-regulation [317]. 
Even if certain co-regulatory issues require resolution, a well-structured co-regulatory model has the 
potential to be more effectively enforced since it reduces burdens on personnel and required 
expertise of the regulatory body [319]. 
The counter argument by critics of co-regulation, as reported by [300], is that an 'industry will not 
reveal insider knowledge to regulators but will instead use its informational upper hand to obtain 
weaker standards.' [320] Moreover, the reduction in the public’s opportunity to participate in co-
regulatory initiatives will lead to less creativity, not more [321]. Because collaborative discussions 
often take place outside of the public eye, this system could also facilitate agency 'capture,' whereby 
government begins to pursue industry’s agenda rather than the public’s agenda [320, 321, 322]. 
Furthermore, business representatives may not enforce the rules vigorously [323], and in the 
absence of such enforcement, some firms may free ride on the efforts of others [320]. Established 
firms could also have an unfair advantage in that they could use collaborative negotiations to 
establish standards that discriminate against new entrants [321]. Finally, industry representatives 
who participate in the co-regulatory process will be conflicted because they have a strong 
A governance framework for algorithmic accountability and transparency 
  
45 
incentive—and even a legal obligation to their shareholders—to put bottom-line concerns ahead 
of the public interest [321]. Critics of co-regulation express profound scepticism that this process, 
which gives industry a greater voice in government regulation, will yield improved social outcomes 
[324].' 
3.9.6. State intervention 
Typical state intervention instruments are: information measures to promote people’s awareness 
and knowledge about risks, and to support appropriate behaviour; incentives by subsidies/funding 
(e.g. European Fund for Strategic Investments) and taxes/fees (e.g. alcohol tax); and command-and-
control regulation (e.g. GDPR). An important reason for turning to state intervention instead of fully 
relying on the previously mentioned market led and self-governance solutions are concerns that 
network and scale effects are driving massive concentration in information industries [325, 326, 
327], which removes market led pressures toward self-governance.  
 Information measures  
As previously discussed, one of the contributing reasons for a lack of demand side market pressure 
for accountability in algorithmic decision-making is a lack of understanding by consumers/citizens 
regarding the ways in which algorithmic decision-making is impacting their lives [328, 329, 330, 331, 
332, 333, 334, 335, 336]. The same is true for many highly skilled non-technical professionals, e.g. 
judges and lawyers [337, 338, 339]. Information measures can be conceptualised as consisting of 
two components: 
1. A general understanding (i.e. 'algorithmic literacy') of algorithmic processes and the 
fundamentals of data analytics and machine learning is required in order for algorithmic 
transparency to enable accountability [340, 341, 342]. In the context of algorithmic 
accountability, 'algorithmic literacy' serves to provide users of algorithmic decision-making 
systems (e.g. public and private service providers including judges and doctors) and 
subjects of algorithmic decisions (e.g. citizens, customers and patients) with the basic skills 
necessary to critically evaluate the decisions. Without algorithmic literacy it is unreasonable 
to expect citizens to be able to know how, or when, they should make use of the 
transparency mechanisms  that the GDPR [343, 344] or other laws might confer. Any 
understanding of algorithmic systems in the general, however will do little to provide 
people with the ability to judge the merits of an algorithmic decision unless it is combined 
with some form of public disclosure about the type and properties of the algorithms, data, 
goals, etc.  associated with a specific decision.  
2. Specific information regarding a particular application of algorithmic decision-making is 
required in order to make it possible for citizens, and professionals, to effectively apply their 
'algorithmic literacy'. At a minimum this could take a form of algorithm/data type label 
notification, analogous to nutrition labels [345, 346, 347] or restaurant inspection scores 
[204]. Just as with nutrition labels, however, the level of information disclosure would have 
to be carefully calibrate to avoid problems of information overload [348] or causing 
vulnerabilities to manipulation by malicious actors [349]. Information that is included in a 
'disclosure label' should therefore be limited to that which has the potential to either impact 
an individual user’s decision processes, or wider public understanding of aggregate system 
behaviour [350]. The persistent problems with developing meaningful Privacy Policy 
notifications that clearly communicate data collection and handling information to citizens 
[351, 352, 353] stands as a warning to the challenges of operationalizing 'algorithm 
notifications' [354]. 
3. Since transparency aims not simply at making information available, but rather at making 
that information useful for advancing social aims, attention should be paid to the various 
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audiences for this information, from end-users to experts attached to regulatory bodies with 
regard to  the level of detail, assumptions of expertise, and differing restrictions on access 
and re-use.  
4. To make disclosed information more useful, when possible without violating privacy or 
trade secrets, it should be linked to sources and useful contexts. For example, a top-level 
user-based 'nutrition label' might link the data it presents to their underlying sources. 
Transparency is made more useful, reliable, and trustworthy when it does not lead to an 
information cul-de-sac. 
Incentives by funding and taxes 
Tax incentives, such as those used to boost eco-friendly technologies (e.g. electric cars, solar panels), 
could be used as part of an incentivising structure for promoting the use of transparency and 
accountability-enabling methods such as voluntary certification against transparency standards 
and performance auditing. This could be applied to systems of medium impact which do not qualify 
for investing the resources of regulatory bodies that would be required for monitoring mandatory 
certification. So far there does not appear to be any research into the possible advantages or 
disadvantages of such a scheme.  
A related form of financial incentive is the aforementioned (see Demand Side Market Solutions) use 
of transparency requirements as part of public procurement of algorithmic services.  
Strategic investment funds could be used to boost the development of new algorithmic decision-
making methods that are optimised for explainability and accountable audit trails. This could be 
direct investment in research through Horizon2020 (and its successors), incentivising and 
promoting of research/innovation that solves accountability problems [355]. Some notable efforts 
in the US along this line are the Data Transparency Lab [356] and the DARPA Explainable Artificial 
Intelligence (XAI) project [357]. Part of such a strategic investment could be targeted at developing 
and maintaining an open source library of transparent, explainable and/or auditable algorithms 
with an accompanying repository of training and validation data sets. This could be done analogous 
to existing efforts in the research community, e.g. the International Neuroinformatics Coordinating 
Facility (INCF)[358]. When considering potential malicious use of AI, [359] look towards the 
cybersecurity community for inspiration, suggesting that the EU should financially and legally 
support 'red teaming' (i.e. independent groups that assume an adversarial roles to challenge 
organisations to improve their effectiveness) to actively probe robustness and reliability of 
algorithmic decision-making systems. 
Another area to consider for strategic direct investment would be to provide funding for skills 
training, technical staff and computing infrastructure to support investigative journalism in the 
domain of algorithmic accountability. As was clearly highlighted by the Cambridge Analytica case 
[360],  the controversy around the COMPAS 'recidivism algorithm' used in various US courts [94] and 
many more [e.g. 361, 362, 363], investigative journalism has frequently led the way in highlighting 
the societal implications of automated decisions (see Appendix I). To do this journalists are 
combining interviews, right to information requests, and investigative reporting, with 
computationally intensive methods (like 'black box testing,') [94, 364]. 
Command-and-control regulation - through legislative measures 
Direct regulatory state intervention in the technology space, through legislative measures is often 
resisted by industry due to fears that it will limit the ability to freely explore and innovate novel 
technologies. Market pressures such as dominant business models and investor ‘group think’ may 
however result in 'innovation lock-in' which also limits free innovation and may require external 
pressures, such as government regulation, in order to open up new avenues of innovation [365, 
366]. Prominent examples of this are in ecological technology development such as improved 
A governance framework for algorithmic accountability and transparency 
  
47 
combustion efficiency and alternatives engine types for vehicle engines, which required 
government regulation (e.g. mandated catalytic converters) and subsidies to trigger the 
development of those improvements [367, 368]. It remains to be seen how successful the 
introduction of the GDPR will be for stimulating privacy as an innovation opportunity [369, 370, 371]. 
An important similarity between ecological considerations in engine development, privacy in online 
services and transparency in algorithmic decision-making (as well as cybersecurity for Internet of 
Things) is that despite their importance for societal wellbeing,  they constitute non-functional 
requirements, i.e.  requirements which are not specifically concerned with the functionality of a 
system [372, 373]. In the absence of state regulation, these requirements do not determine the 
ability of the technology to fulfil its primary design function [374]. 
It is tempting to look towards the GDPR (specifically article 22 often referred to as the 'right to an 
explanation', certain provisions of articles 13-15 'rights to ‘meaningful information about the logic 
involved’ in automated decisions' and article 35 'data protection impact assessment') [344] and the 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as means for enforcing algorithmic accountability. Even though 
the exact operationalisation of many of the clauses in the GDPR are yet to be established through 
legal challenges and rulings by the ECJ, various analyses by legal scholars have already pointed out 
that the narrow focus of the GDPR on personal data, combined with built-in restrictions (e.g. article 
22 applies only to 'significant' decisions that were made with 'no meaningful human input') make it 
highly unlikely that the GDPR confers sufficient rights and obligations to enforce transparent and 
accountable algorithmic decision-making [374, 376, 378]. 
Beyond GDPR, the French 'loi pour une Republique numerique' (Digital Republic Act, law no. 2016-
1321)[378] has drawn attention for the way it addresses algorithmic transparency and accountability 
[290]. The Digital Republic Act gives a right to an explanation for administrative algorithmic 
decisions made about individuals (so does not apply to the private sector), specifying that in the 
case of decisions based on algorithmic treatment (note that this includes decisions that are not fully 
automated but only involve algorithmic recommendations), the rules that define that treatment and 
its 'principal characteristics' must be communicated upon request. Further details were added by 
decree in March 2017 (R311-3-1-2) elaborating that the administration shall provide information 
about: 
1. The degree and the mode of contribution of the algorithmic processing to the decision-
making. 
2. The data processed and its source. 
3. The treatment parameters and, where appropriate, their weighting, applied to the situation 
of the person concerned.  
4. The operations carried out by the treatment. 
The analysis by [290] draws special attention to point 3 (above), which seems to imply the 
explanation must be of a particular decision (subject-based explanation) rather than a general 
overview of a complex model (model-based explanation). Such a focus on only the area 'local' to a 
specific query vastly simplifies the system that needs to be explained [379], which unlike the 
complexity of an entire network, might display recognisable patterns [380]. Knowing how particular 
factors (or 'features,' in machine learning terms)  are weighted may help explain systems, but they 
are by no means a complete fast track to interpretability. There are at least two occasions when a 
court might say that weights are not useful for explaining a decision to a human user, and therefore, 
it is not appropriate to order disclosure. These are when the weighted inputs do not map to any real-
world features the user will find intelligible and, in older or restricted systems, where retrofitting an 
explanation system is infeasible [290]. 
Several experts have proposed the use of counterfactuals as a way to assess the fairness of machine 
learning systems without requiring explanations. With this technique, inputs with only small 
differences in their data are run through the system as a way of isolating the effect of particular 
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features. If, for example, two job applications are run through the system that differ only in the 
gender of the applicant, or only in that the applicant's name is changed from one typical of white 
Americans and the other with African-Americans, if the outcome is significantly different, then the 
system can be presumed to be biased without having to perform a full forensic analysis. [27, 145]  
Another alternative focuses on goal and outcome transparency: the organisation managing a system 
announces what it is being optimised for, and the results of the system are monitored and possibly 
publicly announced; failure to meet the objectives should trigger remedial action by the 
organisation. This is in fact the default for AI that is not making classifications or predictions that 
have an immediate impact on fairness. For example, a recent project was able to predict 
cardiovascular risks from retinal scans, using  'deep learning,' a type of machine learning that can be 
even less amenable to demands for explanations [381]. If such a system were put into practice, the 
goal presumably would be that it diagnose those risk factors more accurately than human experts 
do; that goal would have to be more completely specified in terms of the levels of false positives 
and false negatives. If it achieves those goals, then the other forms of transparency seem 
unnecessary. Even if, hypothetically, the system were to turn out to assess cardiovascular risk more 
accurately than human experts for white patients, but dramatically less accurately than human 
experts for people of colour, we might still want to allow it to be used on white patients while a fix 
— which might not involve finding an explanation — is devised to make it useful for all people. If 
no such fix were found,  a social decision would have to be made about whether we want to 
continue to use the system on white people. Note that this entire hypothetical scenario has played 
out with only goal and outcome transparency at play. The situation becomes more complicated in 
cases where particular categories of people bear a disproportionate weight of harm. For example, 
we might use goal transparency to ensure that autonomous vehicles are achieving social objectives 
such as reducing traffic fatalities and  lowering the environmental impact of cars. But if those goals 
are being met, but the fatalities are born by a disproportionate percentage of poor people or people 
of colour, as an example, we are unlikely to solve the problem by prohibiting those categories of 
people from using AVs. Thus the regulatory disposition of the situation will be different. 
Nevertheless, if the inequity in the outcomes can be fixed without explanations, then this is a case 
where goal and outcome transparency may be judged to be sufficient. As one recent article 
summarised the idea: '1. AI systems ought to be required to declare what they are optimised for. 2. 
The optimisations of systems that significantly affect the public ought to be decided not by the 
companies creating those systems but by bodies representing the public’s interests. 3. 
Optimisations always also need to support critical societal values, such as fairness.'[382]  
An alternative approach to algorithmic accountability that has been proposed by various legal 
scholars, in order to provide citizens with recourse to compensation in the absence of algorithmic 
transparency, is to apply No-Fault/Strict Liability to algorithmic decisions [383, 384, 385]. In order for 
a subject of algorithmic decisions to receive compensation under a regime of Strict Liability, the 
citizen would only need to show that harm had occurred (e.g. they were denied an insurance), but 
would not have to prove that the algorithmic decision had been faulty (hence ‘no-fault liability’). 
Applying Strict Liability to algorithmic decision-making reverses the burden of proof, placing 
pressure on the organisations developing and/or using algorithmic decision-making systems to 
implement algorithmic transparency in order to prove that their system was not at fault (e.g. prove 
that the insurance was denied on valid grounds). 
Command-and-control regulation - through regulatory bodies 
A detailed analysis of the possible roles of a regulatory body for algorithmic systems is presented in 
[32]. These roles can be summarised as acting as: 
1. Standards-setting body, possibly coordinating with Standards Setting Organisations to 
develop classifications of algorithmic complexity, performance-, design- , and liability-
standards and best practices [386]. The algorithm complexity classification (reflecting 
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characteristics such as predictability and explainability) could serve to set the level of 
required regulatory scrutiny of decision-making algorithms. Significant scrutiny, such as a 
requirement for pre-deployment certification, might be reserved for the most opaque, 
complex, and dangerous (in term of impact on human rights and society) types of 
algorithmic systems—thereby leaving untouched the vast majority of algorithms with 
relatively deterministic and predictable outputs or lacking in significant impacts. Table 3 
illustrated an example of a high-level algorithm complexity classification scheme [386]. 
Table 3: Possible classifications of Algorithmic Complexity 
Performance Standards could establish guidance for design, testing, and performance to ensure 
that algorithms are developed with adequate margins of safety, in accordance with its expected use, 
types of critical versus acceptable errors it might make, and the suggested predicted legal standard 
to apply to accidents involving that algorithm.  
Design Standards could look to establish satisfactory measures of predictability and explainability.  
Liability Standards could develop procedures for distributing responsibility for harms among 
coders, implementers, distributors, and end-users.  
2. Light regulator, nudging algorithm designers by imposing regulations that are low enough 
cost that they 'preserve freedom of choice' and do not substantially limit the kinds of 
algorithms that can be developed or when or how they can be released [387]. Such 'light' 
regulations could involve imposing requirements of openness, disclosure, and transparency 
[388] that are tailored to the scrutiny classification associated with the algorithmic system 
(see Table 4).  
Table 4: Spectrum of Disclosure [23] 
3. Hard regulation, imposing substantive restrictions on the use of certain kinds of machine-
learning algorithms, or even with sufficiently complex and mission-critical algorithms, 
requiring pre-market approval before algorithms can be deployed. 
Pre-Market Approval. Among the most aggressive positions an agency could take would be to 
require that certain algorithms slated for use in certain applications receive approval from the 
agency before deployment. The agency could work with an applicant to develop studies that would 
prove to the agency’s satisfaction that the algorithm meets the required performance standard. 
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Algorithms could also be conditionally approved subject to usage restrictions. Off-label use of an 
algorithm, or marketing an unapproved algorithm, could then be subject to legal sanctions. This 
approach may be problematic for systems that learn from their usage in the world that may be used 
in complex, unpredictable systems, such as autonomous vehicles. 
3.10. Existing proposals for governance of algorithmic systems 
The following subsections summarise a number of specific proposals related to the governance of 
algorithmic decision systems that have been published. 
3.10.1. A right to reasonable inferences 
The analysis and proposal in [389] is framed around the observation that '[c]oncerns about 
algorithmic accountability are often actually concerns about the way in which these technologies 
draw privacy invasive and non-verifiable inferences about us that we cannot predict, understand, or 
refute.' This is further elaborated by pointing out that '[c]ounterintuitive and unpredictable 
inferences can be drawn by data controllers, without individuals ever being aware [390], thus posing 
risks to privacy [391] and identity [392], data protection, reputation [393], and informational self-
determination [394]'. This position was also summarised in [395] as 'In a big data world, what calls 
for scrutiny is often not the accuracy of the raw data but rather the accuracy of the inferences drawn 
from the data'. To further clarify this point, [395] provides as example, 'even if a bank can explain 
which data and variables have been used to make a decision (e.g. banking records, income, post 
code), the decisions turns on inferences drawn from these sources. Thus the actual risks posed by big 
data analytics and AI are the underpinning inferences that determine how we, as data subjects, are 
being viewed and evaluated by third parties.'  
These observations are contrasted by with the focus of GDPR and proposed ePrivacy Regulation and 
Digital Content Directive, which aim to give 'data subjects control over how their personal data is 
collected and processed, but very little control over how it is evaluated' [395]. To address these 
accountability gaps, Tene and Polonestsky [395] propose a new right to reasonable inferences, 
which would be 'applicable to inferences based on non-verifiable and counterintuitive predictions 
which invade an individual’s privacy or damage reputation. This right would require ex-ante 
justification to be given by the data controller to establish whether an inference is reasonable. This 
disclosure would address (1) why certain data is a relevant basis to draw inferences; (2) why these 
inferences are relevant for the chosen processing purpose or type of automated decision; and (3) 
whether the data and methods used to draw the inferences are accurate and statistically reliable. 
An ex-post mechanism [would allow] data subjects to challenge unreasonable inferences, which can 
support challenges against automated decisions exercised under Art 22(3) GDPR'. One consequence 
of introducing this right would be that the use of Machine Learning methods, such as Deep 
Learning, that are currently not amenable to explanation would be ruled out for conditions where 
this right applies. 
The proposed 'right to reasonable inferences' would focus on how data is evaluated, not just 
collected, apply irrespective of the identifiability of data subjects, require justification of data 
sources and intended inferences prior to deployment of inferential analytics at scale, and give data 
subjects the ability to challenge unreasonable inferences. 
It is noted that such a 'right to reasonable inferences must, however, be reconciled with EU 
jurisprudence and counterbalanced with IP and trade secrets law as well as freedom of expression 
[396, 397] and Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the freedom to conduct a 
business.' 
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3.10.2. Consumer Protection authorities 
In [398] and [399], algorithmic governance is considered from the perspective of consumer 
protection rules and the possible role of Consumer Protection authorities. Based on an analysis of 
the information asymmetry between consumers and service providers [400, 401, 402], Larsson [398] 
and deSteel [399 challenge the feasibility of asking consumers to protect themselves through 
consent mechanisms. Instead, [402, 403] argue for a broader application of consumer protection 
regulation to user agreements in order to increase accountability for operators. This in turn requires 
consumer protection legislation to be applied pragmatically through the responsible supervisory 
authorities [404]. A recommendation for consumer protection authorities is therefore to develop 
synergies with, in particular, data protection authorities, to provide expertise on consumer 
protection [398]. Transparency would likely have to include audits or control of how data-driven and 
targeting software operates, in order for consumer protection authorities to develop the ability to 
assess - in-house of perhaps through outsourced expertise - what the combination of algorithms 
and use of big data sources are leading to, and to discover the use of erroneous data [405]. This form 
of 'qualified transparency' [23] could be a way forward to keep the proprietary software and the 
specific design of algorithms as he business secrets they may need to be, but at the same time 
provide for a necessary protective mechanism against the worst case detriment to consumers [398]. 
3.10.3.  An 'FDA' for algorithms 
From an analysis of the specific challenges that come from Machine Learning type systems that are 
'trained' rather than 'programmed', [32] develops a proposal for a centralised 'FDA' type regulator 
body for algorithms. The analogy with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is motivated by 
the observation that explainability and predictability are not new problems. 'Technologies, such as 
pharmaceuticals, that operate on extremely complex systems have long confronted them. When 
companies begin developing drugs, their hypotheses about why they might prove effective are little 
better than smart guesses. Even if the drug proves effective for its intended use, it is hard to predict 
its side effects because the body’s biochemistry is so complex. Pfizer was developing Viagra as a 
treatment for heart disease when it discovered that the drug is actually a far more effective 
treatment for erectile dysfunction [406]. Rogaine first came to market as Loniten, a drug used to 
treat high blood pressure before it was discovered that it could regrow hair [407, 408]. The cause of 
Aspirin’s analgesic effects were not understood for many decades after Bayer started selling it [409]. 
Sometimes, once a drug is discovered, its mechanisms (including the reasons for its side effects) can 
be easily explained; sometimes not. But efficacy and side effects can be very difficult to predict in 
advance.' 
The necessity for a singular new regulatory body is argued for based on three characteristics of 
algorithmic decision-making systems (especially those based on Machine Learning): Complexity; 
Opacity; and Dangerousness. 
Opacity. First, the kinds of algorithms that are most concerning are by their nature opaque, with 
benefits and harms that are difficult to quantify without extensive expertise. That feature of the 
market for algorithms contrasts sharply with the market for most products where individuals are 
easily able to assess the benefits and safety risks posed by the product. Highly opaque and complex 
products benefit more from expert evaluation by a regulator than other products do. 
Complexity. Second, the difficulties with assigning and tracing responsibility for harms to algorithms, 
and then associating that responsibility with human actors, further distinguish algorithms from 
other products. Algorithms could commit small but severe long-term harms or may commit 
grievous errors with low probability. Therefore, unlike many other products for which a combination 
of tort regulation and reputation will correct for accidents at an acceptable pace, the market and 
tort regulatory system are likely to prove too slow to respond to algorithmic harms. 
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Dangerousness. Third, at least in some circumstances, algorithms are likely to be capable of inflicting 
unusually grave harm. Whether a machine learning algorithm is responsible for keeping the power 
grid operational, assisting in a surgery, or driving a car, an algorithm can pose an immediate and 
severe threat to human health and welfare in a way many other products simply do not and cannot. 
Based on these observations [32] argues that a central regulatory agency with pre-market review 
would be better able to contend with those problems than subject-matter agencies working 
independently. To the degree significant expertise is required to understand the possible dangers 
algorithms pose, a single central regulatory agency is more likely to be able to pool top talent 
together than are multiple agencies seeking to hire experts to help them make sense of the problem. 
A single regulator could grapple with the dangers algorithms pose holistically rather than 
piecemeal—effectively distinguishing between algorithms on the basis of stakeholder feedback 
and expert judgment. A single agency would be able to maximise the centralised expertise that can 
be brought to bear on the issue while offering the most agility and flexibility in responding to 
technological change and developing granular solutions. 
3.10.4. Agency certification with tort liability 
The proposal put forward by [410] constructs algorithmic accountability around an agency tasked 
with certifying the safety (broadly defined to include societal and discriminatory harms) of 
algorithmic decision-making systems in combination with a legal liability framework under which 
the designers, manufacturers, and sellers of agency-certified systems would be subject to limited 
tort liability, while uncertified systems that are offered for commercial sale or use would be subject 
to strict joint and several liability.[410] 
The agency, staffed by specialist, would be tasked with assessing the safety of algorithmic systems 
while the courts, experienced in adjudicating individual disputes, would have the tasks of 
determining whether an algorithmic system falls within the scope of an agency-certified design and 
allocating responsibility when the interaction between multiple components of the system gives 
rise to tortious harm. This strong tort-based system would compel designers and manufacturers to 
internalise the costs associated with harm caused by algorithmic decisions — ensuring 
compensation for victims and forcing designers, programmers, and manufacturers to examine the 
safety of their systems.[410] 
Systems that successfully complete the agency certification process would enjoy a partial regulatory 
compliance defence with the effect of limiting rather than precluding tort liability. Whenever a 
negligence suit involving the design of a certified AI system succeeds, the Agency would be required 
to publish a report similar to the reports that the National Transportation Safety Board prepares after 
aviation accidents and incidents [411]. 
3.10.5.  Accountability Measures for Algorithmic System use by Public 
Authorities 
Algorithmic systems are currently being used in government, reshaping how criminal justice 
systems work via risk assessment algorithms and predictive policing [412, 413], optimizing energy 
use in critical infrastructure through AI-driven resource allocation [414, 415] and changing 
government resource allocation and monitoring practices [412, 413]. Researchers, advocates, and 
policymakers are debating when and where algorithmic systems are appropriate, including whether 
they are appropriate at all in particularly sensitive domains [e.g. 416, 417, 418]. Questions are being 
raised about how to fully assess the short and long term impacts of these systems, whose interests 
they serve, and if they are sufficiently sophisticated to contend with complex social and historical 
contexts. These questions are essential, and developing strong answers has been hampered in part 
by a lack of information and access to the systems under deliberation. Public authorities urgently 
need a practical framework to assess algorithmic systems and to ensure public accountability [419].  
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 Algorithmic Impact Assessments as a framework [419] 
The Algorithmic Impact Assessment (AIA) framework is designed to support affected communities 
and stakeholders as they seek to assess the claims made about these systems, and to determine 
where – or if – their use is acceptable. It is not simply affected communities who lack the necessary 
information to assess how algorithmic systems are working. Governments are also struggling to 
assess how these systems are used, whether they are producing disparate impacts, and how to hold 
them accountable. Instead, impacted communities, the public at large, and governments are left to 
rely on what journalists, researchers, and public records requests have been able to expose [93, 420]. 
AIAs offer a practical accountability framework combining public authority review and public input. 
AIAs will not solve all of the problems that algorithmic systems might raise, but they do provide an 
important mechanism to inform the public and to engage policymakers and researchers in 
productive conversation. AIAs draw directly from impact assessment frameworks in environmental 
protection [421], human rights [422], privacy [423], and data protection [424] policy domains. 
While AIAs resemble environmental impact assessments, data protection impact assessments, or 
privacy impact assessments, they differ in some very important ways. For example, data protection 
impact assessments (DPIAs), like those mandated under the GDPR, similarly serve to highlight the 
data protection risks of automated systems used to evaluate people based on their personal data 
[425]. If a data controller finds a system to be 'high risk,' then it must consult with its local 
governmental data protection authority [376]. However, DPIAs apply to both public and private 
organisations, are not shared with the public, and have no built-in external researcher review or 
other individualised challenge mechanisms. AIAs, on the other hand, are explicitly designed to 
engage public authorities and the people they serve on these areas of concern through the various 
review, public participation, and right-to-challenge elements. This allows a wide range of 
individuals, communities, researchers, and policymakers to participate in accountability efforts. 
Pre-acquisition review  
An AIA covers any algorithmic system before it is deployed, no matter how it was acquired or if it 
was developed internally. A pre-procurement AIA gives a public authority the opportunity to 
engage the public and proactively identify concerns, establish expectations, and draw on expertise 
and understanding from relevant stakeholders. Although framework agreements are often used as 
an easier alternative to complying with EU Procurement Directives, they are not an ideal procedure 
for acquiring algorithmic systems because they would hinder the ability of the public and 
government to identify and address concerns.   
An AIA gives the public the authority and the opportunity to evaluate the adoption of an automated 
decision system before the public authority has committed to its use. This allows the public 
authority and the public to identify concerns that may need to be negotiated or otherwise 
addressed before a contract is signed. This is also when the public and elected officials can push 
back against deployment before potential harms can occur. In implementing AIAs, authorities 
should consider incorporating AIAs into the processes they already use to procure algorithmic 
systems or any existing pre-acquisition assessment processes the public authority already 
undertakes [426]. Finally, pre-procurement AIAs may also allow member states to identify relevant 
training and policy architecture in accordance with the European Commission’s Recommendation 
on the professionalisation of public procurement [427].  
Creating a Definition 
In an AIA process, public authorities must first publish their own definition of 'automated decision 
system' that is both practical and appropriate for its particular context. This does not mean the 
public authority must go through the effort of redefining 'automated decision system' for each 
particular system: once they reach a working definition, they can choose to republish it in future 
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AIAs as long as it continues to accurately describe the systems in ways that reinforce public trust 
and accountability. Public authorities should also regularly revisit their definition when necessary to 
incorporate new types of systems, new applications of old systems, or research advances in relevant 
fields. 
This process of defining and specifying algorithmic systems would help build the public authority’s 
capacity for the procurement and assessment of future systems; experience with AIAs would help 
guide budgeting and other key milestones in the acquisition process. 
Decisions about which algorithmic systems should be subject to an AIA process will be particular to 
each public authority’s context and the interests of the communities they serve. An overly- broad 
definition could burden authorities with disclosing systems that are not the main sources of 
concern. If a public servant uses a word processor to type up her notes from a meeting where some 
key decisions were made, and then checks them with the program’s 'automated' spell-checker, her 
public authority should not have to perform an AIA for that spell-checker. Alternatively, an overly-
narrow definition could undermine efforts to include high profile systems like those deciding where 
students go to school or how housing opportunities are allocated [428, 429]. In the UK, a review of 
'governmental analytical models' focused on models that are used to inform public authority 
decisions. The review, which went on to inform the UK Government’s 'Aqua Book' on guidance for 
producing quality analysis in government, offers one possible method for defining automated 
decision system [430]. 
It is also essential that 'systems' are defined in terms that are broader than just their software:   AIAs 
should address human and social factors, the histories of bias and discrimination in the context of 
use, and any input and training data [431, 432]. Bias in algorithmic systems can arise as much from 
human choices on how to design or train the system as it can from human errors in judgment when 
interpreting or acting on the outputs [433].  Evaluating a risk assessment tool, for instance, is not just 
a matter of understanding the math behind an algorithm; we must understand how judges, police 
officers, and other decision-makers influence its inputs and interpret its outputs [434]. 
In the GDPR, automated profiling is defined as 'any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural 
person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at 
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
movements.' [435] 
The GDPR language is a good starting point for some authorities, but will require some shaping to 
match the appropriate contexts. In other contexts it may not be sufficient. Some predictive policing 
tools, for example, do not necessarily 'profile individuals', and instead focus on locations, using 
statistics to try to understand and predict crime trends across geographical areas, with the potential 
for disparate impact. A definition might then have to account for 'any systems, tools, or algorithms 
that attempt to predict crime trends and recommend the allocation of policing resources' in non-
individualised terms. In general, any definition should certainly cover systems that might have a 
disparate impact on vulnerable communities and to pay careful attention to how broad terms, like 
'automated processing,' are specified in practice. Public authorities can also learn by borrowing 
definitions from other domains and governments that are better tested, already have public 
approval, or perhaps have even withstood challenges in court.  
Archive of Systems Decisions 
Once a public authority has published their definition of an automated decision system, it will need 
to determine which systems meet this definition and will be subject to AIA requirements. Even when 
a public authority strikes the right balance with its definition of an automated decision system, 
subsequent systems decisions can be subjective or influenced by other considerations, such as 
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intentional avoidance of performing AIAs. Therefore, public authorities should keep a public archive 
of all systems decisions.  
The public archive can provide much needed transparency of public authority decisions, so that the 
public is both aware of and can challenge decisions where an automated decision system is 
improperly excluded from AIA requirements. Such transparency mechanism are not novel within 
the impact assessment frameworks. For instance, in the US Environment Impact Assessment 
context, a proposed federal action can be excluded from a detailed environmental analysis if it is 
determined that the action will not 'individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the 
human environment.' Each public authority develops procedures to perform this assessment, which 
often take the form of a detailed checklist or determination document explaining the exclusion 
[436]. Additionally, some federal authorities maintain a database of all decisions that resulted in a 
proposed actions being excluded from further environmental analysis [437]. 
Public authorities can determine the level of detail of the archive, but at minimum it should provide 
adequate documentation of a public authority’s decision to exclude systems from the AIA 
requirements. The public authority should also publish decisions of excluded systems before the 
system is deployed, so there is a meaningful opportunity for public scrutiny.  
Public Authority Assessment of Systems 
AIAs increase the internal capacity of public authorities to better understand and explicate potential 
impacts before systems are implemented [438, 439, 440]. Public authorities must be experts on their 
own algorithmic systems if they are to ensure public trust. This is why public authorities’ AIAs must 
include an evaluation of how a system might impact different communities and a plan for how 
authorities will address any issues, should they arise. 
Ideally, public authorities should pre-identify issues and potential harms that will be evaluated in 
the self-assessment. For example, in 2014, Former Attorney General Eric Holder urged the 
Sentencing Commission to 'study the use of a data-driven analysis in front-end sentencing - and to 
issue policy recommendations based on this careful, independent analysis.'[441] By standardising 
the process, authorities can ensure the evaluation is comprehensive and comparable. The 
evaluation should be detailed so that outside researchers and experts can adequately scrutinise the 
system and its potential impact, and provide a non-technical summary for the general public. This 
dual explanation is used in other types of impact assessment frameworks and encourages robust 
public engagement [442]. 
In their self-assessments, public authorities should identify potential impacts on the public and then 
proactively engage affected communities to ensure that a system meets a given community’s goals. 
The assessment should articulate why, in light of these goals, the system will have a net positive 
impact on those communities [443].  Fulfilling this requirement of the AIA process would require a 
public authority to engage those communities early on, even before the formal notice and comment 
process. 
Authorities could also use the AIA as an opportunity to lay out any other procedures that will help 
secure public trust in such systems. If appropriate, the public authority might want to identify how 
individuals can appeal decisions involving algorithmic systems, to make clear what appeals 
processes might cover a given system’s decision, or to share its mitigation strategy should the 
system behave in an unexpected and harmful way [444, 445]. If a harm, an undesirable outcome, or 
an error is identified, the public authority should explain how it intends to correct or remedy the 
issue. 
This self-assessment process is also an opportunity for public authorities to develop expertise when 
commissioning and purchasing algorithmic systems, and for vendors to foster public trust in their 
systems. authorities will be better able to assess the risks and benefits associated with different types 
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of systems, and work with vendors and researchers to conduct and share relevant testing and 
research on their automated decision system, including but not limited to testing for any potential 
biases that could adversely impact an individual or group. Indeed, researchers are already 
developing resources and materials that authorities can use to ask appropriate questions of their 
own systems [446].  As noted above, if some vendors raise trade secrecy or confidentiality concerns, 
those can be addressed in the AIA, but responsibility for accountability ultimately falls upon the 
public authority. 
The benefits of self assessments to public authorities go beyond algorithmic accountability: it 
encourages authorities to better manage their own technical systems and become leaders in the 
responsible integration of increasingly complex computational systems in governance. 
 Benefits to Vendors 
AIAs would also benefit vendors that prioritise fairness, accountability, and transparency in their 
offerings. Companies that are best equipped to help authorities and researchers study their systems 
would have a competitive advantage over others. Cooperation would also help improve public trust, 
especially at a time when scepticism of the societal benefits of tech companies is on the rise [447]. 
These new incentives can encourage a race to the top of the accountability spectrum among 
vendors. 
Benefits to public records request processes 
Increasing public authority expertise through AIAs will also help promote transparency and 
accountability in public records requests. Today, when public authorities receive open records 
requests for information about algorithmic systems, there is often a mismatch between how the 
outside requestor thinks authorities use and classify these technologies and the reality [448]. As a 
result, requests may take a scattershot approach, cramming overly broad technical terms into 
numerous requests in the hopes that one or more hit the mark. This can make it difficult for records 
officers responding in good faith to understand the requests, let alone provide the answers the 
public needs. 
 Even open records experts who are willing to reasonably narrow their requests may be unable to 
do so because of the lack of any 'roadmap' showing which systems a given public authority is 
planning, procuring, or deploying. For example, in a project at the University of Maryland, faculty 
and students working in a media law class filed numerous general public records requests for 
information regarding criminal risk assessment algorithm usage in all fifty US states [449]. The 
responses they received varied significantly, making it difficult to aggregate data and compare 
usage across jurisdictions. It also revealed a lack of general knowledge about the systems among 
the authorities, leading to situations where the students had to explain what ‘criminal justice 
algorithms’ were to the public servants in charge of providing the records on their use. 
Accountability processes such as the AIA would help correct this mismatch on both sides of the 
equation.  
Researchers, journalists, legal organisations, and concerned members of the public could use AIAs 
to reasonably target their requests to systems that were enumerated and described, saving public 
records staff significant time and resources. Public authority staff would also gain a better 
understanding of their own systems and records and could then help requestors understand which 
documents and public records are potentially available. This alignment would increase efficiency, 
lower the public authority burden of processing requests, and increase public confidence. And of 
course, some basic requests will be preempted by the AIA’s disclosure requirement, saving 
researchers and the authorities the burden of engaging in the public records request process. 
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Considering allocative and representational harms 
An anticipated challenge for governments performing AIAs is the assessment of potential cultural 
and social harms. This challenge exists in other impact assessment processes because it requires the 
public authority to make assumptions or predictions about cultural or social factors that vary 
enormously within and between communities and geographic areas. This practice often results in 
findings only reflecting potential impacts on a dominant culture and omitting or misinterpreting 
the impacts on marginalised communities and individuals. For instance, in France, protests in 
predominantly Black and Muslim neighbourhoods were often represented as act of criminality and 
delinquency, rather than responses to poverty, exclusion, and abusive police power [450, 451, 452]. 
This prevailing viewpoint unfortunately resulted in greater police presence and questionable police 
practices in these neighbourhoods until France’s highest court ruled that police racially based ID 
checks were illegal and discriminatory [453]. Avoiding these sorts of harms is a key goal of the AIA 
public participation process.  
The existing literature on bias in algorithmic systems has tended to rely heavily on what could be 
called 'harms of allocation,' in which some groups are denied access to valuable resources and 
opportunities [454, 455]. Of course, addressing allocative harms is crucial. But authorities should also 
consider harms of representation – the way a system may unintentionally underscore or reinforce 
the subordination of some social and cultural groups. For example, researchers classify Google’s 
photo platform’s automatic labelling of images of black people as 'gorillas' as a representational 
harm [456], and the denial of mortgages to people who live within a particular zip code as an 
allocative harm [457]. Algorithmic systems used in the public sector are susceptible to both kinds of 
harm because they can be embedded with demographic data that serve as proxies for particular 
groups or reinforce past harms that can have economic or identity-based impacts. 
Datasheets requirement 
The technical research community studying fairness, accountability, and transparency in machine 
learning has begun to consider standard ways to account for data and its history, biases, and skews. 
One such proposal has called for data creators to produce 'datasheets for datasets.'[458] A datasheet 
is a semi-structured document that asks questions like 'Why was the dataset created?,' 'How was the 
data collected?,' or 'If it relates to people, does it unfairly advantage or disadvantage a particular 
social group?'. From those prompts, the data creator can publish information about data’s 
provenance, its biases, and its potential societal impacts. 
Datasheets could become a part of an AIA in one of two ways. First, if a public authority’s acquisition 
or development of an algorithmic system requires the use of government data or the collection of 
new data, the AIA process could require the public authority to create a datasheet. Second, if the 
public authority purchases an algorithmic system from a third-party vendor, the vendor’s contract 
with the authority could require the vendor to provide the public authority with datasheets for any 
data used by the vendor in the development of the system. While the datasheets alone would not 
meet the level of analysis needed in the public authority self-assessment, they are potentially 
valuable public documents that the public authority could include in their AIA. 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
A fundamental aspect of government transparency and accountability is notice of how our rights 
may be affected by government agencies and actors.  When algorithmic systems play a significant 
role in government decisions, the public should be given notice. Substantive public engagement 
requires access to accurate and timely information. Thus, an important component of an AIA is for 
each public authority to publicly disclose proposed and existing automated decision systems, 
including their purpose, reach, internal use policies, and potential impacts on communities or 
individuals. This requirement by itself would go a long way towards shedding light on which 
technologies are being deployed and where accountability research and community advocacy 
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should be focused. AIA disclosures would also help governments proactively avoid political turmoil 
and backlash involving systems that the public may ultimately find untrustworthy or that may cause 
direct or indirect harm. 
It also provides an opportunity for meaningful public participation. The AIA process includes the 
opportunity for the public to engage with the public authority regarding the content of its initial 
AIA disclosure. Public authorities can decide how they want to organise the public participation 
process: they could choose to separate each component of the AIA ('definition,' 'disclosure,' 'self-
assessment,' and 'meaningful access') into separate public participation periods or release the AIA 
as a single document and have one overarching public participation period for that one document. 
There might be an advantage to agencies and the public in separating the definition of automated 
decision systems and the disclosure of systems before moving on to discuss internal assessments 
and external researcher access protocols. The initial disclosure provides a strong foundation for 
building public trust through appropriate levels of transparency, while subsequent requests can 
solicit further information or the presentation of new evidence, research, or other inputs that the 
agency may not have adequately considered. 
Creating and Implementing Mitigation and Corrective Measures 
A public authorities’ self- assessment should identify potential impacts on the public and then 
proactively engage affected communities to ensure that a system meets a given community’s goals. 
The assessment should articulate why, in light of these goals, the system will have a net positive 
impact on those communities [459]. 
Public authorities could also use the AIA as an opportunity to lay out any other procedures that will 
help secure public trust in such systems. If appropriate, the public authority might want to identify 
how individuals can appeal decisions involving algorithmic systems, to make clear what appeals 
processes might cover a given system’s decision, or to share its mitigation strategy should the 
system behave in an unexpected and harmful way [445, 460]. If a harm, an undesirable outcome, or 
an error is identified, the public authority should explain how it intends to correct or remedy the 
issue, and a proposed plan for when such mitigating or corrective measures will be implemented.  
Trade Secrecy 
Public authorities will need to commit to accountability in both their internal technology 
development plans and their vendor and procurement relationships. For example, the disclosure of 
algorithmic systems and meaningful information about those systems will not be feasible if essential 
information is shielded from review by blanket claims of trade secrecy [461].  While there are 
certainly some core aspects of systems that have competitive commercial value, it is unlikely that 
these extend to information such as the existence of the system, the purpose for which it was 
acquired, or the results of the public authority’s internal impact assessment. 
Nor should trade secret claims stand as an obstacle to ensuring meaningful external research on 
such systems. AIAs provide an opportunity for authorities to raise any questions or concerns about 
trade secret claims in the pre-acquisition period, before entering into any contractual obligations. If 
a vendor objects to meaningful external review, this would signal a conflict between that vendor’s 
system and public accountability. Such scenarios may require that authorities ask potential vendors 
to waive restrictions on information necessary for external research and review [462].  At minimum, 
vendors should be contractually required by authorities to waive any proprietary or trade secrecy 
interest in information related to accountability, such as those surrounding testing, validation, 
and/or verification of system performance and disparate impact [463].  This also encourages a 
competitive landscape among government technology vendors to meet the accountability 
requirements of AIAs if they want to do business with public authorities. 
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Meaningful access to outside researchers 
AIAs should provide a comprehensive plan for giving external researchers and auditors meaningful, 
ongoing access to examine specific systems, to gain a fuller account of their workings, and to 
engage the public and affected communities in the process. This plan should give experts rapid 
access to a system once it is deployed (e.g. within six months). However, in situations where internal 
public authority assessments are insufficient or where particular risks or harms have gone 
unaddressed, external researchers and auditors could raise the need for pre-deployment review in 
the comment period. While certain individuals and communities may wish to examine the systems 
themselves, this cannot be relied upon: it would be unreasonable to assume that everyone has the 
time, knowledge, and resources for such testing and auditing [464].  Algorithmic systems can be 
incredibly complex, and issues like bias and systematic errors may not be easily determined through 
the review of systems on an individual, case-by-case basis [204].  A plan to grant meaningful access 
to qualified researchers would allow individuals and communities to call upon the trusted external 
experts best suited to examine and monitor a system to assess whether there are issues that might 
harm the public interest [465, 466]. 
To do this well, it is important to recognise that the appropriate type and level of access may vary 
from public authority to public authority, from system to system, and from community to 
community. The risks and harms at issue in different systems may demand different types of 
assessment and auditing using different methods and disciplines. While the right to an explanation 
concerning a specific automated decision could prove useful in some situations, many systems may 
require a group-level or community-wide analysis. For example, an explanation for a single racial 
profiling incident will not reveal the greater discriminatory pattern.  
Many systems may only require analysis based on inputs, outputs, and simple information about the 
algorithms used without needing access to the underlying source code [467].  We expect that for 
many systems, authorities would have to provide training data or a record of past decisions to 
researchers. We believe that the best way for authorities to develop an appropriate research access 
process initially would be to work with community stakeholders and interdisciplinary researchers 
through the notice and comment process. Importantly, given changing technologies, the 
developing research field around accountability, and the shifting social and political contexts within 
which systems are deployed, access to a system will almost certainly need to be ongoing, and take 
the form of monitoring over time [468]. 
As an individual public authority works with researchers and community members to design its 
research access provisions, there are a number of elements that should be in place. Research and 
auditing performed on these systems should be accountable to the public, and should include a 
public log of which researchers and experts are provided access, and on what basis. Public 
authorities should ensure that affected communities are able to suggest researchers that they feel 
represent their interests, and should work with researchers to ensure that these communities have 
a voice in formulating the questions that are asked and addressed by research and auditing. 
Importantly, to ensure public accountability and a thriving research field, research findings and 
conclusions should be published openly (even if after an embargo period), and be held to standards 
of scrutiny and peer review within the appropriate research domains. 
Ongoing auditing and research access would allow public authorities, researchers, and affected 
communities to work together to develop their approaches to testing and interrogating these 
systems. This is especially important given that the research about algorithmic accountability is 
young and technological development proceeds rapidly. We do not yet know what future tools, 
techniques, and perspectives might best keep systems accountable. External experts from a wide 
variety of disciplines will need the flexibility to adapt to new methods of accountability as new forms 
of automated decision-making emerge [469, 470]. 
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Funding and resources issues 
There is also a real danger that relying on external auditing will become an unfunded tax on 
researchers and the affected communities they engage with, who might be expected to take 
responsibility for testing and monitoring algorithmic systems without resources or compensation. 
Alternatively, if in-house auditors are relied on, they could become captured by the incentives of 
their clients or face conflict-of-interest issues. However, there are approaches that legislation could 
adopt to address this.  
An AIA framework could fund an independent, government-wide oversight body, like an inspector 
general’s office, to support the research, access, and community engagement [471, 472]. 
Community institutional review boards could be supported to help steer and review research 
proposals [473].  Funding could be set aside for the compensation of external auditors. Fortunately, 
there are many options that jurisdictions could consider for their own needs. A growing community 
of computer scientists, journalists, social scientists, and engaged community advocates have 
already proven there is an appetite for research into public algorithmic systems. This work should 
continue to be strongly supported by funding bodies and research authorities. 
Enhanced due process mechanisms to challenge inadequate assessments or failure to 
mitigate  
The AIA process provides a much-needed basis for evaluating and improving public authority 
systems. But without oversight, AIAs could become a checkbox that authorities mark off and forget, 
potentially sidelining community concerns [474].  That is why the AIA process should also provide a 
path for the public to challenge an public authority if it fails to comply with AIA requirements or if 
its self-assessment process was deficient in adequately identifying or addressing key concerns. For 
example, if an public authority fails to disclose a system that should have reasonably been 
considered an algorithmic system, or if it allows vendors to make overbroad trade secret claims 
blocking meaningful system access [475, 476], the public should have the chance to raise concerns 
with a public authority oversight body or directly in a court of law if the public authority refuses to 
rectify these problems after the public comment period. The AIA process should give the public the 
opportunity to effectively challenge the public authority’s adoption of the system and prevent the 
system from being used when it fails to benefit affected communities. In Santa Clara, California, for 
instance, a law passed in 2016 requires the local Board of Supervisors to explicitly approve new 
surveillance technology before moving forward with its use [477]. 
Renewing Algorithmic Impact Assessments (AIAs) 
In order to ensure assessments remain current and incorporate the latest information and research, 
authorities should be required to renew AIAs on a regular schedule. The renewed AIA will also have 
renewed comment and due process challenge periods. For example, authorities could be required 
to conduct a new AIA on all of their systems every two years. However, if there have not been 
significant changes to the system, to the context of its deployment, or to the need for external 
research access, the public authority should be allowed to minimally update their original AIA 
content as part of the renewal process. 
Algorithmic Impact Assessments In Practice  
The AIA framework goes beyond just the components described above. Those parts of an AIA — the 
definition of 'algorithmic system,' public authority self-assessment, public participation, and 
external meaningful researcher access — must be structured into a process that ensures pre-
acquisition review of algorithmic systems and the opportunity for public input to be solicited and 
addressed.  
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In practice, the AIA process will not necessarily look identical between different national contexts 
because of existing government procurement and development practices and local interests or laws 
relevant to individual member states. The below description of a possible AIA process describes 
what a model AIA framework can look like. 
1) Public authority publishes its definition of 'algorithmic system' 
Public authorities should first define 'algorithmic system,' so that the public can understand how the 
authority decides which systems should be subject to the AIA process from the outset. This should 
happen before the rest of the AIA to give the public authority the opportunity to work out a 
definition before committing to a full review of a system that may not need it. 
Once a definition is published, the authority may choose to solicit public participation on the 
definition alone outside of the scope of a single AIA. For example, even if the agency does not 
believe they have any 'algorithmic systems,' a separate process will be necessary so that the 
authority can still publish a definition that the public can then comment on and, if necessary, 
challenge. Subsequent AIAs could then use the new definition going forward.   
2) Public authority publicly discloses purpose, scope, intended use and associated policies/practices, self-
assessment timeline/process and potential implementation timeline of the system OR public authority 
publishes its decision not to review a potential system in their systems decision archive. 
A public authority should first give the public basic notice of a potential new system before 
proceeding with the self-assessment. The public authority can use this opportunity to solicit early 
external feedback. This early feedback will help the public authority focus its self-assessment on the 
most pertinent public concerns before committing to a particular analysis.  
If the public authority has decided that they do not need to conduct a full AIA, then the public 
authority should record that decision in their 'systems decision archive' in lieu of publishing a self-
assessment timeline. This functions similarly to some existing environmental impact assessment 
frameworks that require authorities to first decide if their proposed action requires an assessment 
or is excluded from the assessment requirement [478]. Like the full self-assessment, this decision 
should be published before a system has entered use so that its exclusion can be challenged. 
3) Public authority performs and publishes self-assessment of the system with focus on inaccuracies, bias, 
harms to affected communities, and describes mitigation plans for potential impacts. 
The self-assessment will analyse the algorithmic system to study potential sources of bias, 
inaccuracies, or other harms that are of public concern. To learn about public concerns early and 
start to address the issues the public raises, the public agency conducting the assessment should 
proactively engage with the public to better scope the assessment.  
4) Public authority publishes plan for meaningful, ongoing access to external researchers to review the 
system once it is deployed. 
Ideally, stakeholders who may have helped with the public authority’s self-assessment will include 
the sorts of researchers who should be given ongoing access to the algorithmic system. With those 
stakeholders’ input, the self-assessment will likely reveal what concerns or potential problems will 
require ongoing monitoring and what challenges exist in studying a particular algorithmic system.  
5) Public participation period 
Once the full AIA has been conducted, a final period for public participation must be set aside to 
allow stakeholders to comment on the final product. This final public participation period allows the 
public to voice any concerns or issues that may have been missed during the AIA process, which the 
public authority should be required to address before finalizing the AIA. Ideally, the public authority 
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will have already addressed public concerns through proactive engagement while defining 
'algorithmic system,' scoping the self-assessment, and designing researcher access.  
6) Final version released 
The AIA should be finalised only once concerns and issues raised in the public participation period 
have been addressed. Any documents pertaining to the AIA should be made publicly available. 
7) Renewal of AIAs on a regular timeline 
Public authorities must be required to renew their Algorithmic Impact Assessments on a regular 
schedule. Algorithmic systems and how they are used may change over time, requiring new rounds 
of analysis to revisit if those changes significantly impacted how the algorithmic system operates. 
New concerns may come to light that were not addressed in the original AIA. Researchers might 
develop new techniques to analyse algorithmic systems the public authority could leverage in a 
future review. 
8) Opportunity to challenge failure to mitigate issues raised in the public participation period or 
foreseeable outcomes. 
Once the AIA has been finalised, the public should be given the opportunity to challenge the public 
authority’s failure to implement mitigating or corrective measures that were raised in the AIA 
process. The public should also be able to challenge a public authority’s decision to not conduct an 
AIA for a particular system if the public authority decides that the system does not meet the 
definition of 'algorithmic system.' 
 Accountability and transparency requirements for public procurement of 
algorithmic systems 
The EU has promulgated three Public Procurement Directives that set out a framework and 
procedures for procurement by public authorities [479, 480, 481]. During the specification stage, 
contracting authorities define the requirements for the product or services they intend to procure. 
In 2014, the EU Public Contracts Directive expanded the scope of issues that can be covered during 
specification to include performance, equality, and social/environmental issues as well as any 
relevant processes and methods linked to these issues.  
Many, if not most, algorithmic systems come into government via procurement procedures. These 
procedures can serve as powerful moments to raise and address transparency and accountability 
concerns with algorithmic system vendors. Given the expanded scope of issues that can be covered 
during the specification stage of procurement, contracting authorities should establish a variety of 
transparency and accountability requirements, particularly as they relate to performance, equality, 
and social issues.  
In order for a public authority to adequately assess an algorithmic system’s performance, it will 
require significant information about the system. Often authorities lack necessary information to 
assess performance because vendors use intellectual property claims to avoid providing necessary 
information or authorities fail to inquire about relevant information. There are a variety of 
requirements a public authority can explore to ensure it has enough information to assess the 
performance of an algorithmic system and ensure maintenance for optimal performance. The 
following recommendations seek to address performance and transparency issues. 
● A public authority should require a vendor to produce materials that can be used to explain 
the systems in general to all stakeholders, and a technical manual including user, design and 
code documentation.   
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● The public authority should require a vendor to provide notice of any claims, lawsuits or 
actions related to an algorithmic system that may impact the public authority’s use. 
● The public authority should require a vendor to provide a comprehensive list of all proposed 
data sets and methodologies that the vendor intends to use in the design, production or 
configuration of the system. The public authority should also require the vendor to provide 
a datasheet assessing the quality of the data set, an explanation of any proposed 
manipulation of the data, and a plan to account for possible sources of bias in data collection 
and manipulation. Finally, the public authority should require the vendor to disclose any 
evidence, analysis, or reports of known or discovered flaws in the system or any relevant 
data sets. 
● The public authority should require a vendor to produce a test version of the system and 
conduct a performance analysis. This performance analysis should study potential operator 
use of the system to understand the patterns of use and how the operator interprets or acts 
on the system’s outputs.  
● The vendor should agree to not assert any legal claims against the public authority or third 
parties for conducting research to test, audit, examine or otherwise understand the system’s 
effect on an individual or group of individuals impacted by the system’s outputs.  
Algorithmic systems often use and produce sensitive government information. Sometimes, 
individuals or companies that wish to keep sensitive information private, will seek services from the 
private sector. To address these privacy-related equality concerns, the public authority should 
develop requirements that clarify ownership and confidentiality mechanisms. The following 
recommendations seek to address privacy, accountability, and equality issues. 
 The public authority should require that any materials, processes, products and related technical or 
use materials are exclusively owned by the public authority.  
● If the vendor uses services of individuals or organisations as subcontractors, the public 
authority should require the vendor to use a subcontract agreement to ensure that all 
copyrightable work product remains the property of the public authority and that the 
vendor will take responsibility for the actions of its subcontractors.  
● The public authority should require all materials supplied by the public authority be held in 
strict confidence and the public authority should prohibit copying, duplicating, 
disseminating or discussing public authority materials with anyone other than persons 
authorised by the public authority.  
3.11. Development of Industry Standards for algorithmic decision-
making systems 
Industry standards, such as those developed by national (e.g. AFNOR (Fr), DIN (De), UNI (It), BSI (GB), 
ANSI (US), etc.) or international standards setting bodies (e.g. ISO, IEC, ITU, IEEE, etc.) play an 
important role in establishing common reference structures to enable successful industry self-
regulation. The ISO 9000 family of 'Quality Management System' standards [482] for instance 
facilitates trust between procurers and suppliers in global supply chains. While there exist a number 
of standards that are related to AI/algorithmic decision-making, there currently are no international 
standards that deal with these directly.  
In 2016 the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) launched the IEEE Global Initiative 
on Ethics for Autonomous and Intelligent Systems [483] to address growing concerns about 
unintended consequences of algorithmic systems. Part of this initiative was the launch of the 
development of the IEEE P7000 series of ethics based standards, e.g. P7001 Transparency of 
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Autonomous systems, P7003 Algorithmic Bias Considerations. The first of these standards 
developments is expected to reach completion in late 2019. 
At the start of 2018, the Joint Technical Committee for information systems (JTC 1) of the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
set up a new subcommittee (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42) to identify necessary standards projects for 
Artificial Intelligence [484]. The average development time for these international standards is three 
to five years. The second Study Group (i.e. SG2) that was set up in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 was tasked 
with investigating approaches to establish trust in AI systems through transparency, verifiability, 
explainability, controllability, etc. (SG1 is focusing on terminology). In September 2018 a proposal 
was submitted to the Artificial Intelligence subcommittee (SC42) of JTC 1, with a request to the IT 
Service Management and IT Governance subcommittee (SC40) to establish a joint working group to 
pursue work on ‘Governance implication of the use of AI by organisations’. 
While the current lack of established standards for algorithmic decision-making systems poses a 
challenge for regulatory authorities seeking references for identifying best-practices, the current 
stage in the standards development process provides opportunities for signalling priority areas to 
the Standards Setting Organisations. 
3.12. Human Rights as foundation for algorithm governance 
Many of the concerns that are driving the demands for algorithmic accountability are directly 
related to (inadvertent) violations of fundamental human rights [36, 48-54, 57, 62-64, 86, 91, 92, 93, 
95]. The algorithmic systems which are automating (complex) procedural tasks, lack the capacity of 
human decision-makers to understand the 'human condition' and notice when a decision would 
infringe upon human rights, unless such a test is deliberately coded by developers into an outcomes 
evaluation routine. The fact that these fears are not wholly unjustified is evident from the large 
number of prominent examples of infringements of human rights that have been reported on, 
ranging from racism [e.g. 485], invasions of privacy [e.g. 486] to interference with freedom of 
expression [e.g. 487], restrictions of due process in criminal justice proceedings [488] and more.  
While many in the technical and academic community discussing these issues have framed these 
problems in the language of concerns around ethical behaviour (while also referring to legal 
concepts of discrimination such as 'differential impact'), human-rights NGOs and researchers have 
started to pick up these issues as a matter of human rights. In May 2018, the leading conference on 
human rights in the digital age, RightsCon [489], featured a dedicated conference track on 'Artificial 
Intelligence, Automation and Algorithmic Accountability' and saw the launch of the 'Toronto 
Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination in machine learning systems' 
[490]. In relation to the establishing of governance frameworks for algorithmic transparency and 
accountability, the key message from the Toronto Declaration is: 
'As discourse around ethics and artificial intelligence continues, this Declaration aims to draw 
attention to the relevant and well-established framework of international human rights law and 
standards. These universal, binding and actionable laws and standards provide tangible means to 
protect individuals from discrimination, to promote inclusion, diversity and equity, and to safeguard 
equality. Human rights are ''universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated''. [490] 
Assessment of both theoretical and practical human rights law based approaches for assessing and 
regulating algorithmic systems were summarised in a submissions by the Human Rights, Big Data 
and Technology project [491] in response to the call for evidence by the UK House of Lords Select 
Committee on Artificial Intelligence [492]. The starting point for this assessment was the observation 
that the international human rights framework is much broader than the right to privacy, freedom 
of expression and association, and equality and non-discrimination, and that it places a legally 
binding obligation on nation states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights [493]. Additionally, 
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under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, businesses have a responsibility to 
respect human rights [493]. 'A human rights-based approach provides a system that can be applied 
to plans, policies and processes in order to ensure that those most centrally affected are considered 
and centrally involved [494, 495]'. Flowing from the obligations and responsibilities imposed by 
human rights law, '[a] human rights-based approach offers increased transparency within policy 
formulations, and 'empowers people and communities to hold those who have a duty to act 
accountable' [496]. At a practical level, McGregor [491] presents the following as 'necessary, specific 
and unique' to a human rights-based approach: 
1. 'Assessment and analysis in order to identify the human rights claims of rights-holders and 
the corresponding human rights obligations of duty-bearers, as well as the immediate, 
underlying, and structural causes of the non-realisation of rights. 
2. [Assessment of the] capacity of rights-holders to claim their rights, and of duty-bearers to 
fulfil their obligations, [followed by the development of] strategies to build these capacities. 
3. [Monitoring and evaluating] both outcomes and processes guided by human rights 
standards and principles. 
4. [Programming, processes, policies and planning are] informed by the recommendations of 
international human rights bodies and mechanisms'. [497] 
To illustrate how a human rights-based approach to accountability would apply in the realm of 
algorithmic decision-making, McGregor [491] described how: '[i]n this context, a human rights-
based approach requires using international human rights standards and norms as a means for 
identifying and defining elements within the algorithm life-cycle that give rise to human rights 
concerns, establishing which entity/entities impact(s) upon which rights, addressing questions of 
responsibility, and identifying how human rights concerns can be addressed'.  
A human rights-based approach to the accountability of algorithmic decision-making, such as 
proposed by McGregor [491] would include tools such as initial and ongoing human rights impact 
assessments to test and review the impact of algorithmic decision-making on human rights.  
'Human rights impact assessments [498] are 'instruments for examining policies, legislation, 
programmes and projects prior to their adoption to identify and measure their impact on human 
rights…They are designed to identify the intended and unintended impact on the enjoyment of 
human rights, and the State's ability to protect and fulfil them. As such, they are a planning tool to 
prevent human rights violations by assessing the formal or apparent compatibility of laws, policies, 
budgets and other measures with human rights obligations, as well as the likely impact in practice, 
thus creating the opportunity for reconsideration, revision or adjustment prior to adoption'. [491] 
3.13. Global dimension to algorithm governance 
One of the defining characteristics of the digital economy and the technologies it is based on, 
including internet platforms, cloud computing and algorithmic systems is the high degree of cross-
boarded and global reach of the services that are built on these technologies. To successfully govern 
these technologies therefore requires a global dialogue and collaboration across borders- among 
both rich and poor countries, to avoid a patchwork of country-specific or regional approaches. In 
this section we review some of the international dimensions of governing algorithmic transparency 
and accountability. 
Geopolitical competition 
The introduction of algorithmic processes to increase machine autonomy and automate much of 
the services sector is now globally accepted to represent a significant shift in society akin to a '4th 
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Industrial Revolution' [499]. This perception has raised the spectre of the sharp rise in economic, 
military and political power of those countries that managed to be the first to industrialise in the 
18th century. Many nations, including the US, China and various EU states have responded to this 
view by publishing ambitious 'National Artificial Intelligence Strategies' [500 intended to ensure that 
they will be among the leaders and winners of this new industrial revolution. This has led some 
commentators to raise alarm over a global 'AI arms race' [e.g. 501, 502, 503] with special concerns 
regarding the dual-use (civilian and military) nature of most algorithmic methods [e.g. 504, 505] and 
their potential application in cyber-operations [506] and Autonomous Weapons Systems [507]. In 
such a competitive environment with a strong 'winner-takes-all' narrative [508] there are strong 
pressures to push for computational efficiency and functional performance of algorithmic systems 
at the cost of non-functional considerations (i.e. considerations that do not directly contribute to 
the ability of the system to perform its task) such as transparency [509]. Within this hyper-
competitive environment, any regulatory intervention to mandate algorithmic transparency is likely 
to be met with similar suspicions of protectionist interventionism as has been the case with the 
GDPR [510, 511]. As a counter point however, the GDPR has also inspired various countries to either 
enact similar legislation, such as Brazil [512], China [513], India [514], South Africa [515], California 
[516], etc.  This has further increased their motivation to join the Council of Europe's Convention 108 
(e.g. Senegal, Mauritius, Tunisia, Cabo Verde, Mexico [517]), which in its modernised form [518] is 
closely aligned with the GDPR and represents the most viable basis for a truly global data privacy 
framework [519]. The example presented by the GDPR suggests that regulatory interventions 
geared towards strong protections of citizen rights can position the EU as a viable leader that many 
states are willing to engage with.  
Racial and cultural bias in algorithms 
Most algorithmic systems are created by relatively homogenous groups of developers [520] using 
data sets that frequently over-represent some groups while under-representing others. The 
ImageNet data set for instance, which is a core data set in the creation of computer vision 
applications, is populated for more than 45% with images from the United States, whereas images 
from China and India together contribute just 3% of the date. This lack of diversity is partially 
responsible for failures of image recognition algorithms that interpret Asians eyes as always 
blinking; are capable of labelling a photograph of a traditional US bride dressed in white as 'bride', 
'dress', 'woman', 'wedding', but a photograph of a North Indian bride as 'performance art' and 
'costume'; and misclassify darker-skinned women's gender with an error rate of 35% while lighter-
skinned men are misclassified at a rate of only 0.8% [521]. While such biases can be relatively easy 
to notice in the case of image recognition systems, other algorithms that are more deeply 
embedded within services may contain severe cultural biases that are difficult to detect without 
access to knowledge about how the system works. An illustrative example of such a bias was 
brought to light in 2016 when it was revealed that the database used by the Facebook Trending 
Topics app (since discontinued), which selected news items to recommend to readers, consisted of 
1000 trusted news sources with many of the world's major news outlets missing from the list and 
many countries, especially in Africa and eastern Europe, not having even a single outlet listed. As a 
result, despite being active in countries around the globe, the recommendations by the Facebook 
Trending Topics app were heavily skewed towards news items reported in Anglophone media [522]. 
In order to limit unintended cultural and/or racial discrimination by algorithmic systems when they 
are deployed in a different societal/cultural context than where they were developed, it may be 
necessary to obtain transparency reports that document how the development team has addressed 
the societal/cultural localisation challenges. 
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Foreign interference 
While the usually unintentional types of algorithmic bias discussed in the previous paragraph can 
introduce undesirable cultural interference, a more sinister and deliberate form of foreign 
interference is represented by: 
1. The targeted use of algorithmic systems, such as social media bots [e.g. 523, 524] and big 
data analytics for psychological micro-targeting of political ads [e.g. 525, 526], to intervene 
in the informational integrity of national electoral processes [527]. 
2. Offensive cyber operations [528] for (corporate) espionage [e.g. 529], disruption of national 
services [e.g. 530] and/or interference in elections [e.g. 531, 532]. 
To counter each of these forms of foreign interference it is vital to establish highly confident 
attribution mechanisms in order to hold the true offending party to account. While national counter-
intelligence work is beyond the scope of this document, it is worth noting the important role that 
transnational bodies such as Europol's Cyber Crime units [533] and NATO's Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence [534] play in vital information coordination in response to cyber 
incidents, 
As was shown by the Cambridge Analytica case [360] (see also section 3.4.1), a further important 
element for combating foreign interference is the ability to obtain cooperation, or when necessary 
legally compel, transparency and accountability from corporate actors (e.g. Facebook in the case of 
Cambridge Analytica incidents) whose algorithmic systems were involved in  information/cyber 
interference operations [535].  
Trade Negotiations 
In the context of the global dynamics of geopolitical interference, algorithmic cultural bias and the 
use of algorithmic systems for foreign interference, it is important to note that current e-commerce 
proposals being discussed at the WTO (as well as regional trade negotiations such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and others) include proposals to protect Intellectual 
Property by restricting access to information regarding proprietary algorithms. The Japanese 
proposal at the WTO for exploratory work on an electronic commerce initiative [536] for instance 
includes a clause on 'Prohibition of Disclosure of Important Information such as Trade Secrets 
Including Source Codes and Proprietary Algorithms.' A similar statement on an electronic commerce 
initiative that was filed on the same day by the United States [537] also includes a clause on 
protection of proprietary information, with sections on Protecting Source Code, Barring Forced 
Technology Transfer and Barring Discriminatory Technology Requirements. The degree to which 
similar clauses in free trade agreements might cause problems for accountability and regulatory 
oversight of algorithmic systems will depend on the details of the agreements that are finally 
produced. It will be necessary to find a workable balancing point between trade secrets and 
transparency, similar to policies in other domains [538]. Agreements may need to indicate what 
factors or metrics of the algorithm would be disclosed, the frequency of their disclosure (e.g., daily, 
monthly, or real-time), and the vehicle for communicating such information (e.g., a separate 
document, or integrated into the algorithmic output in some way).[204] 
International coordination in algorithm governance 
As discussed earlier in this section, many aspects of algorithmic accountability involve global 
transnational interactions between states and globally operating corporate actors. In order to 
structurally address issues of transparency and accountability of algorithmic systems will therefore 
require ongoing coordination at an international level. Current international efforts to deal with 
issues arising from the use of algorithmic systems are highly dispersed across multiple sector-
specific initiatives such as UN led efforts to: 
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- Encourage the development of 'AI for Good' to address the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), managed by ITU. [539] 
- Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, primarily discussed under the banner of the UN 
Convention on certain Conventional Weapons (UNCCW). [540] 
- Multi-stakeholder dialog on ethics and governance of AI/algorithmic systems, in the frame 
of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) under the umbrella of UNESCO. [541] 
But also efforts by the Council of Europe (e.g. Committee of experts on Internet Intermediaries (MSI-
NET) [542]), the Innovation Ministers of the G7 [543] and G20 [544] and the OECD [545]. At the same 
time, bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations are asserting the importance of intellectual 
property rights and trade secrets relative to transparency and accountability. 
In order to establish consistent international governance of algorithmic systems, and establish a 
cooperative alternative to the winner-takes-all arms race narrative it may be necessary to establish 
a new international body, possibly within a UN agency. Such a body could help to coordinate 
national regulations by establishing common interests and values for accountable use of 
algorithmic systems, drawing on existing international human rights standards and norms to 
provide enhanced certainty and ensure international perspectives that are based on universal 
values [e.g. 546, 547].  
Though still at an early stage of development, some efforts towards the establishment of trans-
national coordination on governance of algorithmic systems/AI is starting to emerge at fora such as 
the OECD's Artificial Intelligence Expert Group (AIGO) [548], the World Government Summit's Global 
Governance of AI Roundtable [549], and activities on AI at the Council of Europe [550]. 
Some preliminary analyses on the requirements and potential frameworks for a global coordination 
forum for AI governance have been explored in recent publications by Erdelyi and Goldsmith [551], 
and Wendell and Marchant [552]. Erdelyi and Goldsmith propose an International Artificial 
Intelligence Organization (IAIO), which would serve as international forum for discussion as well as 
international standards setting, similar to the role of the ITU for telecommunications [551]. The 
paper by Wendell and Marchant proposes an approach framed around Global Coordinating 
committees (GCCs) in which an international GCC would work with complementary regional bodies 
to reinforce the governance initiatives of organizations such as the IEEE, WEF, Partnership on AI and 
various research centres [552]. 
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4. Policy options  
Based on our review and analysis of the current literature regarding algorithmic transparency and 
accountability, and the successes, failures and challenges of different governance frameworks that 
have been applied to technological developments (especially in ICT), we propose a set of four policy 
options each of which addresses a different aspect of algorithmic transparency and accountability: 
1. Awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistleblowers. 
2. Accountability in public sector use of algorithmic decision-making. 
3. Regulatory oversight and Legal liability on private sector. 
4. Global dimension of algorithmic governance. 
4.1. Awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistleblowers 
Over a decade of struggle with consent based approaches to data privacy have shown how 
information asymmetries between service providers and consumers have limited the ability of 
citizens to successfully exercise their rights when interacting with digital services [553]. When it 
comes to algorithmic decision-making, the prevailing consensus in the literature suggests that 
consumer/citizens are struggling to understand how these systems work, the impact they are 
having, and how to critically evaluate their decisions [554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561]. The 
same is true for many highly skilled non-technical professionals, e.g. judges and lawyers [562, 563, 
564]. This lack of 'algorithmic literacy' is limiting the ability of people to express agency in their 
interaction with these systems, and thereby undermining the functioning of demand side market 
pressure to self-regulate the sector. In order for algorithmic transparency to enable accountability 
[340, 341, 342]. Any general understanding of algorithmic functioning, however will do little to 
provide accountability unless it is combined with some form of public disclosure about the types 
and properties of the algorithms (and data) associated with a specific decision. In order to be useful 
such notifications should be standardised and short, akin to nutrition labels [20, 346, 347] or 
restaurant inspection scores [204]. Information included in a 'disclosure label' should be limited to 
that which has the potential to either impact an individual user's decision processes, or wider public 
understanding of aggregate system behaviour [340]. Beyond helping citizens to navigate their 
personal interactions with algorithmic decision systems, 'algorithmic literacy' is also important to 
help the understand media reports related to algorithmic decisions, and participate in the public 
dialog about the use of these system. 
Investigative journalism and whistleblowers play an important role in uncovering questionable uses 
and outcomes of algorithmic decision-making, and challenging the lack of accountability. Clear 
examples being the Cambridge Analytica case [360], revelations by Edward Snowden regarding 
questionable reliability of algorithmic targeting of drone strikes [565], the controversy around the 
COMPAS 'recidivism algorithm' used in various US courts [94] and many more [e.g. 361, 362, 363, 
566], including the importance of whistleblowing (through the media) as part of (ex-)employee led 
activism aimed at changing company projects that are perceived to be unethical [245, 246, 249, 250, 
253] (see also appendix 1 on examples of public scrutiny much of which was journalist led). A New 
York Times investigation revealed that ride sharing company Uber used an algorithm to flag and 
evade regulators in cities all over the world. Journalists learned about the algorithm's existence and 
purpose by speaking with current and former Uber employees and reviewing documents these 
sources provided [567]. The Times' investigation led to broad media coverage and a Department of 
Justice inquiry into potential criminal behaviour by the company [568]. 
Beyond their role as independent watchdogs, journalists help to present relevant aspects of 
algorithms to the wider audience in plain language with understandable narratives. Several of the 
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journalistic investigations listed above have sparked broad public conversations and important 
normative debates, including triggering series of academic studies [205]. The Propublica report on 
'Machine Bias' in the COMPAS algorithm [93] for instance triggered a series of studies into the 
meaning of 'fair' and 'unbiased' algorithmic systems [e.g. 569, 570, 571] and the impossibility of 
producing a system that would simultaneously be unbiased on measures of 'overall 
misclassification', 'False Positive rates' and 'False Negative rates' [572]. 
In order to uncover cases of algorithmic 'malpractice' journalists are combining interviews, right to 
information requests, and investigative reporting, with computationally intensive methods for 
reverse engineering algorithms (e.g. 'black box testing') [94, 573], which has developed into a small 
but active field of 'algorithmic accountability journalism' that grew out of the more established field 
of 'data journalism' [204]. The reverse engineering process focuses on the system’s performance in-
use and can therefore tease out consequences that might not be apparent even when the journalist 
speak directly to the designers of the algorithm. Legally however, this reverse engineering of 
commercial software is prohibited by Trade Secrets and the Copyright (e.g. the DMCA in the US). 
Software vendors also typically add anti-reverse engineering clauses to End User License 
Agreements (EULAs),[574] forcing the decision: Is it okay to breach such a contract if it gets you 
closer to the truth about the algorithm? This raises the need for establishing exemption clauses for 
public interest reverse engineering of software by 'algorithmic accountability journalists. Something 
similar to the EU Whistleblower Protection directive that was proposed earlier this year [575]. 
Developing the skills to do algorithmic-accountability reporting takes dedicated efforts to learn the 
computational thinking, programming, and technical skills needed to make sense of algorithmic 
decisions. While there is growing awareness of more complex algorithms among data journalists, 
the number of computational journalists with the technical skills to do a deep investigation of 
algorithms is still rather limited [204]. Supporting computationally literate reporters by providing 
computational infrastructure and tech-savvy computer scientists for then to team up with would 
help to facilitate quality algorithmic accountability reporting. Another way would be to provide 
support (e.g. scholarships and dedicated courses) to train journalists themselves in more 
computational techniques.  
Besides technology skills and the legality of reverse engineering, investigative reporting on 
algorithms also requires an understanding of the ethical questions that arise from the possible 
ramifications of publishing details of how certain algorithms work. Would publishing such 
information negatively affect any individuals? By publishing details of how an algorithm functions, 
specifically information about what inputs it pays attention to, how it uses various criteria in a 
ranking, or what criteria it uses to censor, how might that allow the algorithm to be manipulated or 
circumvented? Who would benefit from that manipulation? [204] In order to help investigative 
journalism of algorithms perform their watchdog function, while minimising negative side-effects 
there should be financial and logistical support for coordinated, fact-checked and vetted algorithms 
journalism, similar to the collaborative journalism efforts behind the publications of the Snowden 
files, the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers. 
Recommendations: 
In order for people to have agency and be able to critically evaluate the results they are given by 
algorithmic systems, they must have a basic understanding of how algorithmic decision-making 
works. We therefore recommend: 
● The provision of 'algorithmic literacy' that teaches core concepts such as: computational 
thinking, the role of data and the importance of optimisation criteria. 
● The introduction of standardised notification practices to communicate the type and 
degree of algorithmic processing involved in decisions. 
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In order for democratic society to function, those in power (political or otherwise) must be held 
accountable. Much of the critical discourse on the use and abuse of algorithmic decision-making 
relies on investigative reporting and whistleblowers to identify the existence of issues such as 
algorithmic bias, manipulation and surveillance etc. We therefore recommend: 
● The provision of computational infrastructure and access to technical experts to support the 
data analysis and algorithm reverse engineering efforts of 'algorithmic accountability 
journalists'. 
● Whistleblower protection (expanding the current EC proposal to include any violation of 
human rights) and protection against prosecution on grounds of breaching copyright or 
Terms of Service when doing so served the public interest. 
4.2. Accountability in public sector use of algorithmic decision-
making 
Algorithmic systems are increasing being used by public authorities to improve efficiencies, 
implement complex processes and support evidence-based policy making. Due to the nature of 
public sector responsibilities, these uses of algorithmic systems have potentially far reaching 
impacts sometimes involving the weakest members of society. The use of algorithmic systems in 
public services therefore requires extra levels of transparency and accountability. Public sector 
procurement is also a major source of business for many companies and as such provides a route 
for incentivising commercial development of transparent and accountably systems. We therefore 
recommend Algorithmic Impact Assessments as part of public sector use and procurement of 
algorithmic systems. 
Algorithmic Impact Assessments is a framework designed to help policymakers and their 
constituents understand where algorithmic systems are used within government, assess the 
intended use and proposed implementation, and allow community members and researchers to 
raise concerns that require mitigation. This framework draws on the history and development of 
assessments in other areas such as environmental policy, privacy law, and data protection. It also 
builds on growing and important research on algorithmic accountability. The framework requires 
public authorities to perform a self-assessment of the algorithmic systems it intends to use and they 
will likely require additional information from vendors in order to perform this assessment 
adequately. In practice the exact steps of an Algorithmic Impact Assessment (AIA) is likely to depend 
on the national context and the sensitivities of the specific public sector branch, however the 
general shape of the process is likely to include the following: 
● Publication of public authority’s definition of 'algorithmic system'. This allows the public to 
understand how the authority decides which systems will be subjected to AIAs. This 
definition must be periodically reviewed and should involve public participation. 
Once the definition has been published and gone through public review, it is used to asses all 
currently used systems, and any bid in response to a tender for procurement of an 'algorithmic 
system' by the public authority. 
1. Public disclosure of purpose, scope, intended use and associated policies/practices, self-
assessment timeline/process and potential implementation timeline of the algorithmic system 
OR publication (and archiving) of the decision not to review a potential system. Publication at 
the start of the assessment process provides opportunity for early external feedback which 
can help to focus the assessment on the most pertinent public concerns. 
2. Performing and publishing of self-assessment of the system with focus on inaccuracies, bias, 
harms to affected communities, and describes mitigation plans for potential impacts. This 
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should include proactive engagement with the public who will be most affected by the 
intended use of the system, in order to better scope the assessment. 
3. Publication of plan for meaningful, ongoing access to external researchers to review the system 
once it is deployed. Even though the AIA attempts to anticipate and mitigate potential 
negative impacts of introducing a algorithmic decision system, it is likely that not all effects 
will be (correctly) anticipated. It is therefore important to make sure that the system is set 
up in a way that facilitates external monitoring at an ongoing basis.   
4. Public participation period. Once the evidence from the self-assessment of the system has 
been collected it needs to be communicated to the public in an understandable way and 
the public has to be given a change to voice their concerns. 
5. Publication of final Algorithmic Impact Assessment, once issues raise in public participation have 
been addressed. Any documents pertaining to the AIA must be made publicly available. 
6. Renewal of AIAs on a regular timeline. Algorithmic systems and how they are used may 
change over time, requiring new rounds of analysis to revisit if those changes significantly 
impacted how the algorithmic system operates. New concerns may come to light that were 
not addressed in the original AIA. Researchers might develop new techniques to analyse 
algorithmic systems the public authority could leverage in a future review. 
7. Opportunity for public to challenge failure to mitigate issues raised in the public participation 
period or foreseeable outcomes. Once the AIA has been finalised, the public should be given 
the opportunity to challenge the public authority’s failure to implement mitigating or 
corrective measures that were raised in the AIA process. The public should also be able to 
challenge the decision when the public authority decides that a system does not meet the 
'algorithmic system' criteria it has set itself for triggering AIAs. 
We therefore recommend: 
● Member states adopt Algorithmic Impact Assessments following the process outlined in this 
report.  
● Member states should work with public authorities to ensure that each agency develops a 
meaningful public education and engagement process to ensure all stakeholders can 
participate in the Algorithmic Impact Assessment. We recommend member states review 
existing recommendations on public engagement including the recommendations that 
were recently submitted to New York City’s Automated Decision Systems Task Force, include 
in Appendix II. 
● Member states must develop and implement accountability and transparency procurement 
requirements for the acquisition of algorithmic systems. Such requirements will allow public 
authorities to have access to necessary technical and other information that will allow the 
authorities to perform a robust Algorithmic Impact Assessment.  
4.3. Regulatory oversight and Legal liability 
Commercial development and application of algorithmic decision-making systems is undergoing 
rapid growth, with at times uncertain implications for citizens and society. Industry standards for 
best practice largely do not yet exist in this space. The interpretation of existing laws is sometimes 
uncertain when applied to algorithmic decision-making, and judicial experience in this context  is in 
short supply. While much of this is simply the result of rapid dynamic growth, this must not be 
allowed to limit the rights and legal protections that citizens (and business customers) are entitled 
to.  
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One approach to protecting citizens from negative impacts arising from algorithmic decision-
making might be to impose on all private sector uses of such systems a similar Algorithmic Impacts 
Assessment regime as we are recommending for public sector authorities. While doing so might 
make sense for high-impact applications, such as autonomous passenger vehicles or political 
elections related services etc., for most private sector applications the financial and administrative 
burden of such a requirement would not be proportionate to the risks. For low-risk uses of 
algorithmic decision-making, defined to a large extent by the reverse-ability of the algorithmic 
decision and the non-permanence of its impacts, it would be preferable to establish a legal liability 
framework that allows service providers to accept greater tort liability in exchange for reduced 
transparency and Algorithmic Impact Assessment requirements. 
In order to facilitate such a tiered regulatory regime, it would be necessary to establish a specialised 
regulatory body with expertise in analysing algorithmic decision-making systems and a network of 
external expert advisors. The primary tasks of the regulatory body would be: 
1. Establishing (and keep updated) a 'threat matrix' [e.g. 576] for assessing the level of 
regulatory oversight that is necessary for an algorithmic decision system. This should be 
based on factors such as: impact of its outputs (human rights implications; scale of use; 
(ir)reversibility of the consequences; etc.); application domain; verify-ability of its behaviour 
(including failure modes); explainability of decision outcomes; transparency of processing; 
etc. 
2. Coordinating with existing domain regulators, e.g. Data Protection Authorities, Consumer 
Protection authorities etc., regarding application of existing laws when products/services 
involve the use of algorithmic decision processes. 
3. Coordinating with Standards Setting Organisations (e.g. ISO/IEC, IEEE), industry and civil-
society organisations to identify relevant standards and best-practices procedures that 
could be used for third-party certification. For some algorithmic systems that have been 
assessed as requiring higher levels of regulatory oversight (but not quite requiring 
Algorithmic Impact Assessments), such certification could become a mandatory 
requirement, similar to CE certification. For less critical systems the certification could serve 
to communicate system trustworthiness to end users and reduce the tort liability of the 
service/product provider. 
4. Facilitating the effectiveness of the tort liability mechanism as means for regulating 
accountability of algorithmic systems by providing a contact point for citizens who are not 
familiar with legal procedures. 
5. Auditing the Algorithmic Impact Assessments of high-level impact systems to approve or 
reject the proposed uses of algorithmic decision-making in highly sensitive and/or safety-
critical application domains (e.g. private health-care). The Algorithmic Impact Assessment 
for private sector applications could follow a very similar process as the one we proposed 
for the public sector, with the possible difference that the various stages of public disclosure 
could be handled as confidential communication to the regulatory body (under non-
disclosure agreement) in order to safeguard vital trade secrets. 
6. Investigating suspected cases of rights violations by algorithmic decision-making systems, 
for both individual decision instances (e.g. singular aberrant outcomes) and statistical 
decision patterns (e.g. discriminatory bias). Investigations could be triggered following the 
lodging of complaints, or on the basis of evidence provided by whistleblowers, investigative 
journalists or independent researchers (including NGOs and academics). 
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We therefore recommend: 
● The creation of a regulatory body for algorithmic decision-making tasked with: 
○ Establishing a risk assessment matrix for classifying algorithm types and application 
domains according to potential for significant negative impact on citizens. 
○ Investigating the use of algorithmic systems where there is a suspicion (e.g. 
evidence provided by a whistleblower) of infringement of human rights. 
○ Advising other regulatory bodies regarding algorithmic systems as they apply to the 
remit of those agencies. 
● That systems classified as causing potentially severe non-reversible impact be required to 
produce an Algorithmic Impact Assessment, similar to public sector applications. 
● That systems with medium severity non-reversible impacts require the service provider to 
accept strict tort liability, with a possibility of reducing the liability by having the system 
certified as compliant with (as yet to be determined) best-practice standards. 
4.4. Global coordination for algorithmic governance 
As with much of the digital economy, the use of algorithmic systems is characterised by a high 
degree of cross-border and global reach of the services that are built on these technologies. To 
successfully govern algorithmic systems therefore requires global dialogue and collaboration across 
borders and among rich and poor countries to avoid a patchwork of country-specific or regional 
approaches. The narrative of a '4th Industrial Revolution' with winner-takes-all dynamics however 
has triggered what some have refer to as an 'AI arms race' [e.g. 501, 502, 503]. In such a hyper-
competitive environment there are strong pressures to push for computational efficiency and 
functional performance of algorithmic systems at the cost of non-functional considerations (i.e. 
considerations that do not directly contribute to the ability of the system to perform its task) such 
as transparency [509]. Without multilateral negotiation there is a risk that under these competitive 
conditions any regulatory intervention to mandate algorithmic transparency may be interpreted as 
protectionist interventionism intended to block market access by foreign companies. In the context 
of these global dynamics, proposals for new e-commerce trade agreement are being discussed at 
the WTO (as well as regional trade negotiations such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) and others), which include clauses for Intellectual Property protection that would 
restrict access to information regarding proprietary algorithms. While the details of such restrictions 
remain to be determined, due care will be required to ensure that such clauses in free trade 
agreements do not cause problems for accountability and regulatory oversight of algorithmic 
systems. 
International tensions also arise from the use of algorithmic systems for social media bots [e.g. 523, 
524], micro-targeting of political ads [e.g. 525, 526] and other interventions in the informational 
integrity of national electoral processes [527], as well as offensive cyber operations [e.g. 528, 529, 
530, 531, 532]. In order to effectively respond to such interference without resorting to bilateral 
escalation of cyber operations, it is important to have a broad international community involved in 
publicly establishing methods and guidelines around attribution of such attacks and defining of 
proportionate responses. 
Though still at an early stage of development, some efforts towards the establishment of trans-
national coordination on governance of algorithmic systems/AI is starting to emerge at fora such as 
the OECD’s Artificial Intelligence Expert Group (AIGO) [548], the World Government Summit’s Global 
Governance of AI Roundtable [549], and activities on AI at the Council of Europe [550]. 
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Building on the international recognition as leader in data privacy legislation that the EU has 
established through the introduction of the GDPR, which is exemplified by the various GDPR 
inspired national privacy laws that are being implemented globally, the EU is currently uniquely 
positioned to take the lead in establishing a new international body to help coordinate approaches 
to algorithmic transparency and accountability at a global level. 
Some preliminary analyses on the requirements and potential frameworks for a global coordination 
forum for AI governance have been explored in recent publications by Erdelyi and Goldsmith [551], 
and Wendell and Marchant [552]. Erdelyi and Goldsmith propose an International Artificial 
Intelligence Organization (IAIO), which would serve as international forum for discussion as well as 
international standards setting, similar to the role of the ITU for telecommunications [553]. The 
paper by Wendell and Marchant proposes an approach framed around Global Coordinating 
committees (GCCs) in which an international GCC would work with complementary regional bodies 
to reinforce the governance initiatives of organizations such as the IEEE, WEF, Partnership on AI and 
various research centres [552]. 
We therefore recommend: 
● The establishment of a permanent global Algorithm Governance Forum (AGF) for multi-
stakeholder dialog and policy expertise related to algorithmic systems, and associated 
technologies. Based on the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation, the AGF 
would provide a forum for coordination and exchanging of governance best-practices 
related to algorithmic decision-making. 
● The adoption of a strong position in trade negotiations to protect regulatory ability to                        
investigate algorithmic systems and hold parties accountable for violations of European 
laws and human rights. 
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5. Conclusions 
Algorithmic decision-making systems play an increasingly important part in public and private 
sector decision-making processes with potentially significant consequences for individuals, 
organisations and societies as a whole. When used appropriately, with due care and analysis of their 
impacts on people's lives, algorithmic systems, including AI and machine learning, have great 
potential to improve the quality and efficiency of products and services. In order to achieve this, 
however, it is vitally necessary to establish clear governance frameworks for transparency and 
accountability to make sure that the risk and benefits are equitably distributed in a way that does 
not unduly burden or benefit particular sectors of society.  Within this context transparency and 
accountability are both tools to promote fair algorithmic decisions by providing the foundations for 
obtaining recourse to meaningful explanation, correction, or ways to ascertain faults that could 
bring about compensatory processes. 
At the level of technical properties of algorithmic systems, there has been a great deal of discourse 
regarding the inscrutability of 'black box' algorithms, especially in relation to machine learning 
systems. It is true that the complexity of the algorithmic processing, combined with the scale and 
variety of data involved in the computations, makes transparency in the sense of 'explaining the 
steps of the algorithm' unlikely to lead directly to an informative outcome. This is especially true 
when the system also involved the use of machine learning methods for inferring statistical models 
directly from the data. There are, however, technical methods for reducing algorithmic opacity, or 
extracting explanations for the system's behaviour despite a lack of transparency. Understanding 
the overall system, and understanding a particular outcome may however require quite different 
approaches. A key idea to keep in mind is the goal of transparency.  Is the aim to understand how 
the system works or how it behaves? For an understanding of the overall system, i.e. to obtain a 
general understanding of the algorithmic decision-making process, approaches include: 
design/code review; input data analysis; statistical analysis of outcomes; analysis of sensitivity to 
inputs. One challenge with these approaches is that they are likely to be difficult or impossible 
without direct involvement of system developers. Understanding how a system works is likely of 
little value for the transparency of individual outcomes. In that case approaches providing 
explanation become more important. Meaningful transparency into how outcomes are reached is 
technically challenging given modern computing systems; regulatory requirements for such 
transparency may significantly limit the ability to use advanced computing techniques for regulated 
purposes.  Meaningful transparency into the behaviour of computing systems is feasible, and can 
provide important benefits.  Mechanisms for behavioural transparency may need to be designed 
into systems, and typically require the participation of system developers or operators. Algorithmic 
accountability, such as redress in cases of unfair treatment, are beyond the technical challenges of 
the algorithm. These are more a question of the actions implied by the specifications and the 
organisational structure surrounding the algorithmic system. While accountability for actions taken 
by algorithmic systems may need to be different than for human actions, those differences are 
largely governed by the particular application.  
At a high level, the fast pace of developments and the absence of clearly established best practice 
technology standards suggests that a governance framework following a flexible principles-based 
approach is likely to provide a better balance than a rules-based approach for protecting the 
fundamental rights of citizens while retaining freedom to innovate new algorithmic methods. 
Based on a systematic consideration of each of five governance categories (demand-side market 
solutions; supply-side market solutions; companies' self organisation; branches' self-regulation; co-
regulation; and state intervention) it is concluded that the dynamics of the digital economy do not 
currently lend themselves to demand-side or supply-side market solutions for improving 
algorithmic transparency or accountability. While there are efforts at self organisation relating to the 
ethics of algorithmic decision making, there is currently no convincing evidence that these will be 
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sufficient to provide the necessary safeguards for citizens. Branch self-regulation, or possibly co-
regulation through supervisory involvement from regulatory agencies, is starting to take shape in 
this sector but will require the establishment of industry standards that are currently still in 
development. Schemes for certifying that algorithmic decision systems do not exhibit unjustified 
bias are also being developed. Overall, however, a role can be found for state intervention to guide 
innovation towards a greater focus on transparent, explainable and accountable methods. The type 
and level of state intervention should be carefully adjusted to match the algorithmic accountability 
required within the context of the good, harm and risk these systems bring. Despite problems with 
consent mechanisms for data privacy, information measures including algorithmic literacy 
education, 'food label' style notification of algorithmic decisions and scrutiny by investigative 
journalism (including whistleblowers) remain vital elements for delivering democratic agency to the 
citizen. Funding incentives for research into explainable decision-making algorithms, as well as 
investigations into the impact of algorithmic systems on society would also provide important 
stimuli for greater algorithmic accountability. Probably one of the most important direct incentives 
related to financial incentives is the role of public service procurement of algorithmic systems. Here 
there is strong potential to push for greater transparency and accountability by introducing 
measures such as algorithmic impact assessment requirements for systems that have a significant 
impact on the public. Such requirements are in keeping with the democratic responsibilities of 
public service provision. At the level of direct intervention through legislative means or regulatory 
bodies there is potential for an approach that combines risk assessment by a regulatory body with 
corresponding levels of tort liability. 
As a final element in the assessment of governance frameworks for algorithmic systems the global 
nature of developments in algorithmic decision-making and the need for global coordination are 
highlighted. 
In order to implement these assessments, four mutually reinforcing policy options are proposed, 
addressing:   
1. awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistleblowers; 
2. accountability in public sector use of algorithmic decision-making; 
3. regulatory oversight and legal liability of the private sector; and 
4. the global dimension of algorithmic governance. 
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Beginning with an analysis of the social, technical and 
regulatory challenges posed by algorithmic systems, 
this study explores policy options for the governance of 
algorithmic transparency and accountability. An 
extensive review and analysis of existing proposals for 
algorithmic system governance points to four policy 
options, addressing awareness raising, accountability in 
public sector use, regulatory oversight, and global 
coordination for algorithmic governance.  
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